From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>,
<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <bwidawsk@kernel.org>,
<ira.weiny@intel.com>, <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
<alison.schofield@intel.com>, <dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 12/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 15:25:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221107152543.00001128@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166377436014.430546.12077333298585882653.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>
On Wed, 21 Sep 2022 08:32:40 -0700
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> wrote:
> Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->erase()
> callback. Translate the operation to send "Passphrase Secure Erase"
> security command for CXL memory device.
>
> When the mem device is secure erased, arch_invalidate_nvdimm_cache() is
> called in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access
> the mem device again.
>
> See CXL 2.0 spec section 8.2.9.5.6.6 for reference.
Update references now 3.0 is out.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
A few minor things inline.
> ---
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 1 +
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 8 ++++++++
> drivers/cxl/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index 243b01e2de85..88538a7ccc83 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
> CXL_CMD(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
> CXL_CMD(FREEZE_SECURITY, 0, 0, 0),
> CXL_CMD(UNLOCK, 0x20, 0, 0),
> + CXL_CMD(PASSPHRASE_ERASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 4e6897e8eb7d..1266df3b2d3d 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
> CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK = 0x4503,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY = 0x4504,
> + CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_ERASE = 0x4505,
Hmm. Name is a bit ambiguous. Is it erasing the passphrase or the data?
Perhaps full
CXL_MBOX_O_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE is a little better?
> CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000
> };
>
> @@ -400,6 +401,13 @@ struct cxl_disable_pass {
> u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
> } __packed;
>
> +/* passphrase erase payload */
Same here.
> +struct cxl_pass_erase {
> + u8 type;
> + u8 reserved[31];
> + u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
> +} __packed;
> +
> enum {
> CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER = 0,
> CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER,
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c
> index 8bfdcb58d381..df4cf26e366a 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c
> @@ -128,12 +128,41 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
> + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key,
> + enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype)
> +{
> + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd;
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + struct cxl_pass_erase erase;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + erase.type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ?
> + CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER;
> + memcpy(erase.pass, key->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
> + /* Flush all cache before we erase mem device */
> + cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> + rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_ERASE,
extra space.
> + &erase, sizeof(erase), NULL, 0);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return rc;
> +
> + /* mem device erased, invalidate all CPU caches before data is read */
> + cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = {
> .get_flags = cxl_pmem_get_security_flags,
> .change_key = cxl_pmem_security_change_key,
> .disable = cxl_pmem_security_disable,
> .freeze = cxl_pmem_security_freeze,
> .unlock = cxl_pmem_security_unlock,
> + .erase = cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase,
> };
>
> const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> index 95dca8d4584f..6da25f2e1bf9 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
> ___C(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, "Disable Passphrase"), \
> ___C(FREEZE_SECURITY, "Freeze Security"), \
> ___C(UNLOCK, "Unlock"), \
> + ___C(PASSPHRASE_ERASE, "Passphrase Secure Erase"), \
> ___C(MAX, "invalid / last command")
>
> #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-07 15:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-21 15:31 [PATCH v2 00/19] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] memregion: Add cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() interface Dave Jiang
2022-10-13 0:14 ` [PATCH v3] " Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 21:07 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-04 12:28 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:06 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-04 13:56 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:09 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 14:36 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 14:44 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 19:01 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:27 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 21:49 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-11-07 14:55 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:00 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:15 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 21:23 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-29 16:56 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-11-07 15:25 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2022-11-07 20:19 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:35 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 21:58 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:38 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] cxl/pmem: add id attribute to CXL based nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:41 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] tools/testing/cxl: add mechanism to lock mem device for testing Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:56 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 22:33 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] cxl/pmem: add provider name to cxl pmem dimm attribute group Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:58 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 23:46 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] libnvdimm: Introduce CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 16:01 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 23:46 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] cxl: add dimm_id support for __nvdimm_create() Dave Jiang
2022-09-23 10:31 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-23 16:18 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 16:05 ` Jonathan Cameron
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