From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>,
<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
<dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 11/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 10:33:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221111103315.00006a4b@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166792838491.3767969.5093666840089372918.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>
On Tue, 08 Nov 2022 10:26:24 -0700
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> wrote:
> Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->erase()
> callback. Translate the operation to send "Passphrase Secure Erase"
> security command for CXL memory device.
>
> When the mem device is secure erased, cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is
> called in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access
> the mem device again.
>
> See CXL 3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.6 for reference.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
> ---
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 1 +
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 8 ++++++++
> drivers/cxl/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index 243b01e2de85..4a99d2b1049e 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
> CXL_CMD(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
> CXL_CMD(FREEZE_SECURITY, 0, 0, 0),
> CXL_CMD(UNLOCK, 0x20, 0, 0),
> + CXL_CMD(PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 4e6897e8eb7d..75baeb0bbe57 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
> CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK = 0x4503,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY = 0x4504,
> + CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4505,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000
> };
>
> @@ -400,6 +401,13 @@ struct cxl_disable_pass {
> u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
> } __packed;
>
> +/* passphrase secure erase payload */
> +struct cxl_pass_erase {
> + u8 type;
> + u8 reserved[31];
> + u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
> +} __packed;
> +
> enum {
> CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER = 0,
> CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER,
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c
> index cf20d58ac1b3..631a474939d6 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c
> @@ -128,12 +128,41 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
> + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key,
> + enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype)
> +{
> + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd;
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + struct cxl_pass_erase erase;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + erase.type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ?
> + CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER;
> + memcpy(erase.pass, key->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
> + /* Flush all cache before we erase mem device */
> + cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> + rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
> + &erase, sizeof(erase), NULL, 0);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return rc;
> +
> + /* mem device erased, invalidate all CPU caches before data is read */
> + cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = {
> .get_flags = cxl_pmem_get_security_flags,
> .change_key = cxl_pmem_security_change_key,
> .disable = cxl_pmem_security_disable,
> .freeze = cxl_pmem_security_freeze,
> .unlock = cxl_pmem_security_unlock,
> + .erase = cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase,
> };
>
> const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> index 95dca8d4584f..82bdad4ce5de 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
> ___C(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, "Disable Passphrase"), \
> ___C(FREEZE_SECURITY, "Freeze Security"), \
> ___C(UNLOCK, "Unlock"), \
> + ___C(PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, "Passphrase Secure Erase"), \
> ___C(MAX, "invalid / last command")
>
> #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-11 10:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-08 17:25 [PATCH v3 00/18] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:31 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:33 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:37 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-14 18:15 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:39 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] cxl/pmem: add id attribute to CXL based nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:39 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] tools/testing/cxl: add mechanism to lock mem device for testing Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:40 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-08 17:26 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] cxl/pmem: add provider name to cxl pmem dimm attribute group Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:41 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-08 17:27 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] libnvdimm: Introduce CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:43 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-08 17:27 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] cxl: add dimm_id support for __nvdimm_create() Dave Jiang
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