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From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>,
	<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
	<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	<dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 19/20] acpi/nfit: bypass cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() when in test config
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 11:22:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221201112226.000069fe@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166983619896.2734609.7192339006218947870.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>

On Wed, 30 Nov 2022 12:23:18 -0700
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> wrote:

> Bypass cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() and checks when doing testing
> using CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag. The bypass allows testing on
> QEMU where cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() fails. 

We should probably look at what is required to get that to not fail on QEMU
at least when running fully emulated on x86.

Longer term we'll figure out other architecture solutions for this...

FWIW this looks consistent with what you are aiming to do so.
So subject to the usual I've no idea how this intel specific code works in
general, so only focusing on the corner this patch touches...

Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>


Jonathan


> Usage of
> cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is not needed for nfit_test security
> testing.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
> ---
>  drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c
> index fa0e57e35162..38069f10c316 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c
> @@ -191,6 +191,39 @@ static int intel_security_change_key(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static bool intel_has_invalidate_memregion(struct nvdimm *nvdimm)
> +{
> +	struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
> +	struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = nfit_mem->acpi_desc;
> +	struct device *dev = acpi_desc->dev;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion()) {
> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST)) {
> +			dev_warn_once(dev,
> +				      "Bypassing cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() check for testing!\n");
> +			return true;
> +		}
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +static void intel_invalidate_memregion(struct nvdimm *nvdimm)
> +{
> +	struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
> +	struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = nfit_mem->acpi_desc;
> +	struct device *dev = acpi_desc->dev;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST)) {
> +		dev_warn_once(dev,
> +			      "Bypassing cpu_cache_invalidate_memergion() for testing!\n");
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> +}
> +
>  static int __maybe_unused intel_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  		const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data)
>  {
> @@ -212,7 +245,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  	if (!test_bit(NVDIMM_INTEL_UNLOCK_UNIT, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask))
>  		return -ENOTTY;
>  
> -	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> +	if (!intel_has_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	memcpy(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase, key_data->data,
> @@ -230,7 +263,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  	}
>  
>  	/* DIMM unlocked, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */
> -	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> +	intel_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm);
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -299,11 +332,11 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  	if (!test_bit(cmd, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask))
>  		return -ENOTTY;
>  
> -	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> +	if (!intel_has_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	/* flush all cache before we erase DIMM */
> -	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> +	intel_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm);
>  	memcpy(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase, key->data,
>  			sizeof(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase));
>  	rc = nvdimm_ctl(nvdimm, ND_CMD_CALL, &nd_cmd, sizeof(nd_cmd), NULL);
> @@ -323,7 +356,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  	}
>  
>  	/* DIMM erased, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */
> -	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> +	intel_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -346,7 +379,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_query_overwrite(struct nvdimm *nvdimm)
>  	if (!test_bit(NVDIMM_INTEL_QUERY_OVERWRITE, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask))
>  		return -ENOTTY;
>  
> -	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> +	if (!intel_has_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	rc = nvdimm_ctl(nvdimm, ND_CMD_CALL, &nd_cmd, sizeof(nd_cmd), NULL);
> @@ -363,7 +396,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_query_overwrite(struct nvdimm *nvdimm)
>  	}
>  
>  	/* flush all cache before we make the nvdimms available */
> -	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> +	intel_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -388,11 +421,11 @@ static int __maybe_unused intel_security_overwrite(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>  	if (!test_bit(NVDIMM_INTEL_OVERWRITE, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask))
>  		return -ENOTTY;
>  
> -	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> +	if (!intel_has_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	/* flush all cache before we erase DIMM */
> -	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
> +	intel_invalidate_memregion(nvdimm);
>  	memcpy(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase, nkey->data,
>  			sizeof(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase));
>  	rc = nvdimm_ctl(nvdimm, ND_CMD_CALL, &nd_cmd, sizeof(nd_cmd), NULL);
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-01 11:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-30 19:21 [PATCH v7 00/20] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:21 ` [PATCH v7 01/20] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 15:09   ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-03-01 23:06     ` [PATCH] cxl: fix compile warning for cxl_security_ops extern Dave Jiang
2023-03-02  0:17       ` Alison Schofield
2023-08-16 18:07         ` Alison Schofield
2023-03-03 12:15       ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-08-04 18:02       ` Alison Schofield
2022-11-30 19:21 ` [PATCH v7 02/20] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:21 ` [PATCH v7 03/20] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:21 ` [PATCH v7 04/20] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:21 ` [PATCH v7 05/20] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 06/20] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 07/20] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 08/20] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 09/20] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 10/20] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 11/20] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 12/20] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 13/20] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 14/20] cxl/pmem: add id attribute to CXL based nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:22 ` [PATCH v7 15/20] tools/testing/cxl: add mechanism to lock mem device for testing Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:23 ` [PATCH v7 16/20] cxl/pmem: add provider name to cxl pmem dimm attribute group Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:23 ` [PATCH v7 17/20] libnvdimm: Introduce CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 19:23 ` [PATCH v7 18/20] cxl: bypass cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() when in test config Dave Jiang
2022-11-30 22:16   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-11-30 23:54     ` Dan Williams
2022-12-01  1:51       ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-12-01  3:05         ` Dan Williams
2022-12-01 11:11   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-30 19:23 ` [PATCH v7 19/20] acpi/nfit: " Dave Jiang
2022-12-01 11:22   ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2022-11-30 19:23 ` [PATCH v7 20/20] cxl: add dimm_id support for __nvdimm_create() Dave Jiang
2022-12-01  2:20   ` Dan Williams

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