From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <fan.ni@samsung.com>,
<a.manzanares@samsung.com>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support device sanitation
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2023 16:51:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230613165130.00006259@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230613162611.00007b0b@Huawei.com>
On Tue, 13 Jun 2023 16:26:11 +0100
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com> wrote:
> Hi Davidlohr,
>
> > Testing.
> > ========
> >
> > o There are the mock device tests for Sanitize and Secure Erase.
> >
> > o The latest (v2) qemu bg/sanitize support series is posted here:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/20230418172337.19207-1-dave@stgolabs.net/
>
> That doesn't seem to have support for reading back the security state so
> the stuff this set adds fails before it gets going.
> Am I missing another series?
>
I hacked in enough to get things to carry on...
Following might be something I've broken locally but on basis
it might not... Note my QEMU is odd right now as I'm in middle
of a big refactor of the CCI handling, but this should still not happen
even if I happen to have broken QEMU side of things in some weird way.
My base is more or less mainline + background set as queued on CXL
tree plus this set.
However similar traces to below happen when I poke a 1 into
sanitize
This appears to be:
WARN_ON_ONCE(timer->function != delayed_work_timer_fn);
then
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&work->entry));
triggering.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 617 at kernel/workqueue.c:1663 __queue_delayed_work+0xb8/0xe8
Modules linked in: cxl_pmem cxl_mem cxl_port cxl_pmu cxl_acpi cxl_pci cxl_core
CPU: 3 PID: 617 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6+ #790
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown unknown
pstate: 014000c5 (nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __queue_delayed_work+0xb8/0xe8
lr : queue_delayed_work_on+0x70/0x98
sp : ffff800008a23b10
x29: ffff800008a23b10 x28: ffff0000f6de5880 x27: ffff0000c14d9c80
x26: ffff8000085510a8 x25: ffff0000c0a490d0 x24: ffff0000c14d9cd8
x23: ffff800008a23da8 x22: fffffffffffffff2 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffba73a9885008 x15: 0000aaaad5a0b6b0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffba73a9885078
x8 : ffff800008a23c98 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffffba73a9884ea8 x4 : 0000000000000100 x3 : 00000000000000fa
x2 : ffff0000c14d9e98 x1 : ffff0000c0028600 x0 : ffff0000c14d9eb8
Call trace:
__queue_delayed_work+0xb8/0xe8
queue_delayed_work_on+0x70/0x98
cxl_pci_mbox_send+0x404/0x580 [cxl_pci]
cxl_internal_send_cmd+0x48/0x110 [cxl_core]
cxl_mem_sanitize+0xbc/0x140 [cxl_core]
security_sanitize_store+0x98/0xf0 [cxl_core]
dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40
sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x68
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x200
vfs_write+0x1ac/0x2e8
ksys_write+0x74/0x110
__arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x58/0xf8
do_el0_svc+0x60/0x168
el0_svc+0x38/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-13 15:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-12 18:10 [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/mbox: Allow for IRQ_NONE case in the isr Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 12:49 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 18:11 ` Dave Jiang
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/mem: Introduce security state sysfs file Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 18:12 ` Dave Jiang
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/mbox: Add sanitation handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 16:07 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 16:28 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-14 8:36 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-25 22:13 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-26 18:17 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:18 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:34 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add Sanitize opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add Secure Erase opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 15:26 ` [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support device sanitation Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 15:51 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2023-06-13 16:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:44 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-26 21:32 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-26 22:47 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-27 8:02 ` [PATCH] cxl/pci: Use correct flag for sanitize polling Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-27 23:01 ` Dan Williams
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