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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>, <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <dave.jiang@intel.com>, <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
	<Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>, <fan.ni@samsung.com>,
	<a.manzanares@samsung.com>, <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	<linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support
Date: Sun, 25 Jun 2023 15:34:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6498c0ec8cc41_8e1782946e@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230612181038.14421-5-dave@stgolabs.net>

Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> Implement support for CXL 3.0 8.2.9.8.5.1 Sanitize. This is done by
> adding a security/sanitize' memdev sysfs file to trigger the operation
> and extend the status file to make it poll(2)-capable for completion.
> Unlike all other background commands, this is the only operation that
> is special and monopolizes the device for long periods of time.
> 
> In addition to the traditional pmem security requirements, all regions
> must also be offline in order to perform the operation. This permits
> avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead on
> attach_target() setting CXL_REGION_F_INCOHERENT upon reconnect.

CXL_REGION_F_INCOHERENT is going away, but the sentiment still holds. I
will update this to:

"This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying
instead on the implict cache management when a region transitions
between CXL_CONFIG_ACTIVE and CXL_CONFIG_COMMIT."

> 
> The expectation is that userspace can use it such as:
> 
>     cxl disable-memdev memX
>     echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/sanitize

I assume this will become 'cxl sanitize-memdev' and handle all the busy
reporting etc for the user?

>     cxl wait-sanitize memX
>     cxl enable-memdev memX
> 
> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 21 +++++++-
>  drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  4 ++
>  drivers/cxl/pci.c                       |  6 +++
>  5 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index 721a44d8a482..5753cba98692 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -64,8 +64,25 @@ KernelVersion:	v6.5
>  Contact:	linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
>  Description:
>  		(RO) Reading this file will display the CXL security state for
> -		that device. Such states can be: 'disabled', or those available
> -		only for persistent memory: 'locked', 'unlocked' or 'frozen'.
> +		that device. Such states can be: 'disabled', 'sanitize', when
> +		a sanitation is currently underway; or those available only
> +		for persistent memory: 'locked', 'unlocked' or 'frozen'. This
> +		sysfs entry is select/poll capable from userspace to notify
> +		upon completion of a sanitize operation.
> +
> +
> +What:           /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/sanitize
> +Date:           June, 2023
> +KernelVersion:  v6.5
> +Contact:        linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> +		(WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> +		sanitize the device to securely re-purpose or decommission it.
> +		This is done by ensuring that all user data and meta-data,
> +		whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
> +		or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
> +		is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires
> +		the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.

I notice this attribute is unconditionally available. It would be nice
to hide it on devices that do not support the optional sanitize command.

This is a minor fixup that just needs to be in place before v6.5-final.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-25 22:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-12 18:10 [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/mbox: Allow for IRQ_NONE case in the isr Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 12:49   ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 18:11   ` Dave Jiang
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/mem: Introduce security state sysfs file Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 18:12   ` Dave Jiang
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/mbox: Add sanitation handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 16:07   ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 16:28     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-14  8:36       ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-25 22:13   ` Dan Williams
2023-06-26 18:17     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:18   ` Dan Williams
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:34   ` Dan Williams [this message]
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add Sanitize opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add Secure Erase opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-13 15:26 ` [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support device sanitation Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 15:51   ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-13 16:25     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:44 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-26 21:32   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-26 22:47     ` Dan Williams
2023-06-27  8:02       ` [PATCH] cxl/pci: Use correct flag for sanitize polling Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-27 23:01         ` Dan Williams
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-04-21  9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21  9:23 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 20:04   ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 20:24   ` kernel test robot
2023-05-11 15:07   ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 17:23     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:00       ` Jonathan Cameron

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