From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
<alison.schofield@intel.com>, <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <fan.ni@samsung.com>,
<a.manzanares@samsung.com>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support
Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 16:07:41 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230511160741.00004531@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421092321.12741-5-dave@stgolabs.net>
On Fri, 21 Apr 2023 02:23:18 -0700
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> wrote:
> Implement support for CXL 3.0 8.2.9.8.5.1 Sanitize. This is done by
> adding a security/sanitize' memdev sysfs file, which is poll(2)-capable
> for completion. Unlike all other background commands, this is the
> only operation that is special and monopolizes the device for long
> periods of time.
>
> In addition to the traditional pmem security requirements, all regions
> must also be offline in order to perform the operation.
> This permits
> avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead on
> attach_target() setting CXL_REGION_F_INCOHERENT upon reconnect.
>
> The expectation is that userspace can use it such as:
>
> cxl disable-memdev memX
> echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/sanitize
> cxl wait-sanitize memX
> cxl enable-memdev memX
>
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 19 ++++++
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++
> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 4 ++
> drivers/cxl/pci.c | 5 ++
> 5 files changed, 170 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index 3acf2f17a73f..2e98ec9220ca 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -58,6 +58,25 @@ Description:
> affinity for this device.
>
>
> +What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/sanitize
> +Date: May, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.5
> +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> + (RW) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> + sanitize the device to securely re-purpose or decommission it.
> + This is done by ensuring that all user data and meta-data,
> + whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
> + or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
> + is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires
> + the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
> +
> + Reading this file shows either "disabled" when not running, or
> + "sanitize" during the duration of the sanitize operation. This
> + sysfs entry is select/poll capable from userspace to notify upon
> + completion.
A sysfs attribute that reads different from what is written is not very intuitive.
The one file one thing rule suggests to me that you should have a separate
santize_status or similar. Or just have this read true when in progress making
it a self resetting toggle that returns -EBUSY if anyone tries to unset it.
> +
> +
> What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
> Date: June, 2021
> KernelVersion: v5.14
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index cde7270c6037..28daf7dcdec4 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -1021,6 +1021,62 @@ int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_dev_state_identify, CXL);
>
> +/**
> + * cxl_mem_sanitize() - Send a sanitation command to the device.
> + * @cxlds: The device data for the operation
> + * @cmd: The specific sanitation command opcode
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if the command was executed successfully, regardless of
> + * whether or not the actual security operation is done in the background,
> + * such as for the Sanitize case.
> + * Error return values can be the result of the mailbox command, -EINVAL
> + * when security requirements are not met or invalid contexts, or -EBUSY
> + * if the device is not offline.
What does offline mean for the device? Perhaps a tighter definition needed.
> + *
> + * See CXL 3.0 @8.2.9.8.5.1 Sanitize and @8.2.9.8.5.2 Secure Erase.
This @ syntax would be fine but it's inconsistent with other references in
this file.
> + */
> +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + u32 sec_out = 0;
> + struct cxl_get_security_output {
> + __le32 flags;
> + } out;
> + struct cxl_mbox_cmd sec_cmd = {
> + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
> + .payload_out = &out,
> + .size_out = sizeof(out),
> + };
> + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd };
> +
> + if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to get security state : %d", rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Prior to using these commands, any security applied to
> + * the user data areas of the device shall be DISABLED (or
> + * UNLOCKED for secure erase case).
> + */
> + sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags);
> + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_sanitize, CXL);
> +
> static int add_dpa_res(struct device *dev, struct resource *parent,
> struct resource *res, resource_size_t start,
> resource_size_t size, const char *type)
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index 28a05f2fe32d..70e7158826c9 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,55 @@ static ssize_t pmem_size_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> static struct device_attribute dev_attr_pmem_size =
> __ATTR(size, 0444, pmem_size_show, NULL);
>
> +static ssize_t security_sanitize_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + u64 reg = readq(cxlds->regs.mbox + CXLDEV_MBOX_BG_CMD_STATUS_OFFSET);
> + u32 pct = FIELD_GET(CXLDEV_MBOX_BG_CMD_COMMAND_PCT_MASK, reg);
> + u16 cmd = FIELD_GET(CXLDEV_MBOX_BG_CMD_COMMAND_OPCODE_MASK, reg);
> +
> + if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && pct != 100)
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "sanitize\n");
> + else
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "disabled\n");
As above. I don't like inconsistency of read and write values.
> +}
> +
> +static ssize_t security_sanitize_store(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr,
> + const char *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + ssize_t rc;
> + bool sanitize;
> +
> + rc = kstrtobool(buf, &sanitize);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (sanitize) {
I'd short cut the false case
if (!sanitize)
return len;
...
> + struct cxl_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev);
> +
> + if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /* ensure no regions are mapped to this memdev */
> + if (port->commit_end != -1)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return len;
Simple flow is easier for reviewers to follow.
> + }
> +
> + if (rc == 0)
> + rc = len;
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> @@ -324,11 +384,19 @@ static const struct file_operations cxl_memdev_fops = {
> .llseek = noop_llseek,
> };
>
> +static void put_sanitize(void *data)
> +{
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = data;
> +
> + sysfs_put(cxlds->sec.sanitize_state);
> +}
> +
> struct cxl_memdev *devm_cxl_add_memdev(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> {
> struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd;
> struct device *dev;
> struct cdev *cdev;
> + struct kernfs_node *sec;
> int rc;
>
> cxlmd = cxl_memdev_alloc(cxlds, &cxl_memdev_fops);
> @@ -355,6 +423,24 @@ struct cxl_memdev *devm_cxl_add_memdev(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> rc = devm_add_action_or_reset(cxlds->dev, cxl_memdev_unregister, cxlmd);
> if (rc)
> return ERR_PTR(rc);
> +
> + sec = sysfs_get_dirent(dev->kobj.sd, "security");
> + if (!sec) {
> + dev_err(dev, "sysfs_get_dirent 'security' failed\n");
> + rc = -ENODEV;
> + goto err;
At this stage the devm action is registered to unwind anything above here, so just
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
> + }
> + cxlds->sec.sanitize_state = sysfs_get_dirent(sec, "sanitize");
> + sysfs_put(sec);
> + if (!cxlds->sec.sanitize_state) {
> + dev_err(dev, "sysfs_get_dirent 'sanitize' failed\n");
> + rc = -ENODEV;
> + goto err;
return ERR_PTR(-ENODDEV);
> + }
> + rc = devm_add_action_or_reset(cxlds->dev, put_sanitize, cxlds);
> + if (rc)
> + return ERR_PTR(rc);
> +
> return cxlmd;
>
> err:
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 17e3ab3c641a..9bd33cfdc0ec 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -223,10 +223,12 @@ struct cxl_event_state {
> /**
> * struct cxl_security_state - Device security state
> *
> + * @sanitize_state: sanitation sysfs file to notify
> * @sanitize_dwork: self-polling work item for sanitation
> * @sanitize_tmo: self-polling timeout
> */
> struct cxl_security_state {
> + struct kernfs_node *sanitize_state;
> /* below only used if device mbox irqs are not supported */
> struct delayed_work sanitize_dwork;
> int sanitize_tmo;
> @@ -642,6 +644,8 @@ static inline void cxl_mem_active_dec(void)
> }
> #endif
>
> +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd);
> +
> struct cxl_hdm {
> struct cxl_component_regs regs;
> unsigned int decoder_count;
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/pci.c b/drivers/cxl/pci.c
> index bdee5273af5a..2bc3b595f270 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/pci.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/pci.c
> @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ static irqreturn_t cxl_pci_mbox_irq(int irq, void *id)
> opcode = FIELD_GET(CXLDEV_MBOX_BG_CMD_COMMAND_OPCODE_MASK, reg);
>
> if (opcode == CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE) {
> + if (cxlds->sec.sanitize_state)
> + sysfs_notify_dirent(cxlds->sec.sanitize_state);
> +
> dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "Sanitation operation ended\n");
> } else {
> /* short-circuit the wait in __cxl_pci_mbox_send_cmd() */
> @@ -138,6 +141,8 @@ static void cxl_mbox_sanitize_work(struct work_struct *work)
> if (cxl_mbox_background_complete(cxlds)) {
> cxlds->sec.sanitize_tmo = 0;
> put_device(cxlds->dev);
> + if (cxlds->sec.sanitize_state)
> + sysfs_notify_dirent(cxlds->sec.sanitize_state);
>
> dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "Sanitation operation ended\n");
> } else {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-11 15:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-21 9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/pci: Allocate irq vectors earlier in pci probe Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 16:09 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-11 13:55 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/mbox: Add background cmd handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-23 7:54 ` Li, Ming
2023-04-23 20:51 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 16:21 ` Dave Jiang
2023-04-28 17:18 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 21:04 ` Dave Jiang
2023-04-28 22:03 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-01 15:56 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 14:23 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 16:04 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:05 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/mbox: Add sanitation " Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 16:43 ` Dave Jiang
2023-04-28 16:46 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 17:37 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-11 14:45 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 16:48 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:02 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 20:04 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 20:24 ` kernel test robot
2023-05-11 15:07 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2023-05-11 17:23 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:00 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add Sanitize opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:09 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 15:13 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:10 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add Secure Erase opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:10 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-23 2:05 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-06-12 18:10 [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support " Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-25 22:34 ` Dan Williams
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