From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
<alison.schofield@intel.com>, <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <fan.ni@samsung.com>,
<a.manzanares@samsung.com>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase
Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 16:10:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230511161027.00005413@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421092321.12741-7-dave@stgolabs.net>
On Fri, 21 Apr 2023 02:23:20 -0700
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> wrote:
> Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive secure erase, per
> CXL specs. Create a write-only 'security/erase' sysfs file to
> perform the requested operation.
>
> As with the sanitation this requires the device being offline
> and thus no active HPA-DPA decoding.
>
> The expectation is that userspace can use it such as:
>
> cxl disable-memdev memX
> echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
> cxl enable-memdev memX
>
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 10 ++++++++
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 ++++-
> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index 2e98ec9220ca..af7b603faf77 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ Description:
> completion.
>
>
> +What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
> +Date: May, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.5
> +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> + (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> + secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
> + all user data areas of the device.
> +
> +
> What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
> Date: June, 2021
> KernelVersion: v5.14
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index 28daf7dcdec4..a2180f3e09eb 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
> };
> struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd };
>
> - if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE)
> + if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
> @@ -1067,6 +1067,10 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
> if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE &&
> + sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
> if (rc < 0) {
> dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc);
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index 70e7158826c9..6406e8e47da2 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -138,6 +138,39 @@ static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize =
> __ATTR(sanitize, 0644,
> security_sanitize_show, security_sanitize_store);
>
> +static ssize_t security_erase_store(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr,
> + const char *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + ssize_t rc;
> + bool erase;
> +
> + rc = kstrtobool(buf, &erase);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (erase) {
As with earlier patch, I'd flip the logic.
> + struct cxl_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev);
> +
> + if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /* ensure no regions are mapped to this memdev */
> + if (port->commit_end != -1)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE);
and use a simple error check here.
> + }
> +
> + if (rc == 0)
> + rc = len;
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_erase =
> + __ATTR(erase, 0200, NULL, security_erase_store);
> +
> static ssize_t serial_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> char *buf)
> {
> @@ -199,6 +232,7 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
>
> static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = {
> &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr,
> + &dev_attr_security_erase.attr,
> NULL,
> };
>
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 9bd33cfdc0ec..f8b513e70c21 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
> CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE = 0x4400,
> + CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4401,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501,
> CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-11 15:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-21 9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/pci: Allocate irq vectors earlier in pci probe Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 16:09 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-11 13:55 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/mbox: Add background cmd handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-23 7:54 ` Li, Ming
2023-04-23 20:51 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 16:21 ` Dave Jiang
2023-04-28 17:18 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 21:04 ` Dave Jiang
2023-04-28 22:03 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-01 15:56 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 14:23 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 16:04 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:05 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/mbox: Add sanitation " Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 16:43 ` Dave Jiang
2023-04-28 16:46 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-28 17:37 ` Dave Jiang
2023-05-11 14:45 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 16:48 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:02 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Wire up Sanitation support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 20:04 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 20:24 ` kernel test robot
2023-05-11 15:07 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 17:23 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-12 17:00 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add Sanitize opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:09 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-05-11 15:13 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:10 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2023-04-21 9:23 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add Secure Erase opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:10 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-04-23 2:05 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-06-12 18:10 [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support " Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:31 ` Dave Jiang
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