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From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>, dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: jonathan.cameron@huawei.com, ira.weiny@intel.com,
	fan.ni@samsung.com, a.manzanares@samsung.com,
	linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 11:31:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <17be3112-2a56-1def-794a-d37187ec190d@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230224194652.1990604-7-dave@stgolabs.net>



On 2/24/23 12:46 PM, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive secure erase, per
> CXL specs.
> 
> To properly support this feature, create a 'security/erase' sysfs
> file that when read will list the current pmem security state and
> when written to, perform the requested operation.

Need update. WO attrib.

DJ

> 
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
>   Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 12 ++++++
>   drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               | 32 +++++++++++++-
>   drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  2 +
>   4 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index b315d78b7e91..91a74e27f248 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -80,6 +80,18 @@ Description:
>   	       to be flushed. If this sysfs entry is not present then the
>   	       architecture does not support security features.
>   
> +What:          /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
> +Date:          February, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.4
> +Contact:       linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> +	       (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> +	       secure erase the device to securely re-purpose or decommission
> +	       it. This is done by hanging the media encryption keys for all
> +	       user data areas of the device. This causes all CPU caches to
> +	       be flushed. If this sysfs entry is not present then the
> +	       architecture does not support security features.
> +
>   What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
>   Date:		June, 2021
>   KernelVersion:	v5.14
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index 885de3506735..bf206fe26839 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -1082,6 +1082,62 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_sanitize, CXL);
>   
> +/**
> + * cxl_mem_secure_erase() - Send secure erase command to the device.
> + * @cxlds: The device data for the operation
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if the command was executed successfully.
> + * Upon error, return the result of the mailbox command or -EINVAL if
> + * security requirements are not met. CPU caches are flushed before and
> + * after succesful completion of each command.
> + *
> + * See CXL 3.0 @8.2.9.8.5.2 Secure Erase.
> + */
> +int cxl_mem_secure_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	u32 sec_out = 0;
> +	struct cxl_get_security_output {
> +		__le32 flags;
> +	} out;
> +	struct cxl_mbox_cmd sec_cmd = {
> +		.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
> +		.payload_out = &out,
> +		.size_out = sizeof(out),
> +	};
> +	struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = {
> +		.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE,
> +	};
> +
> +	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
> +	if (rc < 0) {
> +		dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to get security state : %d", rc);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags);
> +	if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_CXL);
> +
> +	rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
> +	if (rc < 0) {
> +		dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to secure erase device : %d", rc);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_CXL);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_secure_erase, CXL);
> +
>   static int add_dpa_res(struct device *dev, struct resource *parent,
>   		       struct resource *res, resource_size_t start,
>   		       resource_size_t size, const char *type)
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index a1bb095d081c..6334a0d1a925 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -155,6 +155,34 @@ static ssize_t security_sanitize_store(struct device *dev,
>   static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize =
>   	__ATTR(sanitize, 0200, NULL, security_sanitize_store);
>   
> +static ssize_t security_erase_store(struct device *dev,
> +				    struct device_attribute *attr,
> +				    const char *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> +	struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> +	struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> +	ssize_t rc;
> +	bool erase;
> +
> +	rc = kstrtobool(buf, &erase);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	if (erase) {
> +		if (cxl_memdev_active_region(cxlmd))
> +			return -EBUSY;
> +
> +		rc = cxl_mem_secure_erase(cxlds);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (rc == 0)
> +		rc = len;
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_erase =
> +	__ATTR(sanitize, 0200, NULL, security_erase_store);
> +
>   static ssize_t serial_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>   			   char *buf)
>   {
> @@ -217,6 +245,7 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
>   static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = {
>   	&dev_attr_security_state.attr,
>   	&dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr,
> +	&dev_attr_security_erase.attr,
>   	NULL,
>   };
>   
> @@ -224,7 +253,8 @@ static umode_t cxl_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
>   				    struct attribute *a, int n)
>   {
>   	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() &&
> -	    a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr)
> +	    (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr ||
> +	     a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr))
>   		return 0;
>   	return a->mode;
>   }
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 0d2009b36933..2cf9ec3242a6 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
>   	CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA		= 0x4304,
>   	CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA	= 0x4305,
>   	CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE		= 0x4400,
> +	CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE	= 0x4401,
>   	CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE	= 0x4500,
>   	CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE	= 0x4501,
>   	CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE	= 0x4502,
> @@ -632,6 +633,7 @@ static inline void cxl_mem_active_dec(void)
>   #endif
>   
>   int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
> +int cxl_mem_secure_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
>   
>   struct cxl_hdm {
>   	struct cxl_component_regs regs;

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-28 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-24 19:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/mbox: Add background cmd handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:27   ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 20:18     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:35       ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-27 21:57   ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/security: Add security state sysfs ABI Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:47   ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-28  1:11   ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/region: Add cxl_memdev_active_region() Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-27  3:46   ` Alison Schofield
2023-02-28 20:26     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:20       ` Fan Ni
2023-03-28  1:15       ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Support Sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 17:28   ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 20:22     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-03-28  6:26   ` Dan Williams
2023-04-05 21:06     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-05 22:24       ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add "Sanitize" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:03   ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:31   ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add "Secure Erase" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:36   ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-22  0:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-04-21  9:23 [PATCH v4 " Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-21  9:23 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-05-11 15:10   ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-06-12 18:10 [PATCH v6 0/7] cxl: Support device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-06-12 18:10 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso

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