From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>, <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>, <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
<fan.ni@samsung.com>, <a.manzanares@samsung.com>,
<linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: RE: [PATCH 2/7] cxl/security: Add security state sysfs ABI
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 18:11:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <64223ecd8b2e0_21a829454@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230224194652.1990604-3-dave@stgolabs.net>
Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> This adds the sysfs memdev's security/ directory with
> a single 'state' file, which is always visible. In the
> case of unsupported security features, this will show
> disabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 8 ++++
> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index 3acf2f17a73f..e9c432a5a841 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -57,6 +57,14 @@ Description:
> host PCI device for this memory device, emit the CPU node
> affinity for this device.
>
> +What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/state
> +Date: February, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.4
> +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> + (RO) The security state for that device. The following states
> + are available: frozen, locked, unlocked and disabled (which
> + is also the case for any unsupported security features).
>
> What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
> Date: June, 2021
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index 0af8856936dc..47cc625bb1b0 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> /* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. */
>
> +#include <linux/memregion.h>
> #include <linux/device.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/idr.h>
> @@ -89,6 +90,43 @@ static ssize_t pmem_size_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> static struct device_attribute dev_attr_pmem_size =
> __ATTR(size, 0444, pmem_size_show, NULL);
>
> +static ssize_t security_state_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + u32 sec_out;
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + struct cxl_get_security_output {
> + __le32 flags;
> + } out;
> + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = {
> + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
> + .payload_out = &out,
> + .size_out = sizeof(out),
> + };
> +
> + if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> + goto disabled;
I think this can go as security state can still be read even if
unlocking is not safely possible.
> +
> + if (cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd) < 0)
> + goto disabled;
I would prefer to not have an any-user triggerable way to spam mailbox
commands. Security state should be read from a cached value that gets
updated when security operations are run.
> +
> + sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags);
> + if (!(sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET))
> + goto disabled;
> + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN)
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "frozen\n");
> + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED)
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "locked\n");
> + else
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "unlocked\n");
> +disabled:
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "disabled\n");
> +}
> +
> +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_state =
> + __ATTR(state, 0444, security_state_show, NULL);
This looks copied from pmem_size above, however that one is using
open-coded __ATTR() because the attribute name, "size", does not match
the prefix of the show() handler, "pmem_size_show()". In this case the
shorter DEVICE_ATTR_RO() helper can be used.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-28 1:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-24 19:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/mbox: Add background cmd handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:27 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 20:18 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:35 ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-27 21:57 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/security: Add security state sysfs ABI Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:47 ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-28 1:11 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/region: Add cxl_memdev_active_region() Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-27 3:46 ` Alison Schofield
2023-02-28 20:26 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:20 ` Fan Ni
2023-03-28 1:15 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Support Sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 17:28 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 20:22 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-03-28 6:26 ` Dan Williams
2023-04-05 21:06 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-05 22:24 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add "Sanitize" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:03 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:31 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add "Secure Erase" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:36 ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-22 0:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
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