From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>, dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: jonathan.cameron@huawei.com, ira.weiny@intel.com,
fan.ni@samsung.com, a.manzanares@samsung.com,
linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Support Sanitation
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 10:28:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7333903c-4ef9-6f1f-9767-e32f228149b3@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230224194652.1990604-5-dave@stgolabs.net>
On 2/24/23 12:46 PM, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive sanitize (aka overwrite),
> per CXL specs. This is the baseline for the sanitize-on-release
> functionality.
>
> To properly support this feature, create a 'security/sanitize' sysfs
> file that when read will list the current pmem security state and
> when written to, perform the requested operation.
I think this segment needs to be updated? The attrib is write only from
the code below.
DJ
>
> This operation can run in the background and the driver must wait
> for completion (no timeout), where the poller will awake every
> ~10 seconds (this could be further based on the size of the device).
>
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 14 ++++++
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 2 +
> 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index e9c432a5a841..b315d78b7e91 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -66,6 +66,20 @@ Description:
> are available: frozen, locked, unlocked and disabled (which
> is also the case for any unsupported security features).
>
> +What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/sanitize
> +Date: February, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.4
> +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> + (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> + sanitize the device to securely re-purpose or decommission it.
> + This is done by ensuring that all user data and meta-data,
> + whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
> + or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
> + is appropriate for the media type. This causes all CPU caches
> + to be flushed. If this sysfs entry is not present then the
> + architecture does not support security features.
> +
> What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
> Date: June, 2021
> KernelVersion: v5.14
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index f2addb457172..885de3506735 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> /* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
> #include <linux/io-64-nonatomic-lo-hi.h>
> +#include <linux/memregion.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/debugfs.h>
> #include <linux/ktime.h>
> @@ -1021,6 +1022,66 @@ int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_dev_state_identify, CXL);
>
> +/**
> + * cxl_mem_sanitize() - Send sanitation (aka overwrite) command to the device.
> + * @cxlds: The device data for the operation
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if the command was executed successfully, regardless of
> + * whether or not the actual security operation is done in the background.
> + * Upon error, return the result of the mailbox command or -EINVAL if
> + * security requirements are not met. CPU caches are flushed before and
> + * after succesful completion of each command.
> + *
> + * See CXL 3.0 @8.2.9.8.5.1 Sanitize.
> + */
> +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + u32 sec_out = 0;
> + struct cxl_get_security_output {
> + __le32 flags;
> + } out;
> + struct cxl_mbox_cmd sec_cmd = {
> + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
> + .payload_out = &out,
> + .size_out = sizeof(out),
> + };
> + struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = {
> + .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE,
> + .poll_interval = 10000UL,
> + };
> +
> + if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to get security state : %d", rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Prior to using these commands, any security applied to
> + * the user data areas of the device shall be DISABLED (or
> + * UNLOCKED for secure erase case).
> + */
> + sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags);
> + if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_CXL);
> +
> + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_CXL);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_sanitize, CXL);
> +
> static int add_dpa_res(struct device *dev, struct resource *parent,
> struct resource *res, resource_size_t start,
> resource_size_t size, const char *type)
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index 68c0ab06b999..a1bb095d081c 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -127,6 +127,34 @@ static ssize_t security_state_show(struct device *dev,
> static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_state =
> __ATTR(state, 0444, security_state_show, NULL);
>
> +static ssize_t security_sanitize_store(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr,
> + const char *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> + ssize_t rc;
> + bool sanitize;
> +
> + rc = kstrtobool(buf, &sanitize);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (sanitize) {
> + if (cxl_memdev_active_region(cxlmd))
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds);
> + }
> +
> + if (rc == 0)
> + rc = len;
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize =
> + __ATTR(sanitize, 0200, NULL, security_sanitize_store);
> +
> static ssize_t serial_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> char *buf)
> {
> @@ -188,11 +216,22 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
>
> static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = {
> &dev_attr_security_state.attr,
> + &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr,
> NULL,
> };
>
> +static umode_t cxl_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
> + struct attribute *a, int n)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() &&
> + a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr)
> + return 0;
> + return a->mode;
> +}
> +
> static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = {
> .name = "security",
> + .is_visible = cxl_security_visible,
> .attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes,
> };
>
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 4e31f3234519..0d2009b36933 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -631,6 +631,8 @@ static inline void cxl_mem_active_dec(void)
> }
> #endif
>
> +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
> +
> struct cxl_hdm {
> struct cxl_component_regs regs;
> unsigned int decoder_count;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-28 17:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-24 19:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/mbox: Add background cmd handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:27 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 20:18 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:35 ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-27 21:57 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/security: Add security state sysfs ABI Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:47 ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-28 1:11 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/region: Add cxl_memdev_active_region() Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-27 3:46 ` Alison Schofield
2023-02-28 20:26 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:20 ` Fan Ni
2023-03-28 1:15 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Support Sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 17:28 ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2023-02-28 20:22 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-03-28 6:26 ` Dan Williams
2023-04-05 21:06 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-05 22:24 ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add "Sanitize" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:03 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:31 ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add "Secure Erase" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:36 ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-22 0:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
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