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From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>, dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: jonathan.cameron@huawei.com, ira.weiny@intel.com,
	fan.ni@samsung.com, a.manzanares@samsung.com,
	linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Support Sanitation
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 10:28:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7333903c-4ef9-6f1f-9767-e32f228149b3@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230224194652.1990604-5-dave@stgolabs.net>



On 2/24/23 12:46 PM, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive sanitize (aka overwrite),
> per CXL specs. This is the baseline for the sanitize-on-release
> functionality.
> 
> To properly support this feature, create a 'security/sanitize' sysfs
> file that when read will list the current pmem security state and
> when written to, perform the requested operation.

I think this segment needs to be updated? The attrib is write only from 
the code below.

DJ

> 
> This operation can run in the background and the driver must wait
> for completion (no timeout), where the poller will awake every
> ~10 seconds (this could be further based on the size of the device).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> ---
>   Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 14 ++++++
>   drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               | 39 ++++++++++++++++
>   drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  2 +
>   4 files changed, 116 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> index e9c432a5a841..b315d78b7e91 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
> @@ -66,6 +66,20 @@ Description:
>   		are available: frozen, locked, unlocked and disabled (which
>   		is also the case for any unsupported security features).
>   
> +What:          /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/sanitize
> +Date:          February, 2023
> +KernelVersion: v6.4
> +Contact:       linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> +	       (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
> +	       sanitize the device to securely re-purpose or decommission it.
> +	       This is done by ensuring that all user data and meta-data,
> +	       whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
> +	       or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
> +	       is appropriate for the media type. This causes all CPU caches
> +	       to be flushed. If this sysfs entry is not present then the
> +	       architecture does not support security features.
> +
>   What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
>   Date:		June, 2021
>   KernelVersion:	v5.14
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index f2addb457172..885de3506735 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
>   // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>   /* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
>   #include <linux/io-64-nonatomic-lo-hi.h>
> +#include <linux/memregion.h>
>   #include <linux/security.h>
>   #include <linux/debugfs.h>
>   #include <linux/ktime.h>
> @@ -1021,6 +1022,66 @@ int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_dev_state_identify, CXL);
>   
> +/**
> + * cxl_mem_sanitize() - Send sanitation (aka overwrite) command to the device.
> + * @cxlds: The device data for the operation
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if the command was executed successfully, regardless of
> + * whether or not the actual security operation is done in the background.
> + * Upon error, return the result of the mailbox command or -EINVAL if
> + * security requirements are not met. CPU caches are flushed before and
> + * after succesful completion of each command.
> + *
> + * See CXL 3.0 @8.2.9.8.5.1 Sanitize.
> + */
> +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	u32 sec_out = 0;
> +	struct cxl_get_security_output {
> +		__le32 flags;
> +	} out;
> +	struct cxl_mbox_cmd sec_cmd = {
> +		.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
> +		.payload_out = &out,
> +		.size_out = sizeof(out),
> +	};
> +	struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = {
> +		.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE,
> +		.poll_interval = 10000UL,
> +	};
> +
> +	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
> +	if (rc < 0) {
> +		dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to get security state : %d", rc);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Prior to using these commands, any security applied to
> +	 * the user data areas of the device shall be DISABLED (or
> +	 * UNLOCKED for secure erase case).
> +	 */
> +	sec_out = le32_to_cpu(out.flags);
> +	if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_CXL);
> +
> +	rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
> +	if (rc < 0) {
> +		dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc);
> +		return rc;
> +	}
> +
> +	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_CXL);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_sanitize, CXL);
> +
>   static int add_dpa_res(struct device *dev, struct resource *parent,
>   		       struct resource *res, resource_size_t start,
>   		       resource_size_t size, const char *type)
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> index 68c0ab06b999..a1bb095d081c 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
> @@ -127,6 +127,34 @@ static ssize_t security_state_show(struct device *dev,
>   static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_state =
>   	__ATTR(state, 0444, security_state_show, NULL);
>   
> +static ssize_t security_sanitize_store(struct device *dev,
> +				       struct device_attribute *attr,
> +				       const char *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> +	struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
> +	struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
> +	ssize_t rc;
> +	bool sanitize;
> +
> +	rc = kstrtobool(buf, &sanitize);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	if (sanitize) {
> +		if (cxl_memdev_active_region(cxlmd))
> +			return -EBUSY;
> +
> +		rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (rc == 0)
> +		rc = len;
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize =
> +	__ATTR(sanitize, 0200, NULL, security_sanitize_store);
> +
>   static ssize_t serial_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>   			   char *buf)
>   {
> @@ -188,11 +216,22 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
>   
>   static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = {
>   	&dev_attr_security_state.attr,
> +	&dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr,
>   	NULL,
>   };
>   
> +static umode_t cxl_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
> +				    struct attribute *a, int n)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() &&
> +	    a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr)
> +		return 0;
> +	return a->mode;
> +}
> +
>   static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = {
>   	.name = "security",
> +	.is_visible = cxl_security_visible,
>   	.attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes,
>   };
>   
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> index 4e31f3234519..0d2009b36933 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
> @@ -631,6 +631,8 @@ static inline void cxl_mem_active_dec(void)
>   }
>   #endif
>   
> +int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
> +
>   struct cxl_hdm {
>   	struct cxl_component_regs regs;
>   	unsigned int decoder_count;

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-28 17:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-24 19:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] cxl/mbox: Add background cmd handling machinery Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:27   ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-28 20:18     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:35       ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-27 21:57   ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] cxl/security: Add security state sysfs ABI Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 16:47   ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-28  1:11   ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] cxl/region: Add cxl_memdev_active_region() Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-27  3:46   ` Alison Schofield
2023-02-28 20:26     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 23:20       ` Fan Ni
2023-03-28  1:15       ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] cxl/mem: Support Sanitation Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 17:28   ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2023-02-28 20:22     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-03-28  6:26   ` Dan Williams
2023-04-05 21:06     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-04-05 22:24       ` Dan Williams
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] cxl/test: Add "Sanitize" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:03   ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:31   ` Dave Jiang
2023-02-24 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] cxl/test: Add "Secure Erase" opcode support Davidlohr Bueso
2023-02-28 18:36   ` Dave Jiang
2023-03-22  0:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation Davidlohr Bueso

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