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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: alistair23@gmail.com, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ojeda@kernel.org, gary@garyguo.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/23] rust: create basic untrusted data API
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 05:34:10 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-186123@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261027052536.1722081-3-alistair.francis@wdc.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] rust: validate: from_mut() and from_mut_slice() bypass Untrusted opacity
--

commit 46cfb0c607f570933dd68037f09805a7bea851ee
Author: Benno Lossin <lossin@kernel.org>

rust: create basic untrusted data API

This commit introduces the Untrusted<T> wrapper type in kernel::validate to
explicitly mark external data as untrusted and prevent unvalidated data from
being directly read or used for kernel logic decisions.

> diff --git a/rust/kernel/validate.rs b/rust/kernel/validate.rs
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..3c1fe37624573
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/rust/kernel/validate.rs
> @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@

[ ... ]

> +impl<T> Untrusted<T> {
> +    /// Marks the data behind the given reference as untrusted.
> +    ///
> +    /// Unlike [`Untrusted::new`], this does not require moving the value.
> +    #[inline]
> +    pub const fn from_ref(value: &T) -> &Self {
> +        // SAFETY: `Untrusted<T>` transparently wraps `T`. The cast
> +        // does not introduce interior mutability, as `Untrusted<T>`
> +        // has interior mutability if and only if `T` has.
> +        unsafe { &*from_ref(value).cast::<Self>() }
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Marks the data behind the given mutable reference as untrusted.
> +    ///
> +    /// Unlike [`Untrusted::new`], this does not require moving the value.
> +    #[inline]
> +    pub const fn from_mut(value: &mut T) -> &mut Self {
> +        // SAFETY: Same reasoning as `from_ref()`.
> +        unsafe { &mut *from_mut(value).cast::<Self>() }
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Marks the given slice of data as untrusted.
> +    #[inline]
> +    pub const fn from_slice(value: &[T]) -> &[Self] {
> +        // SAFETY: `Untrusted<T>` transparently wraps `T`. The cast
> +        // does not introduce interior mutability either, as `Untrusted<T>`
> +        // has interior mutability if and only if `T` has.
> +        unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts(value.as_ptr().cast::<Self>(), value.len()) }
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Marks the given mutable slice of data as untrusted.
> +    #[inline]
> +    pub const fn from_mut_slice(value: &mut [T]) -> &mut [Self] {
> +        // SAFETY: Same reasoning as `from_slice()`.
> +        unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts_mut(value.as_mut_ptr().cast::<Self>(), value.len()) }
> +    }
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Do public Untrusted::from_mut() and Untrusted::from_mut_slice() allow safe
code to bypass the opacity guarantee of Untrusted<T>?

Because mutable references are invariant in T, converting &mut T into
&mut Untrusted<T> (or &mut [T] into &mut [Untrusted<T>]) allows callers to
write unvalidated Untrusted<T> values directly into a plain, trusted T or [T]
variable without validation:

    let mut trusted: u8 = 0;
    *Untrusted::from_mut(&mut trusted) = untrusted_byte;

Similarly, a caller with a plain mutable slice buf: &mut [u8] can pass
Untrusted::from_mut_slice(buf) to a function expecting &mut [Untrusted<u8>]
(such as the read_from_userspace(buf: &mut [Untrusted<u8>]) pattern shown in
the documentation) and then read the unvalidated bytes directly from buf
after the call returns.

Since DerefMut on Untrusted<[T]> and Untrusted<Vec<T, A>> only converts an
already-untrusted container into &mut [Untrusted<T>], should from_mut_slice()
be private and from_mut() be removed or kept private?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261027052536.1722081-1-alistair.francis@wdc.com?part=2

  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-27  5:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-27  5:25 [PATCH v5 00/23] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 01/23] virt: coco: change tsm_register() to use a const struct alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 02/23] rust: create basic untrusted data API alistair23
2026-10-27  5:34   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-27 13:17     ` Benno Lossin
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 03/23] rust: validate: add `Validate` trait alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 04/23] X.509: Make certificate parser public alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 05/23] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 06/23] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 07/23] rust: add bindings for hash.h alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 08/23] rust: device: Expose Device from_raw() publically alistair23
2026-10-27  5:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 09/23] lib: rspdm: Initial commit of Rust SPDM alistair23
2026-10-27  5:42   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 10/23] PCI/TSM: Rename pf0 to host alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 11/23] PCI/TSM: Support connecting to PCIe CMA devices alistair23
2026-10-27  5:50   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 12/23] PCI/CMA: Add a PCI TSM CMA driver using SPDM alistair23
2026-10-27  5:46   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 13/23] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 14/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_version alistair23
2026-10-27  5:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 15/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_capabilities alistair23
2026-10-27  5:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 16/23] rust: kernel: Add crypto hash bindings alistair23
2026-10-27  5:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 17/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM negotiate_algorithms alistair23
2026-10-27  5:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 18/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_digests alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 19/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 20/23] rust: public_key: Add crypto public key bindings alistair23
2026-10-27  5:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 21/23] rust: x509: Add X509 certificate bindings alistair23
2026-10-27  5:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 22/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation alistair23
2026-10-27  5:25 ` [PATCH v5 23/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM challenge alistair23
2026-10-27  5:43   ` sashiko-bot

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