From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: alistair23@gmail.com, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ojeda@kernel.org, gary@garyguo.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 20/23] rust: public_key: Add crypto public key bindings
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 05:41:17 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-186132@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261027052536.1722081-21-alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] rust: public_key: missing unsafe on PublicKey::from_raw()
- [Low] rust: public_key: wrong Kconfig guard on public_key module in lib.rs
- [Low] rust: public_key: missing inline attributes and split imports
--
commit d3b51b7112cb9e69d8cc7083f31a2a45bf366492
Author: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
rust: public_key: Add crypto public key bindings
This commit adds initial Rust bindings and a PublicKey wrapper around
the kernel crypto public key (asymmetric-keys) APIs, including
PublicKey::from_raw(), PublicKey::verify_signature(), and Drop cleanup via
public_key_free().
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/lib.rs b/rust/kernel/lib.rs
> index f7db5975e7621..e8b652faa3b49 100644
> --- a/rust/kernel/lib.rs
> +++ b/rust/kernel/lib.rs
> @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@
> pub mod print;
> pub mod processor;
> pub mod ptr;
> +#[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO)]
> +pub mod public_key;
[Severity: Low]
Will gating the public_key module on CONFIG_CRYPTO break the build when
CONFIG_RUST=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO=y, while
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE is n or m?
In rust/kernel/public_key.rs, PublicKey::verify_signature() calls
bindings::public_key_verify_signature() and PublicKey::drop() calls
bindings::public_key_free(). Both functions are defined in
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c, which is built under the tristate
symbol CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE rather than CONFIG_CRYPTO:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile:
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
When CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=n, include/crypto/public_key.h
defines public_key_verify_signature() as a static inline stub:
include/crypto/public_key.h:
#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE)
int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
#else
static inline
int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
Without a Rust helper wrapper, bindgen does not generate
bindings::public_key_verify_signature, and public_key_free() has no stub at
all. Additionally, when CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=m, built-in
rust/kernel.o cannot link against public_key_verify_signature() and
public_key_free() in the loadable public_key.ko module.
Should this module instead be gated on
#[cfg(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE = "y")]?
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/public_key.rs b/rust/kernel/public_key.rs
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..e1d51333c1179
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/rust/kernel/public_key.rs
> @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +// Copyright (C) 2026 Western Digital
> +
> +//! Wrappers around the Linux kernel crypto public key APIs.
> +//!
> +//! C headers: [`include/crypto/public_key.h`](srctree/include/crypto/public_key.h).
> +//!
> +//! Reference: <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/crypto/asymmetric-keys.html>
> +
> +use core::ptr::NonNull;
> +use kernel::prelude::*;
> +use kernel::{
> + bindings,
> + error::to_result,
> + str::CStr, //
> +};
> +
> +/// Owned `struct public_key` wrapper.
> +pub struct PublicKey {
> + key: NonNull<bindings::public_key>,
> +}
> +
> +impl PublicKey {
> + /// Create a Rust `PublicKey` from a valid C `struct public_key` pointer.
> + pub fn from_raw(key: NonNull<bindings::public_key>) -> Self {
> + Self { key }
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Should PublicKey::from_raw() be marked unsafe?
NonNull<bindings::public_key> is Copy and can be constructed or duplicated
in safe Rust (for example via NonNull::dangling() or passing the same
NonNull pointer twice). However, PublicKey::verify_signature() passes
self.key.as_ptr() to bindings::public_key_verify_signature(), which
dereferences the pointer and its internal fields, and PublicKey::drop()
unconditionally passes self.key.as_ptr() to bindings::public_key_free(),
which calls kfree_sensitive(key->key), kfree(key->params), and kfree(key).
Although Certificate::take_public_key() in a later commit in this series
passes a valid pointer and clears cert->pub_, leaving PublicKey::from_raw()
as a safe public function makes the abstraction unsound for safe callers.
Could PublicKey document its type invariants in an Invariants section, and
could PublicKey::from_raw() be made an unsafe fn with a Safety section and
an invariant comment?
> +
> + /// Verify a signature using this public key.
> + pub fn verify_signature(
> + &self,
> + signature: &[u8],
> + encoding: &'static CStr,
> + hash_algo: &'static CStr,
> + message: &[u8],
> + ) -> Result {
> + let sig = bindings::public_key_signature {
> + s: signature.as_ptr().cast_mut(),
> + s_size: signature.len() as u32,
> + encoding: encoding.as_char_ptr().cast::<u8>(),
> + hash_algo: hash_algo.as_char_ptr().cast::<u8>(),
> + m: message.as_ptr().cast_mut(),
> + m_size: message.len() as u32,
> + ..Default::default()
> + };
> +
> + // SAFETY: `self.key` is a valid public key handle, and `sig` points to
> + // valid signature/message data owned by the caller for the duration of
> + // this call.
> + unsafe {
> + to_result(bindings::public_key_verify_signature(
> + self.key.as_ptr(),
> + &sig,
> + ))
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +impl Drop for PublicKey {
> + fn drop(&mut self) {
> + // SAFETY: `self.key` was either returned by `x509_cert_parse()` or
> + // manually transferred from an `x509_certificate` and has not been
> + // freed yet.
> + unsafe {
> + bindings::public_key_free(self.key.as_ptr());
> + }
> + }
> +}
[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but per the Rust coding guidelines for the kernel crate,
could PublicKey::from_raw(), PublicKey::verify_signature(), and
PublicKey::drop() be annotated with #[inline], and could the two
use kernel::... blocks at the top of rust/kernel/public_key.rs be merged
into a single vertical import block (noting that CStr is already exported by
kernel::prelude::*)?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261027052536.1722081-1-alistair.francis@wdc.com?part=20
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-27 5:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-27 5:25 [PATCH v5 00/23] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 01/23] virt: coco: change tsm_register() to use a const struct alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 02/23] rust: create basic untrusted data API alistair23
2026-10-27 5:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 13:17 ` Benno Lossin
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 03/23] rust: validate: add `Validate` trait alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 04/23] X.509: Make certificate parser public alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 05/23] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 06/23] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 07/23] rust: add bindings for hash.h alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 08/23] rust: device: Expose Device from_raw() publically alistair23
2026-10-27 5:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 09/23] lib: rspdm: Initial commit of Rust SPDM alistair23
2026-10-27 5:42 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 10/23] PCI/TSM: Rename pf0 to host alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 11/23] PCI/TSM: Support connecting to PCIe CMA devices alistair23
2026-10-27 5:50 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 12/23] PCI/CMA: Add a PCI TSM CMA driver using SPDM alistair23
2026-10-27 5:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 13/23] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 14/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_version alistair23
2026-10-27 5:41 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 15/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_capabilities alistair23
2026-10-27 5:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 16/23] rust: kernel: Add crypto hash bindings alistair23
2026-10-27 5:41 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 17/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM negotiate_algorithms alistair23
2026-10-27 5:43 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 18/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_digests alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 19/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 20/23] rust: public_key: Add crypto public key bindings alistair23
2026-10-27 5:41 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 21/23] rust: x509: Add X509 certificate bindings alistair23
2026-10-27 5:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 22/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation alistair23
2026-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v5 23/23] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM challenge alistair23
2026-10-27 5:43 ` sashiko-bot
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