From: Frank Li <Frank.li@oss.nxp.com>
To: pankaj.gupta@oss.nxp.com
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@kernel.org>,
Conor Dooley <conor+dt@kernel.org>, Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>,
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>,
Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>,
Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, imx@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v42 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 10:28:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ao20pJG7gJp6mAgz@SMW015318> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260825-imx-se-if-v42-5-2e8efac0bb16@nxp.com>
On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 04:33:37AM +0530, pankaj.gupta@oss.nxp.com wrote:
> From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
>
> Adds the driver for communication interface to secure-enclave, that
> enables exchanging messages with NXP secure enclave HW IP(s)
> like EdgeLock Enclave, from:
> - User-Space Applications via character driver.
>
> ABI documentation for the NXP secure-enclave driver.
>
> User-space library using this driver:
> - i.MX Secure Enclave library:
> -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
> - i.MX Secure Middle-Ware:
> -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git
>
> Following checks are performed on the incoming msg-header,
> to block exchanging invalid arbitrary commands:
> - maximum allowed words,
> - check if command-tag & response-tag are valid
> - version,
> - command id validation check, to allow limited base-line API(s)
> and restrict following:
> - exchanging power management commands.
> - reset requests.
> - BBSM configuration requests.
> - re-initializing the FW.
> - RNG init
> - CAAM resource release management
> - SE's internal memory management.
> from user-space.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
> ---
...
> +
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_rsp(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header);
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + bool is_cmd_receiver = false;
> +
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
> + if (dev_ctx == priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
> + is_cmd_receiver = true;
> +
> + if (!is_cmd_receiver)
> + return -EINVAL;
is_cmd_receiver only use once
if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
return -EINVAL;
so is_cmd_receiver can be removed.
> +
> + return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz);
> +}
> +
...
> +int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl)
> +{
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL;
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
cleanup prefer declear varible here
struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tx_msg)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rx_msg)
> + return -ENOMEM;
the same here. Check other place.
> +
> + /*
> + * Session close is a FW-API command; format it with the FW API version
> + * so se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status() below (called with is_base_api = false,
> + * i.e. expecting fw_api_ver) does not reject the matching response and
> + * wrongly report the close as failed, which would leak the handle.
> + */
> + se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false);
> +
> + tx_msg->data[0] = session_hdl;
> +
> + /*
> + * Transmit on the caller's own context. Using dev_ctx (rather than
> + * hardcoding priv->priv_dev_ctx) keeps a userspace close() subject to
> + * the going_away check in ele_msg_send_rcv(): if unbind has begun and
> + * freed priv->tx_chan, the send is rejected with -ENODEV instead of
> + * touching the freed mailbox channel. The teardown path passes
> + * priv_dev_ctx so its resync closes are still let through.
> + */
> + ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx,
> + tx_msg,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ,
> + rx_msg,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv,
> + rx_msg,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ,
> + false);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
...
> +int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf,
> + dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> +
> + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx))
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc, GFP_KERNEL);
GPF_KERNEL is default for *_obj alloc macro. Needn't set it
kzalloc_obj(*b_desc), check others.
Frank
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-25 15:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-24 23:03 [PATCH v42 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 17:44 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 17:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 17:50 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-25 15:06 ` Frank Li
2026-08-25 15:28 ` Frank Li [this message]
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node pankaj.gupta
2026-08-24 23:03 ` [PATCH v42 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add reserved memory for EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
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