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From: Frank Li <Frank.li@oss.nxp.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: pankaj.gupta@oss.nxp.com, devicetree@vger.kernel.org,
	conor+dt@kernel.org, robh@kernel.org, imx@lists.linux.dev,
	Frank.Li@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v48 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 09:59:44 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aprc4CCjSfGhP9Z0@SMW015318> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260904093956.1F5401F00A3D@smtp.kernel.org>

On Fri, Sep 04, 2026 at 09:39:55AM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [High] Permanent destruction of priv_dev_ctx's shared DMA buffer on late firmware response.
> - [High] Leaked firmware session handles due to killable wait in `close()` aborting instantly on fatal signals.
> - [High] Deadlock risk during PM suspend due to GFP_KERNEL allocation inside a required GFP_NOIO context.
> --
>
> commit 8a8db094cff29d90b76f6889f2022ca7253f3ec8
> Author: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
>
> firmware: imx: adds miscdev
>
> Adds the driver for communication interface to NXP secure-enclave hardware
> via a character driver. Handles ABI, initialization, shared memory, and
> restricted command forwarding.
>
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
> >  	get_info_len = ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ;
> >  	if (priv->mem_pool) {
> >  		ret = se_get_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, &get_info_data,
> >  					  &get_info_addr, get_info_len);
>
> [Severity: High]
> Could this cause a system deadlock during PM suspend?
>
> The caller ele_get_info allocates its message buffers using GFP_NOIO
> specifically to prevent direct reclaim from triggering I/O to a suspended
> storage device. However, it relies on se_get_mem_pool_buf here, which
> does a standard kernel allocation.
>
> [ ... ]
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
> >  				if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
> >  					/*
> >  					 * The enclave may still DMA into this
> >  					 * buffer (either a normal timeout or
> >  					 * a teardown complete_all() wakeup).
> >  					 * Quarantine the buffer and arm the
> >  					 * circuit breaker unconditionally.
> >  					 */
> >  					se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
> >  					se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
> >  				}
> >  				spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> >  			}
> >  			break;
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does this instantly abort the wait and arm the circuit breaker if a fatal
> signal like SIGKILL is pending?
>
> By breaking out early, it immediately marks the firmware as busy.
>
> [ ... ]
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -406,6 +406,12 @@ static void cleanup_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool recla
> >  	if (free_dma_buf) {
> >  		dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
> >  				  se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr,
> >  				  se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr);
> >  	}
> >
> >  	/*
> >  	 * Drop the host-side tracking unconditionally. On the reclaim path the
> >  	 * buffer has been freed. On the deliberate-leak path the buffer is
> >  	 * abandoned on purpose, so clearing the pointer here guarantees a later
> >  	 * cleanup pass (e.g. se_if_priv_release()) cannot double-free it.
> >  	 */
> >  	se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr = NULL;
> >  	se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr = 0;
> >  	se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = 0;
>
> [Severity: High]
> Are we unconditionally destroying the DMA buffer state here?
>
> Even when reclaim is false, the size and pointers are zeroed out.
> If this is called for priv_dev_ctx (which has no open/close cycle to
> reallocate it), the persistent DMA buffer becomes permanently unusable.
>
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -1149,6 +1149,7 @@ static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> >  			/*
> >  			 * Late response arrived after going_away is clear.
> >  			 * fw_busy has already been cleared atomically above;
> >  			 * reclaim the shared-memory slot now. For priv_dev_ctx
> >  			 * this is the only reclaim site (no close() path). For
> >  			 * userspace contexts cleanup_se_shared_mem() is a
> >  			 * safe no-op if the close() path already reset pos.
> >  			 */
> >  			cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
>
> [Severity: High]
> Can this permanently break internal firmware communications for priv_dev_ctx?
>
> If an internal command times out, priv_dev_ctx is set as the busy context.
> When a late response arrives, se_clear_fw_busy runs and calls
> cleanup_se_shared_mem with reclaim=true.
>
> Because cleanup_se_shared_mem zeros out the DMA pointer and size, the
> permanent DMA buffer used by priv_dev_ctx is destroyed, breaking subsequent
> operations like system suspend or firmware loading.
>
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -1331,6 +1331,10 @@ static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
> >  				struct se_if_device_ctx *tx_ctx = is_fclose ? dev_ctx :
> >  							dev_ctx->priv->priv_dev_ctx;
> >
> >  				if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl && se_close_storage(tx_ctx,
> >  									  dev_ctx->strg_hdl))
> >  					dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close storage.\n");
> >  				if (dev_ctx->sess_hdl && se_close_session(tx_ctx,
> >  									  dev_ctx->sess_hdl))
> >  					dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close session.\n");
>
> [Severity: High]
> Will this skip sending the session close command and leak the firmware session
> handle if the killable wait aborted instantly above?
>
> Because ele_msg_send_rcv returns -EBUSY immediately if the circuit breaker
> was armed by a SIGKILL interrupt, se_close_storage fails instantly. The
> subsequent call to se_close_session is then also skipped due to the busy
> firmware path.
>
> An unprivileged user could trigger this leak by opening a session and
> sending SIGKILL to their own process, permanently exhausting hardware enclave
> resources.
>
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -2145,6 +2145,8 @@ int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf,
> >  	if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx))
> >  		return -EBUSY;
> >
> >  	b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc);
> >  	if (!b_desc)
> >  		return -ENOMEM;
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does this kzalloc_obj allocation violate the GFP_NOIO context required by
> ele_get_info during suspend?
>
> The kzalloc_obj macro implicitly uses GFP_KERNEL, which can trigger direct
> memory reclaim. Since the storage device may already be suspended, flushing
> dirty pages to it will lead to an unrecoverable system deadlock.

In suspend function, call pair.

memalloc_noio_save() / memalloc_noio_restore() can fix this problem

Frank

>
> --
> Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260904-imx-se-if-v48-0-dad90eec7eaf@nxp.com?part=5

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-04 14:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-04 14:51 [PATCH v48 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04  9:39   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-04 14:59     ` Frank Li [this message]
2026-09-04 15:10     ` Pankaj Gupta (OSS)
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node pankaj.gupta
2026-09-04  9:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-04 14:51 ` [PATCH v48 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add reserved memory for EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta

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