From: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>, Yanteng Si <si.yanteng@linux.dev>,
Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Cc: "Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
"Boqun Feng" <boqun@kernel.org>, "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
"Benno Lossin" <lossin@kernel.org>,
"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@kernel.org>,
"Trevor Gross" <tmgross@umich.edu>,
"Danilo Krummrich" <dakr@kernel.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
"Alice Ryhl" <aliceryhl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] cred: delete task_euid()
Date: Thu, 07 May 2026 09:48:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260507-remove-task-euid-v3-2-27f22f335c2c@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260507-remove-task-euid-v3-0-27f22f335c2c@google.com>
task_euid() is a very weird operation. You can see how weird it is by
grepping for task_euid() - binder is its only user. task_euid() obtains
the objective effective UID - it looks at the credentials of the task
for purposes of acting on it as an object, but then accesses the
effective UID (which the credentials.7 man page describes as "[...] used
by the kernel to determine the permissions that the process will have
when accessing shared resources [...]").
Since usage in Binder has now been removed, get rid of the resulting
dead code.
Changes to the zh_CN translation was carried out with the help of
Gemini and Google Translate, and since adjusted as per Alex Shi's
feedback.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
---
Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 6 ++----
Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/credentials.rst | 4 +---
include/linux/cred.h | 1 -
rust/helpers/task.c | 5 -----
rust/kernel/task.rs | 10 ----------
5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
index d0191c8b8060..81d3b5737d85 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
@@ -393,16 +393,14 @@ the credentials so obtained when they're finished with.
The result of ``__task_cred()`` should not be passed directly to
``get_cred()`` as this may race with ``commit_cred()``.
-There are a couple of convenience functions to access bits of another task's
-credentials, hiding the RCU magic from the caller::
+There is a convenience function to access bits of another task's credentials,
+hiding the RCU magic from the caller::
uid_t task_uid(task) Task's real UID
- uid_t task_euid(task) Task's effective UID
If the caller is holding the RCU read lock at the time anyway, then::
__task_cred(task)->uid
- __task_cred(task)->euid
should be used instead. Similarly, if multiple aspects of a task's credentials
need to be accessed, RCU read lock should be used, ``__task_cred()`` called,
diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/credentials.rst
index 88fcd9152ffe..20c8696f8198 100644
--- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/credentials.rst
+++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/credentials.rst
@@ -337,15 +337,13 @@ const指针上操作,因此不需要进行类型转换,但需要临时放弃
``__task_cred()`` 的结果不应直接传递给 ``get_cred()`` ,
因为这可能与 ``commit_cred()`` 发生竞争条件。
-还有一些方便的函数可以访问另一个任务凭据的特定部分,将RCU操作对调用方隐藏起来::
+有一个方便的函数可用于访问另一个任务凭据的特定部分,从而对调用方隐藏RCU机制::
uid_t task_uid(task) Task's real UID
- uid_t task_euid(task) Task's effective UID
如果调用方在此时已经持有RCU读锁,则应使用::
__task_cred(task)->uid
- __task_cred(task)->euid
类似地,如果需要访问任务凭据的多个方面,应使用RCU读锁,调用 ``__task_cred()``
函数,将结果存储在临时指针中,然后从临时指针中调用凭据的各个方面,最后释放锁。
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index c6676265a985..6ef1750c93e2 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ DEFINE_FREE(put_cred, struct cred *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) put_cred(_T))
})
#define task_uid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), uid))
-#define task_euid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), euid))
#define task_ucounts(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), ucounts))
#define current_cred_xxx(xxx) \
diff --git a/rust/helpers/task.c b/rust/helpers/task.c
index c0e1a06ede78..b46b1433a67e 100644
--- a/rust/helpers/task.c
+++ b/rust/helpers/task.c
@@ -28,11 +28,6 @@ __rust_helper kuid_t rust_helper_task_uid(struct task_struct *task)
return task_uid(task);
}
-__rust_helper kuid_t rust_helper_task_euid(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- return task_euid(task);
-}
-
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_NS
__rust_helper uid_t rust_helper_from_kuid(struct user_namespace *to, kuid_t uid)
{
diff --git a/rust/kernel/task.rs b/rust/kernel/task.rs
index 7950c3a3950d..e568dfab93c4 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/task.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/task.rs
@@ -217,16 +217,6 @@ pub fn uid(&self) -> Kuid {
Kuid::from_raw(unsafe { bindings::task_uid(self.as_ptr()) })
}
- /// Returns the objective effective UID of the given task.
- ///
- /// You should probably not be using this; the effective UID is normally
- /// only relevant in subjective credentials.
- #[inline]
- pub fn euid(&self) -> Kuid {
- // SAFETY: It's always safe to call `task_euid` on a valid task.
- Kuid::from_raw(unsafe { bindings::task_euid(self.as_ptr()) })
- }
-
/// Determines whether the given task has pending signals.
#[inline]
pub fn signal_pending(&self) -> bool {
--
2.54.0.563.g4f69b47b94-goog
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-07 9:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-07 9:48 [PATCH v3 0/2] Delete task_euid() Alice Ryhl
2026-05-07 9:48 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors Alice Ryhl
2026-05-07 11:08 ` Gary Guo
2026-05-07 12:03 ` Alice Ryhl
2026-05-07 9:48 ` Alice Ryhl [this message]
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