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From: "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>
To: "Alice Ryhl" <aliceryhl@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Alex Shi" <alexs@kernel.org>,
	"Yanteng Si" <si.yanteng@linux.dev>,
	"Dongliang Mu" <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Cc: "Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	"Boqun Feng" <boqun@kernel.org>, "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
	"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
	"Benno Lossin" <lossin@kernel.org>,
	"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@kernel.org>,
	"Trevor Gross" <tmgross@umich.edu>,
	"Danilo Krummrich" <dakr@kernel.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors
Date: Thu, 07 May 2026 12:08:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DICEBGUAU4OT.244JDJIKXRHBS@garyguo.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260507-remove-task-euid-v3-1-27f22f335c2c@google.com>

On Thu May 7, 2026 at 10:48 AM BST, Alice Ryhl wrote:
> From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>
> Linux has separate subjective and objective task credentials, see the
> comment above `struct cred`. Clarify which accessor functions operate on
> which set of credentials.
>
> Also document that Task::euid() is a very weird operation. You can see how
> weird it is by grepping for task_euid() - binder is its only user.
> Task::euid() obtains the objective effective UID - it looks at the
> credentials of the task for purposes of acting on it as an object, but then
> accesses the effective UID (which the credentials.7 man page describes as
> "[...] used by the kernel to determine the permissions that the process
> will have when accessing shared resources [...]").
>
> For context:
> Arguably, binder's use of task_euid() is a theoretical security problem,
> which only has no impact on Android because Android has no setuid binaries
> executable by apps.
> commit 29bc22ac5e5b ("binder: use euid from cred instead of using task")
> fixed that by removing that only user of task_euid(), but the fix got
> reverted in commit c21a80ca0684 ("binder: fix test regression due to
> sender_euid change") because some Android test started failing.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
> ---
> Originally sent as:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260212-rust-uid-v1-1-deff4214c766@google.com
> ---
>  rust/kernel/task.rs | 9 ++++++---
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/task.rs b/rust/kernel/task.rs
> index 38273f4eedb5..7950c3a3950d 100644
> --- a/rust/kernel/task.rs
> +++ b/rust/kernel/task.rs
> @@ -210,14 +210,17 @@ pub fn pid(&self) -> Pid {
>          unsafe { *ptr::addr_of!((*self.as_ptr()).pid) }
>      }
>  
> -    /// Returns the UID of the given task.
> +    /// Returns the objective real UID of the given task.
>      #[inline]
>      pub fn uid(&self) -> Kuid {
>          // SAFETY: It's always safe to call `task_uid` on a valid task.
>          Kuid::from_raw(unsafe { bindings::task_uid(self.as_ptr()) })
>      }
>  
> -    /// Returns the effective UID of the given task.
> +    /// Returns the objective effective UID of the given task.
> +    ///
> +    /// You should probably not be using this; the effective UID is normally
> +    /// only relevant in subjective credentials.
>      #[inline]
>      pub fn euid(&self) -> Kuid {
>          // SAFETY: It's always safe to call `task_euid` on a valid task.
> @@ -371,7 +374,7 @@ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
>  impl Eq for Task {}
>  
>  impl Kuid {
> -    /// Get the current euid.
> +    /// Get the current subjective euid.

For consistency this should be "subjective effective UID".

Best,
Gary

>      #[inline]
>      pub fn current_euid() -> Kuid {
>          // SAFETY: Just an FFI call.


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-07 11:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-07  9:48 [PATCH v3 0/2] Delete task_euid() Alice Ryhl
2026-05-07  9:48 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors Alice Ryhl
2026-05-07 11:08   ` Gary Guo [this message]
2026-05-07 12:03     ` Alice Ryhl
2026-05-07  9:48 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] cred: delete task_euid() Alice Ryhl

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