From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"Saenz Julienne, Nicolas" <nsaenz@amazon.es>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<luto@kernel.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>, <chao.gao@intel.com>,
<hch@infradead.org>, <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX
Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 22:20:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <afpPt7gObsyFkPRy@wieczorr-mobl1.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4cb5f8e-caf5-4513-9538-edaaea20de2d@citrix.com>
On 2026-05-05 at 19:30:21 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>On 05/05/2026 7:04 pm, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
>> Hello!
>>
>>
>> On 2026-04-23 at 15:56:54 -0700, Xin Li wrote:
>>>> On Apr 23, 2026, at 7:35 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> wrote:
>>>> Here's one to get you started (untested as I haven't found suitable
>>>> hardware to test it on).
>>> Same here for me now :(
>> I ran David's selftest on a PTL laptop and ran into a couple of issues.
>>
>> ...
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Test 1: ICEBP (INT1) — should be EVENT_TYPE_PRIV_SWEXC (5) */
>>>> + fred_handler_called = false;
>>>> + asm volatile("lea 1f(%%rip), %0\n\t"
>>>> + ".byte 0xf1\n\t"
>>>> + "1:" : "=r"(expected_rip) :: "memory");
>>>> + check_fred_event(expected_rip, DB_VECTOR, EVENT_TYPE_PRIV_SWEXC,
>>>> + "ICEBP");
>>>> + GUEST_SYNC(0);
>> The above event type test seems to fail and return 0x3 instead of 0x5:
>>
>> Random seed: 0x6b8b4567
>> Testing FRED event types with EPT fault on stack
>> ==== Test Assertion Failure ====
>> x86/int1_fred_test.c:120: event_type == expected_type
>> pid=16646 tid=16646 errno=4 - Interrupted system call
>> 1 0x0000000000413349: assert_on_unhandled_exception at processor.c:659
>> 2 0x0000000000407d36: _vcpu_run at kvm_util.c:1703
>> 3 (inlined by) vcpu_run at kvm_util.c:1714
>> 4 0x0000000000403104: main at int1_fred_test.c:207
>> 5 0x00007ff8d4c2a1c9: ?? ??:0
>> 6 0x00007ff8d4c2a28a: ?? ??:0
>> 7 0x0000000000403314: _start at ??:?
>> 0x3 != 0x5 (event_type != expected_type)
>>
>> after a little digging I think the issue could be this in arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:
>>
>> static inline bool kvm_exception_is_soft(unsigned int nr)
>> {
>> return (nr == BP_VECTOR) || (nr == OF_VECTOR);
>> }
>>
>> Since ICEBP(INT1) results in a DB_VECTOR it's not take into account and the
>> check fails. Then in vmx_inject_exception() INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION is picked
>> which is 0x3 when decoded.
>
>That's a real bug then.
>
>> I think you'd need to add another check in vmx_inject_exception() to handle that
>> DB_VECTOR too. Simply changing the event type if the vector is of DB_VECTOR type
>> fixes that problem but then the selftest fails in other places (assert
>> fred_handler_called and saved rip vs expected_rip). I didn't yet have the time
>> to figure out what could be wrong there, maybe you would have more of an idea :)
>
>#DB is intercepted to mitigate CVE-2015-8104 (systemwide DoS). But, to
>start with, check that the test passes when #DB is not intercepted.
>That's the basecase for architectural behaviour.
I take it you mean dropping the ICEBP selftest test case and just checking INT3
and INT $0x20? In that case the other two tests pass after a minor change -
namely in guest_code() the expected_rip needs to be volatile as well. Otherwise
there is a RIP mismatch.
Or did you mean I should check something else?
>When #DB is intercepted, the type in EXIT_INTR_INFO needs preserving and
>forwarding into ENTRY_INTR_INFO, because that is what distinguishes an
>ICEBP #DB from other #DBs. There's no way of recovering this detail
>after the fact.
>
>On the injection side, some #DB's are traps and some are faults. ICEBP
>will have a fault-like VMExit but need trap semantics, so like other
>soft interrupts, need INSN_LEN adding to %rip. But, type=3 #DBs need to
>leave %rip unchanged.
>
>~Andrew
--
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-05 20:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20 9:24 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28 2:31 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07 7:38 ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 2:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 6:44 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 0:45 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 1:56 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:27 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:56 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 2:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:59 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 7:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01 6:20 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:19 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 8:05 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 3:24 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12 ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:54 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07 2:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07 3:05 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:13 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:26 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 7:20 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 5:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 7:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:56 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 8:07 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:09 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 9:46 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:30 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 0:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52 ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:00 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:19 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 2:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08 ` Xin Li
2026-04-23 14:35 ` David Woodhouse
2026-04-23 22:56 ` Xin Li
2026-05-05 18:04 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-05 18:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-05-05 19:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-05 20:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman [this message]
2026-05-05 20:27 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-05-06 14:05 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 7:49 ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 12:59 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 13:35 ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 13:53 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 14:01 ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 23:00 ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-08 14:25 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-08 14:46 ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-08 18:06 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
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