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From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Saenz Julienne, Nicolas" <nsaenz@amazon.es>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<luto@kernel.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>, <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	<hch@infradead.org>, <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX
Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 22:20:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <afpPt7gObsyFkPRy@wieczorr-mobl1.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4cb5f8e-caf5-4513-9538-edaaea20de2d@citrix.com>

On 2026-05-05 at 19:30:21 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>On 05/05/2026 7:04 pm, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
>> Hello!
>>
>>
>> On 2026-04-23 at 15:56:54 -0700, Xin Li wrote:
>>>> On Apr 23, 2026, at 7:35 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> wrote:
>>>> Here's one to get you started (untested as I haven't found suitable
>>>> hardware to test it on).
>>> Same here for me now :(
>> I ran David's selftest on a PTL laptop and ran into a couple of issues.
>>
>> ...
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Test 1: ICEBP (INT1) — should be EVENT_TYPE_PRIV_SWEXC (5) */
>>>> + fred_handler_called = false;
>>>> + asm volatile("lea 1f(%%rip), %0\n\t"
>>>> +     ".byte 0xf1\n\t"
>>>> +     "1:" : "=r"(expected_rip) :: "memory");
>>>> + check_fred_event(expected_rip, DB_VECTOR, EVENT_TYPE_PRIV_SWEXC,
>>>> + "ICEBP");
>>>> + GUEST_SYNC(0);
>> The above event type test seems to fail and return 0x3 instead of 0x5:
>>
>> Random seed: 0x6b8b4567
>> Testing FRED event types with EPT fault on stack
>> ==== Test Assertion Failure ====
>>   x86/int1_fred_test.c:120: event_type == expected_type
>>   pid=16646 tid=16646 errno=4 - Interrupted system call
>>      1  0x0000000000413349: assert_on_unhandled_exception at processor.c:659
>>      2  0x0000000000407d36: _vcpu_run at kvm_util.c:1703
>>      3   (inlined by) vcpu_run at kvm_util.c:1714
>>      4  0x0000000000403104: main at int1_fred_test.c:207
>>      5  0x00007ff8d4c2a1c9: ?? ??:0
>>      6  0x00007ff8d4c2a28a: ?? ??:0
>>      7  0x0000000000403314: _start at ??:?
>>   0x3 != 0x5 (event_type != expected_type)
>>
>> after a little digging I think the issue could be this in arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:
>>
>> 	static inline bool kvm_exception_is_soft(unsigned int nr)
>> 	{
>> 		return (nr == BP_VECTOR) || (nr == OF_VECTOR);
>> 	}
>>
>> Since ICEBP(INT1) results in a DB_VECTOR it's not take into account and the
>> check fails. Then in vmx_inject_exception() INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION is picked
>> which is 0x3 when decoded.
>
>That's a real bug then.
>
>> I think you'd need to add another check in vmx_inject_exception() to handle that
>> DB_VECTOR too. Simply changing the event type if the vector is of DB_VECTOR type
>> fixes that problem but then the selftest fails in other places (assert
>> fred_handler_called and saved rip vs expected_rip). I didn't yet have the time
>> to figure out what could be wrong there, maybe you would have more of an idea :)
>
>#DB is intercepted to mitigate CVE-2015-8104 (systemwide DoS).  But, to
>start with, check that the test passes when #DB is not intercepted. 
>That's the basecase for architectural behaviour.

I take it you mean dropping the ICEBP selftest test case and just checking INT3
and INT $0x20? In that case the other two tests pass after a minor change -
namely in guest_code() the expected_rip needs to be volatile as well. Otherwise
there is a RIP mismatch.

Or did you mean I should check something else?

>When #DB is intercepted, the type in EXIT_INTR_INFO needs preserving and
>forwarding into ENTRY_INTR_INFO, because that is what distinguishes an
>ICEBP #DB from other #DBs.  There's no way of recovering this detail
>after the fact.
>
>On the injection side, some #DB's are traps and some are faults.  ICEBP
>will have a fault-like VMExit but need trap semantics, so like other
>soft interrupts, need INSN_LEN adding to %rip.  But, type=3 #DBs need to
>leave %rip unchanged.
>
>~Andrew

-- 
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-05 20:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20  9:24   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05  0:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28  2:31     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07  7:38     ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  2:44   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  6:44   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14     ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  0:45       ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  1:56         ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22           ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:27       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25           ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:49   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:56       ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  2:30       ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17  0:43     ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:59   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  7:23   ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01  6:20     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:19   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  8:05   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  3:24   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12     ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50         ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:54   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07  2:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  3:05     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:13   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:26   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  7:20       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09           ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46             ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  5:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:40   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  7:30   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:56     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  8:07       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:09         ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  9:46           ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04               ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58             ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:32   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:30     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07       ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10         ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  0:44       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52         ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:00   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:19     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  2:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:35   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:20   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08   ` Xin Li
2026-04-23 14:35 ` David Woodhouse
2026-04-23 22:56   ` Xin Li
2026-05-05 18:04     ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-05 18:30       ` Andrew Cooper
2026-05-05 19:29         ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-05 20:20         ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman [this message]
2026-05-05 20:27           ` Andrew Cooper
2026-05-06 14:05             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07  7:49           ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 12:59             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 13:35               ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 13:53                 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 14:01                   ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 23:00                   ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-08 14:25                     ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-08 14:46                       ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-08 18:06                         ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman

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