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From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
	Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
	Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
	Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
	Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
	Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
	Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:38:25 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5amrr8yldi.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261105-device-trust-core-v1-17-1e536825b4eb@nvidia.com>

Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> writes:

> From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
>
> Convert the PCI specific untrusted to use the common device trust
> level. Adversarial means the same thing untrusted does.
>
> PCI discovery keeps the logic that set untrusted: it looks for removable
> PCI devices with arch_pci_dev_is_removable() and defaults them to an
> adversarial policy. Treat a disabled policy the same way when choosing
> the IOMMU domain. Do not record the ATS capability of such a device, as
> pci_ats_supported() rejected untrusted ones. Let the Intel write-buffer
> quirk apply, as it only adds flushing.
>

 [ ... 28 lines skipped ... ] 

> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
> index 78742aeba932d..a48fb511bfe6f 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
> @@ -589,16 +589,11 @@ static int iova_reserve_iommu_regions(struct device *dev,
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> -static bool dev_is_untrusted(struct device *dev)
> -{
> -	return dev_is_pci(dev) && to_pci_dev(dev)->untrusted;
> -}
> -

 [ ... 244 lines skipped ... ] 

> diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h
> index 65ea07c9ac35b..870ce14924905 100644
> --- a/include/linux/device.h
> +++ b/include/linux/device.h
> @@ -934,6 +934,11 @@ static inline bool device_iommu_mapped(struct device *dev)
>  	return (dev->iommu_group != NULL);
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool device_policy_is_adversarial(const struct device *dev)
> +{
> +	return READ_ONCE(dev->trust_policy) == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY;
> +}
> +
>  /* Get the wakeup routines, which depend on struct device */
>  #include <linux/pm_wakeup.h>
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h
> index aa3765a20a96c..087c63b177c85 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pci.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pci.h
> @@ -490,14 +490,6 @@ struct pci_dev {
>  	unsigned int	shpc_managed:1;		/* SHPC owned by shpchp */
>  	unsigned int	is_thunderbolt:1;	/* Thunderbolt controller */
>  	unsigned int	is_cxl:1;               /* Compute Express Link (CXL) */
> -	/*
> -	 * Devices marked being untrusted are the ones that can potentially
> -	 * execute DMA attacks and similar. They are typically connected
> -	 * through external ports such as Thunderbolt but not limited to
> -	 * that. When an IOMMU is enabled they should be getting full
> -	 * mappings to make sure they cannot access arbitrary memory.
> -	 */
> -	unsigned int	untrusted:1;
>  	/*
>  	 * Info from the platform, e.g., ACPI or device tree, may mark a
>  	 * device as "external-facing".  An external-facing device is
> @@ -616,6 +608,28 @@ static inline struct pci_dev *to_pci_dev(const struct device *dev)
>  {
>  	return container_of(dev, struct pci_dev, dev);
>  }
> +
> +static inline bool
> +pci_dev_default_is_restricted(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
> +{
> +	enum device_trust_policy policy = READ_ONCE(pdev->dev.trust_policy);
> +
> +	return policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED ||
> +	       policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY;
> +}
> +

Could you clarify how this series will work alongside device acceptance
and private-memory access?

In particular, what should callers of device_cc_accepted() use under
this model? My understanding is that trust describes the operating
policy, not TDISP acceptance or DMA access to private memory. Therefore,
neither FULL nor ADVERSARY alone indicates whether a device can access
private memory?

You also mention that once a trust level other than DISABLED is set, it
cannot be changed during the device's lifetime. If a device initially
operates in ADVERSARY mode and later attestation justifies FULL
operation, is that transition intentionally unsupported for the existing
device object? As documented, unbind/rebind and reset preserve the
committed level.

Some of these details are discussed in this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260708143153.GH118978@ziepe.ca/

It would help to describe how the trust framework fits together with
those separate mechanisms, including which pieces are left for follow-up
series.

-aneesh

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 13:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-05 11:42 [PATCH 00/17] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 01/17] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/17] Input: serio " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:05   ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 19:19     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:34       ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-06 14:33         ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 03/17] net: phy: Attach generic PHY " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:50   ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:35     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 15:33   ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:45     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 04/17] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 05/17] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:24   ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 18:44     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:04       ` Alan Stern
2026-11-08 11:09         ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-08 16:59           ` Alan Stern
2026-11-09  9:23             ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 06/17] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 07/17] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 08/17] driver core: Allow userspace to detect EPROBE_DEFER when using sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 09/17] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:10   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:27     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:40       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:59         ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 14:03           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:17             ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:26             ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 15:45               ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:06           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 14:43           ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 14:59             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:09             ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 13:42       ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 17:02   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 19:06     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 11/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 12/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 13/17] driver core: Preserve trust commitment beyond driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 14/17] driver core: Add a global initial device trust policy Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 15/17] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 16/17] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:12   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:18     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:26       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:03       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:43         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 16:26           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 18:26           ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 13:08   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-11-16 13:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe

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