From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
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Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin"
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"Matt Fleming"
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"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky"
<boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Larry Woodman"
<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini"
<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
Date: Fri, 07 Jul 2017 08:39:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170707133900.29711.29533.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170707133804.29711.1616.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address
space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this
reduction.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c47ceee..5bdcbd4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -613,15 +613,19 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
/*
- * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has not enabled SME
- * then don't advertise the feature (set in scattered.c)
+ * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has enabld SME then
+ * adjust x86_phys_bits by the SME physical address space reduction
+ * value. If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
+ * feature (set in scattered.c).
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
u64 msr;
/* Check if SME is enabled */
rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
- if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT)
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
+ else
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
}
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-07 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-07 13:38 [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170707133804.29711.1616.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170711055659.GA4554-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
[not found] ` <CAMzpN2gq0TZbgy-3PUixwvL+6ECX5bOdE0XZsLtGFXA+-Embeg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 9:24 ` [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <20170708092426.prf7xmmnv6xvdqx4-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
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