From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: Brian Gerst <brgerst-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>,
linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Matt Fleming"
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers"
<x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Larry Woodman"
<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin"
<mst-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky"
<boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 10:02:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <81fbf5db-c42f-cfe6-5d31-d60adbd18f26@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMzpN2gq0TZbgy-3PUixwvL+6ECX5bOdE0XZsLtGFXA+-Embeg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On 7/10/2017 11:58 PM, Brian Gerst wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 3:50 PM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>> On 7/8/2017 7:57 AM, Brian Gerst wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
>>>> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
>>>> perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
>>>> mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
>>>> resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
>>>> that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
>>>> intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
>>>> bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
>>>>
>>>> Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
>>>> usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
>>>> remaining ioremap() path.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 7 +------
>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>> index 4c1b5fd..bfc3e2d 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>>>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
>>>> #include <linux/slab.h>
>>>> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>>>> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>>>>
>>>> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
>>>> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
>>>> @@ -106,12 +107,6 @@ static void __iomem
>>>> *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> - * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
>>>> - */
>>>> - if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
>>>> - return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
>>>> -
>>>> - /*
>>>> * Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
>>>> */
>>>> pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>>
>>>
>>> Removing this also affects 32-bit, which is more likely to access
>>> legacy devices in this range. Put in a check for SME instead
>>
>>
>> I originally had a check for SME here in a previous version of the
>> patch. Thomas Gleixner recommended removing the check so that the code
>> path was always exercised regardless of the state of SME in order to
>> better detect issues:
>>
>> http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149803067811436&w=2
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>
> Looking a bit closer, this shortcut doesn't set the caching
> attributes. So it's probably best to get rid of it anyways. Also
> note, there is a corresponding check in iounmap().
Good catch. I'll update the patch to include the removal of the ISA
checks in the iounmap() path as well.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> --
> Brian Gerst
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-11 15:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-07 13:38 [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170707133804.29711.1616.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170711055659.GA4554-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
[not found] ` <CAMzpN2gq0TZbgy-3PUixwvL+6ECX5bOdE0XZsLtGFXA+-Embeg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 9:24 ` [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <20170708092426.prf7xmmnv6xvdqx4-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=81fbf5db-c42f-cfe6-5d31-d60adbd18f26@amd.com \
--to=thomas.lendacky-5c7gfcevmho@public.gmane.org \
--cc=arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org \
--cc=aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org \
--cc=boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org \
--cc=brgerst-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org \
--cc=brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org \
--cc=corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org \
--cc=dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org \
--cc=kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org \
--cc=kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org \
--cc=luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org \
--cc=lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org \
--cc=mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=mst-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org \
--cc=x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox