From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v10 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 15:38:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240826223835.3928819-17-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
The function tpm_tis_request_locality() is expected to return the locality
value that was requested, or a negative error code upon failure. If it is called
while locality_count of struct tis_data is non-zero, no actual locality request
will be sent. Because the ret variable is initially set to 0, the
locality_count will still get increased, and the function will return 0. For a
caller, this would indicate that locality 0 was successfully requested and not
the state changes just mentioned.
Additionally, the function __tpm_tis_request_locality() provides inconsistent
error codes. It will provide either a failed IO write or a -1 should it have
timed out waiting for locality request to succeed.
This commit changes __tpm_tis_request_locality() to return valid negative error
codes to reflect the reason it fails. It then adjusts the return value check in
tpm_tis_request_locality() to check for a non-negative return value before
incrementing locality_cout. In addition, the initial value of the ret value is
set to a negative error to ensure the check does not pass if
__tpm_tis_request_locality() is not called.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
index 22ebf679ea69..20a8b341be0d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int __tpm_tis_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int l)
again:
timeout = stop - jiffies;
if ((long)timeout <= 0)
- return -1;
+ return -EBUSY;
rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(priv->int_queue,
(check_locality
(chip, l)),
@@ -229,18 +229,21 @@ static int __tpm_tis_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int l)
tpm_msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);
} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
}
- return -1;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
static int tpm_tis_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int l)
{
struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret = -EBUSY;
+
+ if (l < 0 || l > TPM_MAX_LOCALITY)
+ return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&priv->locality_count_mutex);
if (priv->locality_count == 0)
ret = __tpm_tis_request_locality(chip, l);
- if (!ret)
+ if (ret >= 0)
priv->locality_count++;
mutex_unlock(&priv->locality_count_mutex);
return ret;
--
2.39.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-26 22:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-26 22:38 [PATCH v10 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-27 17:19 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 20:09 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:09 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-28 20:19 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-29 13:23 ` Jonathan McDowell
2024-08-29 13:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 15:13 ` ross.philipson
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