Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch

[ross.philipson@oracle.com]

On 8/27/24 3:28 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 27 Aug 2024 at 00:44, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>>
>> This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub
>> launch of the Linux kernel is done. This is accomplished by providing
>> a handler to jump to when a Secure Launch is in progress. This has to be
>> called after the EFI stub does Exit Boot Services.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> 
> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

Thank you for the two reviews
Ross

> 
>> ---
>>   drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h  |  8 ++
>>   drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   2 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
>> index d33ccbc4a2c6..baf42d6d0796 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
>> @@ -135,6 +135,14 @@ void efi_set_u64_split(u64 data, u32 *lo, u32 *hi)
>>          *hi = upper_32_bits(data);
>>   }
>>
>> +static inline
>> +void efi_set_u64_form(u32 lo, u32 hi, u64 *data)
>> +{
>> +       u64 upper = hi;
>> +
>> +       *data = lo | upper << 32;
>> +}
>> +
>>   /*
>>    * Allocation types for calls to boottime->allocate_pages.
>>    */
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
>> index f8e465da344d..04786c1b3b5d 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
>> @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
>>   #include <linux/efi.h>
>>   #include <linux/pci.h>
>>   #include <linux/stddef.h>
>> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>>
>>   #include <asm/efi.h>
>>   #include <asm/e820/types.h>
>> @@ -923,6 +925,99 @@ static efi_status_t efi_decompress_kernel(unsigned long *kernel_entry)
>>          return efi_adjust_memory_range_protection(addr, kernel_text_size);
>>   }
>>
>> +static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt,
>> +                                                struct boot_params *boot_params)
>> +{
>> +       struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
>> +       struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
>> +       struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle;
>> +       bool updated = false;
>> +       int i;
>> +
>> +       txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
>> +       if (!txt_info)
>> +               return false;
>> +
>> +       os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
>> +       if (!os_mle)
>> +               return false;
>> +
>> +       os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params;
>> +
>> +       policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
>> +       if (!policy)
>> +               return false;
>> +
>> +       for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
>> +               if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) {
>> +                       policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
>> +                       updated = true;
>> +                       break;
>> +               }
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       /*
>> +        * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will
>> +        * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage
>> +        * of the Secure Launch boot.
>> +        */
>> +       if (image) {
>> +               struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base +
>> +                                           offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
>> +               u64 cmdline_ptr;
>> +
>> +               boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size;
>> +               boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset;
>> +               efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr,
>> +                                &cmdline_ptr);
>> +               boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       return updated;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params)
>> +{
>> +       struct slr_entry_dl_info *dlinfo;
>> +       efi_guid_t guid = SLR_TABLE_GUID;
>> +       dl_handler_func handler_callback;
>> +       struct slr_table *slrt;
>> +
>> +       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       /*
>> +        * The presence of this table indicated a Secure Launch
>> +        * is being requested.
>> +        */
>> +       slrt = (struct slr_table *)get_efi_config_table(guid);
>> +       if (!slrt || slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC)
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       /*
>> +        * Since the EFI stub library creates its own boot_params on entry, the
>> +        * SLRT and TXT heap have to be updated with this version.
>> +        */
>> +       if (!efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(slrt, boot_params))
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       /* Jump through DL stub to initiate Secure Launch */
>> +       dlinfo = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_DL_INFO);
>> +
>> +       handler_callback = (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler;
>> +
>> +       handler_callback(&dlinfo->bl_context);
>> +
>> +       unreachable();
>> +}
>> +
>>   static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr,
>>                                      struct boot_params *boot_params)
>>   {
>> @@ -1050,6 +1145,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
>>                  goto fail;
>>          }
>>
>> +       /* If a Secure Launch is in progress, this never returns */
>> +       efi_secure_launch(boot_params);
>> +
>>          /*
>>           * Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's
>>           * GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI.
>> --
>> 2.39.3
>>