From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@windriver.com>,
Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Changbin Du <changbin.du@huawei.com>,
Huang Shijie <shijie@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv8 13/17] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 12:58:42 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250701095849.2360685-14-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250701095849.2360685-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Handlers for #GP and #SS will now share code to decode the exception
address and retrieve the exception hint string.
The helper, enum, and array should be renamed as they are no longer
specific to #GP.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 5206eb0ab01a..ceb091f17a5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -633,28 +633,28 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_bounds)
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
}
-enum kernel_gp_hint {
- GP_NO_HINT,
- GP_NON_CANONICAL,
- GP_CANONICAL,
- GP_LASS_VIOLATION,
- GP_NULL_POINTER,
+enum kernel_exc_hint {
+ EXC_NO_HINT,
+ EXC_NON_CANONICAL,
+ EXC_CANONICAL,
+ EXC_LASS_VIOLATION,
+ EXC_NULL_POINTER,
};
-static const char * const kernel_gp_hint_help[] = {
- [GP_NON_CANONICAL] = "probably for non-canonical address",
- [GP_CANONICAL] = "maybe for address",
- [GP_LASS_VIOLATION] = "LASS prevented access to address",
- [GP_NULL_POINTER] = "kernel NULL pointer dereference",
+static const char * const kernel_exc_hint_help[] = {
+ [EXC_NON_CANONICAL] = "probably for non-canonical address",
+ [EXC_CANONICAL] = "maybe for address",
+ [EXC_LASS_VIOLATION] = "LASS prevented access to address",
+ [EXC_NULL_POINTER] = "kernel NULL pointer dereference",
};
/*
- * When an uncaught #GP occurs, try to determine the memory address accessed by
- * the instruction and return that address to the caller. Also, try to figure
- * out whether any part of the access to that address was non-canonical.
+ * When an uncaught #GP/#SS occurs, try to determine the memory address accessed
+ * by the instruction and return that address to the caller. Also, try to
+ * figure out whether any part of the access to that address was non-canonical.
*/
-static enum kernel_gp_hint get_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long *addr)
+static enum kernel_exc_hint get_kernel_exc_address(struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long *addr)
{
u8 insn_buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
struct insn insn;
@@ -662,15 +662,15 @@ static enum kernel_gp_hint get_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs,
if (copy_from_kernel_nofault(insn_buf, (void *)regs->ip,
MAX_INSN_SIZE))
- return GP_NO_HINT;
+ return EXC_NO_HINT;
ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, insn_buf);
if (ret < 0)
- return GP_NO_HINT;
+ return EXC_NO_HINT;
*addr = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
if (*addr == -1UL)
- return GP_NO_HINT;
+ return EXC_NO_HINT;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
@@ -680,16 +680,16 @@ static enum kernel_gp_hint get_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs,
*/
if (*addr < ~__VIRTUAL_MASK &&
*addr + insn.opnd_bytes - 1 > __VIRTUAL_MASK)
- return GP_NON_CANONICAL;
+ return EXC_NON_CANONICAL;
else if (*addr < ~__VIRTUAL_MASK &&
cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS)) {
if (*addr < PAGE_SIZE)
- return GP_NULL_POINTER;
- return GP_LASS_VIOLATION;
+ return EXC_NULL_POINTER;
+ return EXC_LASS_VIOLATION;
}
#endif
- return GP_CANONICAL;
+ return EXC_CANONICAL;
}
#define GPFSTR "general protection fault"
@@ -808,8 +808,8 @@ static void gp_user_force_sig_segv(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
{
char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
- enum kernel_gp_hint hint = GP_NO_HINT;
- unsigned long gp_addr;
+ enum kernel_exc_hint hint = EXC_NO_HINT;
+ unsigned long exc_addr;
if (user_mode(regs) && try_fixup_enqcmd_gp())
return;
@@ -846,21 +846,21 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
if (error_code)
snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "segment-related " GPFSTR);
else
- hint = get_kernel_gp_address(regs, &gp_addr);
+ hint = get_kernel_exc_address(regs, &exc_addr);
- if (hint != GP_NO_HINT) {
+ if (hint != EXC_NO_HINT) {
snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), GPFSTR ", %s 0x%lx",
- kernel_gp_hint_help[hint], gp_addr);
+ kernel_exc_hint_help[hint], exc_addr);
}
/*
* KASAN is interested only in the non-canonical case, clear it
* otherwise.
*/
- if (hint != GP_NON_CANONICAL)
- gp_addr = 0;
+ if (hint != EXC_NON_CANONICAL)
+ exc_addr = 0;
- die_addr(desc, regs, error_code, gp_addr);
+ die_addr(desc, regs, error_code, exc_addr);
exit:
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
--
2.47.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-01 9:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-01 9:58 [PATCHv8 00/17] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 01/17] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 02/17] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 8:44 ` David Laight
2025-07-03 10:39 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 12:15 ` David Laight
2025-07-03 13:33 ` Vegard Nossum
2025-07-03 16:52 ` David Laight
2025-07-03 14:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 17:02 ` David Laight
2025-07-03 17:13 ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-04 9:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-06 9:13 ` David Laight
2025-07-07 8:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-07 9:33 ` David Laight
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 03/17] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 18:44 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 04/17] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning setup until after EFI initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 19:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-02 9:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-02 10:05 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-04 12:23 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 05/17] efi: Disable LASS around set_virtual_address_map() EFI call Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 06/17] x86/vsyscall: Do not require X86_PF_INSTR to emulate vsyscall Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 07/17] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the #PF emulation code Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 08/17] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 09/17] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 10/17] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 11/17] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 22:51 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 12/17] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 0:36 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-02 10:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2025-07-02 0:54 ` [PATCHv8 13/17] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 14/17] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 1:35 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-02 2:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 2:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 10:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 14:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 14:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 17:10 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 23:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-07-03 0:44 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-06 9:22 ` David Laight
2025-07-06 15:07 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 13:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 17:56 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-03 10:40 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 20:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-03 11:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 20:12 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-04 9:23 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 15/17] x86/cpu: Make LAM depend on LASS Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 23:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 16/17] x86/cpu: Enable LASS during CPU initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 9:58 ` [PATCHv8 17/17] x86: Re-enable Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 23:13 ` Sohil Mehta
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