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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@windriver.com>,
	Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
	Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
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	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Changbin Du <changbin.du@huawei.com>,
	Huang Shijie <shijie@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv8 03/17] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives
Date: Tue,  1 Jul 2025 12:58:32 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250701095849.2360685-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250701095849.2360685-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>

For patching, the kernel initializes a temporary mm area in the lower
half of the address range. See commit 4fc19708b165 ("x86/alternatives:
Initialize temporary mm for patching").

Disable LASS enforcement during patching to avoid triggering a #GP
fault.

The objtool warns due to a call to a non-allowed function that exists
outside of the stac/clac guard, or references to any function with a
dynamic function pointer inside the guard. See the Objtool warnings
section #9 in the document tools/objtool/Documentation/objtool.txt.

Considering that patching is usually small, replace the memcpy and
memset functions in the text poking functions with their inline versions
respectively.

Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h   | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
index 4f84d421d1cf..d0cc24348641 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
@@ -23,18 +23,47 @@
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
 
+/*
+ * The CLAC/STAC instructions toggle the enforcement of X86_FEATURE_SMAP and
+ * X86_FEATURE_LASS.
+ *
+ * SMAP enforcement is based on the _PAGE_BIT_USER bit in the page tables: the
+ * kernel is not allowed to touch pages with the bit set unless the AC bit is
+ * set.
+ *
+ * LASS enforcement is based on bit 63 of the virtual address. The kernel is
+ * not allowed to touch memory in the lower half of the virtual address space
+ * unless the AC bit is set.
+ *
+ * Use stac()/clac() when accessing userspace (_PAGE_USER) mappings,
+ * regardless of location.
+ *
+ * Use lass_stac()/lass_clac() when accessing kernel mappings (!_PAGE_USER)
+ * in the lower half of the address space.
+ *
+ * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
+ */
+
 static __always_inline void clac(void)
 {
-	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
 	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 }
 
 static __always_inline void stac(void)
 {
-	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
 	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 }
 
+static __always_inline void lass_clac(void)
+{
+	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void lass_stac(void)
+{
+	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+}
+
 static __always_inline unsigned long smap_save(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index ea1d984166cd..3d2bcb7682eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -2447,16 +2447,26 @@ void __init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
 __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *text_poke_mm;
 __ro_after_init unsigned long text_poke_mm_addr;
 
+/*
+ * Text poking creates and uses a mapping in the lower half of the
+ * address space. Relax LASS enforcement when accessing the poking
+ * address.
+ */
+
 static void text_poke_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
 {
-	memcpy(dst, src, len);
+	lass_stac();
+	__inline_memcpy(dst, src, len);
+	lass_clac();
 }
 
 static void text_poke_memset(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
 {
 	int c = *(const int *)src;
 
-	memset(dst, c, len);
+	lass_stac();
+	__inline_memset(dst, c, len);
+	lass_clac();
 }
 
 typedef void text_poke_f(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len);
-- 
2.47.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-07-01  9:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-01  9:58 [PATCHv8 00/17] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 01/17] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 02/17] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03  8:44   ` David Laight
2025-07-03 10:39     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 12:15       ` David Laight
2025-07-03 13:33         ` Vegard Nossum
2025-07-03 16:52           ` David Laight
2025-07-03 14:10         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 17:02           ` David Laight
2025-07-03 17:13   ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-04  9:04     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-06  9:13     ` David Laight
2025-07-07  8:02       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-07  9:33         ` David Laight
2025-07-01  9:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2025-07-01 18:44   ` [PATCHv8 03/17] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 04/17] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning setup until after EFI initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 19:03   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-02  9:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 23:10   ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-02 10:05     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-04 12:23       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 05/17] efi: Disable LASS around set_virtual_address_map() EFI call Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 06/17] x86/vsyscall: Do not require X86_PF_INSTR to emulate vsyscall Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 07/17] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the #PF emulation code Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 08/17] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 09/17] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 10/17] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 11/17] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 22:51   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 12/17] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02  0:36   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-02 10:10     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 13/17] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02  0:54   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 14/17] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02  1:35   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-02  2:00     ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02  2:06     ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 10:17       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 14:37         ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 14:47           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 17:10             ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 23:42       ` Andrew Cooper
2025-07-03  0:44         ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-06  9:22       ` David Laight
2025-07-06 15:07         ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-07-02 13:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 17:56       ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-03 10:40         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-02 20:05       ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-03 11:31         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-03 20:12           ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-04  9:23             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 15/17] x86/cpu: Make LAM depend on LASS Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 23:03   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 16/17] x86/cpu: Enable LASS during CPU initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01  9:58 ` [PATCHv8 17/17] x86: Re-enable Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-01 23:13   ` Sohil Mehta

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