From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6.12] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 01:02:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-187298@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261028003746.31943-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] ext4: unvalidated rescan rec_len in ext4_readdir() bypasses tail check
--
commit f6671320411a20d7f17d0b2fabcaf53f7a52ec83
Author: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
This commit bounds the directory entry rescan loop in ext4_readdir() using the
minimum directory entry record length and validates that offset does not land
in a truncated block tail before entering the main entry-processing loop. If
offset falls into the trailing bytes at the end of the block, it logs a
directory error and advances ctx->pos to the next block.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260706041313.708346-1-yaokai34@huawei.com
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c
> index b278b5703c197..265e544cc3482 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -234,7 +235,10 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
> * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block
> * to make sure. */
> if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, info->cookie)) {
> - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) {
> + for (i = 0;
> + i <= sb->s_blocksize -
> + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode) &&
> + i < offset;) {
> de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)
> (bh->b_data + i);
> /* It's too expensive to do a full
> @@ -256,6 +260,17 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
> info->cookie = inode_query_iversion(inode);
> }
>
> + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize &&
> + offset > sb->s_blocksize -
> + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode))) {
> + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr,
> + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu",
> + "directory entry too close to block end",
> + offset, sb->s_blocksize);
> + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize);
> + goto next_block;
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
What happens in ext4_readdir() if a corrupted de->rec_len in the rescan loop
advances i past sb->s_blocksize?
In fs/ext4/dir.c:ext4_readdir(), when !inode_eq_iversion(inode, info->cookie)
triggers a rescan (for instance after ext4_dir_llseek()), the loop only checks
the lower bound of de->rec_len before adding it to i and updating ctx->pos:
if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, info->cookie)) {
for (i = 0;
i <= sb->s_blocksize -
ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode) &&
i < offset;) {
...
if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len,
sb->s_blocksize) < ext4_dir_rec_len(1,
inode))
break;
i += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len,
sb->s_blocksize);
}
offset = i;
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1))
| offset;
info->cookie = inode_query_iversion(inode);
}
Because de->rec_len is a 16-bit on-disk value, a corrupted entry can set
offset > sb->s_blocksize. That value is bitwise-ORed into ctx->pos, which
corrupts the upper block-number bits of ctx->pos, and info->cookie is updated
to match inode->i_version.
Then, because the new tail check requires offset < sb->s_blocksize:
if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize &&
offset > sb->s_blocksize -
ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode))) {
and the subsequent main loop also checks offset < sb->s_blocksize, an
oversized offset bypasses both EXT4_ERROR_FILE() and ext4_check_dir_entry() on
the corrupted block. On the next iteration of the outer loop, ext4_readdir()
will read the block corresponding to the corrupted ctx->pos at an arbitrary
mid-block offset = ctx->pos & (sb->s_blocksize - 1) without rescanning, since
info->cookie now matches inode->i_version.
Should the tail check (or the rescan loop) also catch offset > sb->s_blocksize
before bitwise-ORing offset into ctx->pos and validating info->cookie?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261028003746.31943-1-ebiggers@kernel.org?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-28 1:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 0:37 [PATCH 6.12] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent Eric Biggers
2026-10-28 1:02 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-28 1:13 ` Eric Biggers
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