From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] LSM: add security_execve_abort() hook
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 06:24:57 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202402070622.D2DCD9C4@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <999a4733-c554-43ca-a6e9-998c939fbeb8@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Sat, Feb 03, 2024 at 07:52:54PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> A regression caused by commit 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable
> file before doing anything else") has been fixed by commit 4759ff71f23e
> ("exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMs") and commit
> 3eab830189d9 ("uselib: remove use of __FMODE_EXEC"). While fixing this
> regression, Linus commented that we want to remove current->in_execve flag.
>
> The current->in_execve flag was introduced by commit f9ce1f1cda8b ("Add
> in_execve flag into task_struct.") when TOMOYO LSM was merged, and the
> reason was explained in commit f7433243770c ("LSM adapter functions.").
>
> In short, TOMOYO's design is not compatible with COW credential model
> introduced in Linux 2.6.29, and the current->in_execve flag was added for
> emulating security_bprm_free() hook which has been removed by introduction
> of COW credential model.
>
> security_task_alloc()/security_task_free() hooks have been removed by
> commit f1752eec6145 ("CRED: Detach the credentials from task_struct"),
> and these hooks have been revived by commit 1a2a4d06e1e9 ("security:
> create task_free security callback") and commit e4e55b47ed9a ("LSM: Revive
> security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob.").
>
> But security_bprm_free() hook did not revive until now. Now that Linus
> wants TOMOYO to stop carrying state across two independent execve() calls,
> and TOMOYO can stop carrying state if a hook for restoring previous state
> upon failed execve() call were provided, this patch revives the hook.
>
> Since security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds()
> hooks are called when an execve() request succeeded, we don't need to call
> security_bprm_free() hook when an execve() request succeeded. Therefore,
> this patch adds security_execve_abort() hook which is called only when an
> execve() request failed after successful prepare_bprm_creds() call.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
This looks good to me.
Given this touches execve and is related to the recent execve changes,
shall I carry this in the execve tree for testing and send a PR to Linus
for it before v6.8 releases?
There's already an Ack from Serge, so this seems a reasonable way to go
unless Paul would like it done some other way?
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-07 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-03 10:52 [PATCH v2 0/3] fs/exec: remove current->in_execve flag Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-03 10:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] LSM: add security_execve_abort() hook Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-07 14:24 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-02-07 14:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-07 15:21 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-07 15:43 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-07 16:45 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-07 17:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-07 18:12 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-07 22:22 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-08 0:57 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-03 10:53 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] tomoyo: replace current->in_execve flag with " Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-04 1:53 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-07 14:25 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-03 10:53 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] fs/exec: remove current->in_execve flag Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-07 14:26 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-05 3:28 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] " Serge Hallyn
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