From: Tao Cui <cui.tao@linux.dev>
To: clm@fb.com, dsterba@suse.com
Cc: josef@toxicpanda.com, brauner@kernel.org, sforshee@kernel.org,
linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, cui.tao@linux.dev,
Tao Cui <cuitao@kylinos.cn>
Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: use mount idmap for defrag permission check
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 11:41:46 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260813034146.1207640-1-cui.tao@linux.dev> (raw)
From: Tao Cui <cuitao@kylinos.cn>
btrfs_ioctl_defrag() checks MAY_WRITE with nop_mnt_idmap, which skips
the mount idmap. On an idmapped mount the owner comparison then uses
the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid, dropping the mapping.
Every other permission/owner check in btrfs ioctl uses
file_mnt_idmap(file) (e.g. :1152, :1310, :1946); this one missed it.
Switch to file_mnt_idmap(file). It equals nop_mnt_idmap on a normal
mount, and the check stays behind !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so only
unprivileged callers on idmapped btrfs change. The RO-fd note in the
comment above is about the file descriptor, not this inode check, and
is unaffected.
Signed-off-by: Tao Cui <cuitao@kylinos.cn>
---
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 72bc9d4f7708..607329dedd50 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_defrag(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
* running and allows defrag on files open in read-only mode.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE)) {
+ inode_permission(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, MAY_WRITE)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-13 3:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-13 3:41 Tao Cui [this message]
2026-08-13 6:34 ` [PATCH] btrfs: use mount idmap for defrag permission check Qu Wenruo
2026-08-13 17:11 ` Seth Forshee
2026-08-14 3:29 ` Qu Wenruo
2026-08-14 5:15 ` Tao Cui
2026-08-14 15:25 ` Seth Forshee
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