From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Qing Zhao <qing.zhao@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
Joseph Myers <josmyers@redhat.com>,
Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>,
Jeff Law <jeffreyalaw@gmail.com>,
Andrew Pinski <pinskia@gmail.com>,
Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>,
Martin Uecker <uecker@tugraz.at>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Jan Hubicka <hubicka@ucw.cz>,
Richard Earnshaw <richard.earnshaw@arm.com>,
Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com>,
Marcus Shawcroft <marcus.shawcroft@arm.com>,
Kyrylo Tkachov <kyrylo.tkachov@arm.com>,
Kito Cheng <kito.cheng@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Andrew Waterman <andrew@sifive.com>,
Jim Wilson <jim.wilson.gcc@gmail.com>,
Dan Li <ashimida.1990@gmail.com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@google.com>,
Joao Moreira <joao@overdrivepizza.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
"Osterlund, Sebastian" <sebastian.osterlund@intel.com>,
"Constable, Scott D" <scott.d.constable@intel.com>,
gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 0/7] Introduce Kernel Control Flow Integrity ABI [PR107048]
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 18:20:26 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251210022025.harder.803-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
Hi,
This series implements[1][2] the Linux Kernel Control Flow Integrity
ABI, which provides a function prototype based forward edge control flow
integrity protection by instrumenting every indirect call to check for
a hash value before the target function address. If the hash at the call
site and the hash at the target do not match, execution will trap.
I'm hoping we can land front- and middle-end and do architectures as
they also pass review. What do folks think? I'd really like to get this
in a position where more people can test with GCC snapshots, etc.
Thanks!
-Kees
Changes since v8[3], addressing Andrew's feedback:
- Split out aarch64 indirect branch logic into separate patch[4].
- Simplify aarch64 asm output.
- Clarify BTI interaction (it's safe) in commit log.
- Move kcfi compatibility checking into hook logic instead of overrides
in aarch64, i386, and riscv.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=107048
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/369
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20251120222105.us.687-kees@kernel.org/
[4] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=59a5fecfb260456dd60be687491717f3dbdb354f
Kees Cook (7):
typeinfo: Introduce KCFI typeinfo mangling API
kcfi: Add core Kernel Control Flow Integrity infrastructure
kcfi: Add regression test suite
x86: Add x86_64 Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation
aarch64: Add AArch64 Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation
arm: Add ARM 32-bit Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation
riscv: Add RISC-V Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation
gcc/kcfi.h | 59 ++
gcc/kcfi.cc | 696 ++++++++++++++++++
gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64-protos.h | 4 +
gcc/config/arm/arm-protos.h | 4 +
gcc/config/i386/i386-protos.h | 2 +-
gcc/config/i386/i386.h | 3 +-
gcc/config/riscv/riscv-protos.h | 3 +
gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.md | 56 ++
gcc/config/arm/arm.md | 62 ++
gcc/config/i386/i386.md | 63 +-
gcc/config/riscv/riscv.md | 76 +-
gcc/config/aarch64/aarch64.cc | 93 +++
gcc/config/arm/arm.cc | 170 +++++
gcc/config/i386/i386-expand.cc | 22 +-
gcc/config/i386/i386.cc | 210 +++++-
gcc/config/riscv/riscv.cc | 180 +++++
gcc/doc/extend.texi | 137 ++++
gcc/doc/invoke.texi | 127 ++++
gcc/doc/tm.texi | 32 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi.exp | 51 ++
gcc/testsuite/lib/target-supports.exp | 14 +
.../gcc.dg/builtin-typeinfo-errors.c | 28 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/builtin-typeinfo.c | 350 +++++++++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-aarch64-ilp32.c | 7 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-adjacency.c | 114 +++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-arm-fixed-ip.c | 15 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-arm-fixed-r12.c | 15 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-basics.c | 149 ++++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-call-sharing.c | 90 +++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-cold-partition.c | 126 ++++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-complex-addressing.c | 203 +++++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-complex-addressing.s | 0
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-ipa-robustness.c | 54 ++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-move-preservation.c | 118 +++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-no-sanitize-inline.c | 100 +++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-no-sanitize.c | 39 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-offset-validation.c | 38 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-entry-only.c | 64 ++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-incompatible.c | 7 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-large.c | 54 ++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-medium.c | 60 ++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-prefix-only.c | 61 ++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-32bit.c | 7 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-fixed-t1.c | 7 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-fixed-t2.c | 7 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-fixed-t3.c | 7 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-runtime.c | 276 +++++++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-tail-calls.c | 140 ++++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-trap-encoding.c | 69 ++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-trap-section.c | 29 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-32bit.c | 7 +
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-arity.c | 93 +++
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-fixed-r10.c | 7 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-fixed-r11.c | 7 +
.../gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-retpoline-r11.c | 40 +
gcc/Makefile.in | 2 +
gcc/c-family/c-common.h | 1 +
gcc/flag-types.h | 2 +
gcc/gimple.h | 22 +
gcc/kcfi-typeinfo.h | 32 +
gcc/tree-pass.h | 1 +
gcc/c-family/c-attribs.cc | 17 +-
gcc/c-family/c-common.cc | 2 +
gcc/c/c-parser.cc | 72 ++
gcc/common.opt | 8 +
gcc/df-scan.cc | 7 +
gcc/doc/tm.texi.in | 12 +
gcc/final.cc | 3 +
gcc/kcfi-typeinfo.cc | 516 +++++++++++++
gcc/opts.cc | 2 +
gcc/passes.cc | 1 +
gcc/passes.def | 1 +
gcc/rtl.def | 6 +
gcc/rtlanal.cc | 5 +
gcc/target.def | 39 +
gcc/toplev.cc | 12 +
gcc/tree-inline.cc | 10 +
gcc/varasm.cc | 37 +-
78 files changed, 5218 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 gcc/kcfi.h
create mode 100644 gcc/kcfi.cc
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi.exp
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/builtin-typeinfo-errors.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/builtin-typeinfo.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-aarch64-ilp32.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-adjacency.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-arm-fixed-ip.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-arm-fixed-r12.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-basics.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-call-sharing.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-cold-partition.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-complex-addressing.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-complex-addressing.s
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-ipa-robustness.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-move-preservation.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-no-sanitize-inline.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-no-sanitize.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-offset-validation.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-entry-only.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-incompatible.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-large.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-medium.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-patchable-prefix-only.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-32bit.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-fixed-t1.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-fixed-t2.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-riscv-fixed-t3.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-runtime.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-tail-calls.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-trap-encoding.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-trap-section.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-32bit.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-arity.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-fixed-r10.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-fixed-r11.c
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/kcfi/kcfi-x86-retpoline-r11.c
create mode 100644 gcc/kcfi-typeinfo.h
create mode 100644 gcc/kcfi-typeinfo.cc
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2025-12-10 2:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-10 2:20 Kees Cook [this message]
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] typeinfo: Introduce KCFI typeinfo mangling API Kees Cook
2025-12-12 23:07 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 1:24 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-13 1:29 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 1:43 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] kcfi: Add core Kernel Control Flow Integrity infrastructure Kees Cook
2025-12-10 4:00 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 2:30 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] kcfi: Add regression test suite Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] x86: Add x86_64 Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] aarch64: Add AArch64 " Kees Cook
2025-12-10 3:48 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-12 22:47 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 1:40 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] arm: Add ARM 32-bit " Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] riscv: Add RISC-V " Kees Cook
2025-12-10 18:55 ` [PATCH v9 0/7] Introduce Kernel Control Flow Integrity ABI [PR107048] Sam James
2025-12-11 0:07 ` Kees Cook
2026-01-01 22:42 ` Andrew Pinski
2026-01-02 3:42 ` Kees Cook
2026-01-09 5:48 ` Andrew Pinski
2026-01-09 18:22 ` Kees Cook
2026-01-09 18:43 ` Jeffrey Law
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