From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Cc: Qing Zhao <qing.zhao@oracle.com>, Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
Joseph Myers <josmyers@redhat.com>,
Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>,
Jeff Law <jeffreyalaw@gmail.com>,
Andrew Pinski <pinskia@gmail.com>,
Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>,
Martin Uecker <uecker@tugraz.at>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Jan Hubicka <hubicka@ucw.cz>,
Richard Earnshaw <richard.earnshaw@arm.com>,
Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com>,
Marcus Shawcroft <marcus.shawcroft@arm.com>,
Kyrylo Tkachov <kyrylo.tkachov@arm.com>,
Kito Cheng <kito.cheng@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Andrew Waterman <andrew@sifive.com>,
Jim Wilson <jim.wilson.gcc@gmail.com>,
Dan Li <ashimida.1990@gmail.com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@google.com>,
Joao Moreira <joao@overdrivepizza.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
"Osterlund, Sebastian" <sebastian.osterlund@intel.com>,
"Constable, Scott D" <scott.d.constable@intel.com>,
gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/7] Introduce Kernel Control Flow Integrity ABI [PR107048]
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2025 16:07:20 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202512101558.C8A68633@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <875xaei2u4.fsf@gentoo.org>
On Wed, Dec 10, 2025 at 06:55:31PM +0000, Sam James wrote:
> Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> writes:
>
> > Hi,
> >
> > This series implements[1][2] the Linux Kernel Control Flow Integrity
> > ABI, which provides a function prototype based forward edge control flow
> > integrity protection by instrumenting every indirect call to check for
> > a hash value before the target function address. If the hash at the call
> > site and the hash at the target do not match, execution will trap.
> >
> > I'm hoping we can land front- and middle-end and do architectures as
> > they also pass review. What do folks think? I'd really like to get this
> > in a position where more people can test with GCC snapshots, etc.
>
> What's the status of this on the kernel side? Could you link me to
> patches so I can have a play?
This works already with all standard config Linux versions that support
KCFI, though prior to v6.18, you'll get a confusing "CONFIG_CFI_CLANG"
config option for it, which still works since the feature gets detected
as present in the compiler.
Regardless, here's the CONFIG_CFI_CLANG -> CONFIG_CFI renaming patch
that landed in v6.18:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250923213422.1105654-3-kees@kernel.org/
And a clean-ups series that also landed in v6.18 I did just to help with
my own debugging while developing GCC KCFI, which contained 2 corner case
fixes:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250904033217.it.414-kees@kernel.org/
So, I guess, tl;dr: if you don't want to think about it at all, use
v6.18. Prior to that, it should work as long as you aren't building
without retpolines.
> Thank you for working on this. We get a lot of requests for it and
> pressure to build the kernel with Clang for this feature.
It's been a hoot. :) Thanks for any testing you can do!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-11 0:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-10 2:20 [PATCH v9 0/7] Introduce Kernel Control Flow Integrity ABI [PR107048] Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] typeinfo: Introduce KCFI typeinfo mangling API Kees Cook
2025-12-12 23:07 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 1:24 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-13 1:29 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 1:43 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] kcfi: Add core Kernel Control Flow Integrity infrastructure Kees Cook
2025-12-10 4:00 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 2:30 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] kcfi: Add regression test suite Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] x86: Add x86_64 Kernel Control Flow Integrity implementation Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] aarch64: Add AArch64 " Kees Cook
2025-12-10 3:48 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-12 22:47 ` Andrew Pinski
2025-12-13 1:40 ` Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] arm: Add ARM 32-bit " Kees Cook
2025-12-10 2:20 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] riscv: Add RISC-V " Kees Cook
2025-12-10 18:55 ` [PATCH v9 0/7] Introduce Kernel Control Flow Integrity ABI [PR107048] Sam James
2025-12-11 0:07 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2026-01-01 22:42 ` Andrew Pinski
2026-01-02 3:42 ` Kees Cook
2026-01-09 5:48 ` Andrew Pinski
2026-01-09 18:22 ` Kees Cook
2026-01-09 18:43 ` Jeffrey Law
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