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From: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic()
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:20:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <45b0265c-8aaa-42cf-959f-04583269cf99@quicinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240531214545.GPZlpFCaXtTGinbcfl@fat_crate.local>

On 5/31/2024 2:45 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 02:34:07PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 11:20:09PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>>> So I get an allergic reaction everytime we wag the dog - i.e., fix the
>>> code because some tool or option can't handle it even if it is
>>> a perfectly fine code. In that case it is an unused symbol.
>>>
>>> And frankly, I'd prefer the silly warning to denote that fortify doesn't
>>> need to do any checking there vs shutting it up just because.
>>
>> If we want to declare that x86 boot will never perform string handling
>> on strings with unknown lengths, we could just delete the boot/
>> implementation of __fortify_panic(), and make it a hard failure if such
>> cases are introduced in the future. This hasn't been a particularly
>> friendly solution in the past, though, as the fortify routines do tend
>> to grow additional coverage over time, so there may be future cases that
>> do trip the runtime checking...
> 
> Yes, and we should not do anything right now either.
> 
> As said, I'd prefer the warning which actually says that fortify
> routines are not used, which in itself is useful information vs shutting
> it up.
> 

I'm ok with whatever you want to do. I was just following the example from ARM
where they have a prototype in arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h to match the
implementation in arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c

/jeff

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-31 22:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-29 18:09 [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic() Jeff Johnson
2024-05-30 15:42 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-30 16:23   ` Jeff Johnson
2024-05-30 16:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 16:53       ` Kees Cook
2024-05-31 19:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 20:46           ` Kees Cook
2024-05-31 20:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 21:06               ` Kees Cook
2024-05-31 21:20                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 21:34                   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-31 21:45                     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 22:20                       ` Jeff Johnson [this message]
2024-05-31 16:28     ` Kees Cook
2024-05-31 18:28       ` Jeff Johnson
2024-05-31 18:34         ` Dan Carpenter
2024-06-01  7:27       ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-06-10  7:08         ` Nikolay Borisov

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