* Re: [PATCH v2 09/25] tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default
[not found] ` <019e96b5-4047-6458-0cfa-c9ef8f0d0470@gmail.com>
@ 2021-11-05 8:50 ` Leonard Crestez
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Leonard Crestez @ 2021-11-05 8:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Ahern, Dmitry Safonov, Eric Dumazet
Cc: David S. Miller, Herbert Xu, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Hideaki YOSHIFUJI,
Jakub Kicinski, Yuchung Cheng, Francesco Ruggeri, Mat Martineau,
Christoph Paasch, Ivan Delalande, Priyaranjan Jha, netdev,
linux-crypto, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel, Shuah Khan,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
On 11/3/21 4:39 AM, David Ahern wrote:
> On 11/1/21 10:34 AM, Leonard Crestez wrote:
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
>> index 97eb54774924..cc34de6e4817 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
>> @@ -17,10 +17,11 @@
>> #include <net/udp.h>
>> #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
>> #include <net/ping.h>
>> #include <net/protocol.h>
>> #include <net/netevent.h>
>> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
>>
>> static int two = 2;
>> static int three __maybe_unused = 3;
>> static int four = 4;
>> static int thousand = 1000;
>> @@ -583,10 +584,19 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
>> .mode = 0644,
>> .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
>> .extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min,
>> .extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max,
>> },
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
>> + {
>> + .procname = "tcp_authopt",
>> + .data = &sysctl_tcp_authopt,
>> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
>> + .mode = 0644,
>> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
>
> Just add it to the namespace set, and this could be a u8 (try to plug a
> hole if possible) with min/max specified:
>
> .maxlen = sizeof(u8),
> .mode = 0644,
> .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
> .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
>
>
> see icmp_echo_enable_probe as an example. And if you are not going to
> clean up when toggled off, you need a handler that tells the user it can
> not be disabled by erroring out on attempts to disable it.
This is deliberately per-system because the goal is to avoid possible
local privilege escalations by reducing the attack surface. Even the
smallest flaw could be exploited by a malicious application establishing
an authenticated connection on loopback.
Applications running in containers frequently have full access to
sysctls so making this per-namespace would defeat the original purpose.
I can't think of any reason to prevent using this feature at the
namespace level, it has no interesting effects outside TCP connections
for which it is enabled.
I also believe that as similar sysctl would be useful for TCP-MD5.
You're right about adding additional prints.
--
Regards,
Leonard
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