From: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@linux.microsoft.com>,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 02/12] drivers: hv: hv_common: Allocate Hyper-V output arg page when VSM is enabled
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 15:56:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260901225606.GA2583463@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260901171238.834601F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org>
On Tue, Sep 01, 2026 at 05:12:38PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
>
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [High] hv_apicid_to_vp_index() unconditionally dereferences the unallocated hyperv_pcpu_output_arg pointer in standard/SNP guests.
> --
>
> commit 0ee3313e113c9ca7969923f2af5a1ed18ddb25d2
> Author: Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> drivers: hv: hv_common: Allocate Hyper-V output arg page when VSM is enabled
>
> This commit extends hv_output_page_exists() to return true when
> CONFIG_HYPERV_VSM is enabled. This ensures the per-CPU output argument
> page is allocated at boot for VSM hypercalls.
>
> > diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv_common.c b/drivers/hv/hv_common.c
> > index 31256cb22b39e..44f4a10984618 100644
> > --- a/drivers/hv/hv_common.c
> > +++ b/drivers/hv/hv_common.c
> > @@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ static void hv_kmsg_dump_register(void)
> >
> > static inline bool hv_output_page_exists(void)
> > {
> > - return hv_parent_partition() || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV_VTL_MODE);
> > + return hv_parent_partition() || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV_VTL_MODE) ||
> > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV_VSM);
>
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but modifying this function highlights a
> vulnerability for SEV-SNP guests where VSM and VTL modes are disabled.
>
> When an SEV-SNP guest boots secondary CPUs, hv_smp_prepare_cpus() overrides
> the wakeup callback with hv_snp_boot_ap(), which then calls
> hv_apicid_to_vp_index() in arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c.
>
> If CONFIG_HYPERV_VSM and CONFIG_HYPERV_VTL_MODE are both disabled,
> hv_output_page_exists() evaluates to false. This means hyperv_pcpu_output_arg
> is never allocated during hv_common_init() and remains NULL.
>
> Consequently, arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c:hv_apicid_to_vp_index() dereferences
> this unallocated pointer:
>
> arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c:hv_apicid_to_vp_index() {
> ...
> output = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_output_arg);
> ...
> status = hv_do_hypercall(HVCALL_GET_VP_ID_FROM_APIC_ID, input, output);
> ...
> }
>
> Since this_cpu_ptr(NULL) resolves to the base of the per-CPU area, it
> dereferences a garbage pointer. This is then passed to hv_do_hypercall(),
> causing the hypervisor to overwrite random physical memory with the hypercall
> result, and eventually oopsing the kernel when output[0] is read.
>
This looks like a real bug. It should / will be fixed separately.
Wei
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-01 22:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-01 16:55 [RFC PATCH 00/12] Introduce LVBS support for Hyper-V guests Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] drivers: hv: Add HYPERV_VSM kconfig option Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] drivers: hv: hv_common: Allocate Hyper-V output arg page when VSM is enabled Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 22:56 ` Wei Liu [this message]
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] drivers: hv: Reserve memory for VSM secure kernel during early boot Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 0:59 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 13:38 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] firmware: efi: libstub: x86-stub: Enable VSM awareness in efi os indications variable Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 1:09 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 14:23 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] include: hyperv: hvgdk_mini.h: Add VTL-specific structures and bits Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] drivers: hv: Add VSM boot driver and enable VTL1 at the partition level Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 1:16 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 14:28 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 4:43 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-04 13:23 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: load secure kernel image from firmware Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 4:37 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 16:22 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 22:58 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] arch: x86: hyperv: Build initial vCPU context for VTL1 secure kernel Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Enable VTL1 on the boot processor Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] arch: x86: hyperv: hv_vtl_vsm: Introduce vtlcall Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Boot primary processor in VTL1 Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Boot secondary processors " Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:44 ` sashiko-bot
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