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From: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
To: Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
	kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, decui@microsoft.com,
	tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, javierm@redhat.com,
	lszubowi@redhat.com, francescopompo2@gmail.com,
	tgopinath@microsoft.com, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: load secure kernel image from firmware
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 15:58:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260902225835.GA2896046@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4d876bd8-3885-4d65-a272-d846ae0d7d3d@linux.microsoft.com>

On Wed, Sep 02, 2026 at 12:22:37PM -0400, Thara Gopinath wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/2/2026 12:37 AM, Wei Liu wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 01, 2026 at 09:55:21AM -0700, Thara Gopinath wrote:
> >> LVBS bring-up requires loading a secure kernel image into VTL1 before
> >> starting it. Add the VTL0-side loader that stages the image in the
> >> memory region reserved by hv_vsm_securekernel, in preparation for the
> >> VTL1 bring-up.
> >>
> >> The image is a 64-bit ELF fetched via request_firmware("vsm_sk"). It
> >> is expected to ship inside the signed UKI/initramfs so it is
> >> authenticated end-to-end via Secure Boot before the loader consumes
> >> it; sourcing it from an unauthenticated location would break the LVBS
> >> trust model.
> >>
> >> The loader validates the ELF header, stages the PT_LOAD segments into
> >> the reserved region and records the entry point as a physical address
> >> for use at VTL1 start time.
> >>
> >> If VSM support has been advertised to the hypervisor but no secure
> >> kernel region was reserved on the command line, panic: LVBS bring-up
> >> is committed at this point and there is no safe way to continue.
> > 
> > This conflicts with the memory reservation patch, in which there is an
> > automatic allocation when no kernel command line is specified.
> 
> Ah no.. So securekernel= has to be specified in the command line for
> __setup() to be invoked . It can be left blank without parameters like
> securekernel= or with parameters like securekernel=256M@0x80000000. The
> reservation logic will take care of reserving the correct memory if there
> are no parameters but if there is no command line specified __setup will
> not be  called. The other way of solving this and invoking the reservations
> unconditionally will be to call it from setup_arch like how reserve_crashkernel
> is invoked. I am not sure if we want to do that now ?? What do you think ?
> 

I see. No need to do that now. Let's see if others have opinions.

Wei

> But I will reword this and state that the panic happens if there is no
> securekernel memory allocated (either because securekernel= was not
> specified or because memory reservation itself failed)
> 
> > 
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@linux.microsoft.com>
> >> ---
> >>  drivers/hv/hv_vsm.h      |  17 ++++
> >>  drivers/hv/hv_vsm_boot.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >>  include/hyperv/vsm.h     |  21 ++++
> >>  3 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>  create mode 100644 drivers/hv/hv_vsm.h
> >>  create mode 100644 include/hyperv/vsm.h
> > [...]
> >> +
> >> +static void __init hv_vsm_get_sk_mem(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * The reserved secure kernel region is mandatory once VSM support has
> >> +	 * been advertised. Without it we cannot load the secure kernel and
> >> +	 * bringing up VTL1 is impossible, so fail hard rather than continuing
> >> +	 * in an unusable state.
> >> +	 */
> >> +	if (!sk_res.start)
> >> +		panic("No memory reserved in cmdline for secure kernel");
> >> +
> > 
> > This log line is wrong.
> 
> I will fix this 
> 
> Warm Regards
> Thara
> > 
> > Wei
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-02 22:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-01 16:55 [RFC PATCH 00/12] Introduce LVBS support for Hyper-V guests Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] drivers: hv: Add HYPERV_VSM kconfig option Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] drivers: hv: hv_common: Allocate Hyper-V output arg page when VSM is enabled Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:12   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 22:56     ` Wei Liu
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] drivers: hv: Reserve memory for VSM secure kernel during early boot Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02  0:59   ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 13:38     ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] firmware: efi: libstub: x86-stub: Enable VSM awareness in efi os indications variable Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02  1:09   ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 14:23     ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] include: hyperv: hvgdk_mini.h: Add VTL-specific structures and bits Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] drivers: hv: Add VSM boot driver and enable VTL1 at the partition level Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02  1:16   ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 14:28     ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02  4:43   ` Wei Liu
2026-09-04 13:23     ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: load secure kernel image from firmware Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02  4:37   ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 16:22     ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 22:58       ` Wei Liu [this message]
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] arch: x86: hyperv: Build initial vCPU context for VTL1 secure kernel Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:25   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Enable VTL1 on the boot processor Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] arch: x86: hyperv: hv_vtl_vsm: Introduce vtlcall Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Boot primary processor in VTL1 Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Boot secondary processors " Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 17:44   ` sashiko-bot

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