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* [Patch v5 0/3] Guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection
@ 2026-11-17 17:56 Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 1/3] x86/sev: Add Enhanced SMT Protection fields to the VMSA Pratik R. Sampat
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-11-17 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, kvm, linux-hyperv, linux-kernel
  Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, haiyangz, wei.liu, seanjc, pbonzini,
	thomas.lendacky, kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra,
	prsampat

Enhanced SMT Protection (ESMTP) allows an SEV-SNP VM to require that,
while one of its vCPUs is in guest mode, every SMT sibling thread on
that physical core is either idle in host mode or running a vCPU the
guest itself has declared a legal sibling.  This mitigates the
side-channel risk of sharing core resources with untrusted host threads
or with another guest.

Unlike core scheduling, where co-residency is a host kernel policy
expressed with cookies, ESMTP is enforced by hardware. The sibling mask
lives in the VMSA.  The host is not trusted to run arbitrary kernel,
userspace, or interrupt-handling work on a sibling thread while an ESMTP
vCPU is active on that core.

This series adds the guest side. The VMM enables ESMTP for an SNP
guest through SEV_FEATURES[17], and the guest observes it as
SEV_STATUS[19]. Two new VMSA fields carry the policy: VCPU_ID
identifies the vCPU within the guest, and VCPU_SIBLING_MASK selects
which of its peers it may share a physical core with. Two vCPUs are
legal siblings when both are ESMTP vCPUs of the same guest (matching
ASID), their VCPU_SIBLING_MASK values match, and their VCPU_IDs agree
outside that mask.

Merging
-------
Following the discussion on v4 [4], guest and host support are now
split into separate series to untangle x86 and KVM. This series only
touches guest code and the VMSA definitions it needs, has no dependency
on KVM, and is meant to go through tip. Nothing changes for a guest
unless the hypervisor enables ESMTP, so it is safe to merge ahead of
host support. KVM host support will be posted separately, potentially on
top of the scattered.c rework as suggested by Boris and Sean.

Testing
-------
End-to-end testing needs the host support, which is not part of this
series. It was tested with the v4 host patches and patched OVMF [1] and
QEMU [2] builds. Launch an SEV-SNP guest with ESMTP enabled on the
sev-snp-guest object:

  -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,esmtp=on

The guest reports the feature in dmesg among the SNP feature names:

  # dmesg | grep -i SEV
  ... SEV-SNP ... ESMTProt ...

To check the sibling behaviour on an SMT=2 host:

* Identify a sibling pair X and Y on the host:
    cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/topology/thread_siblings_list
* Pin two of the guest's vCPUs to X and Y.
* Load both vCPUs in the guest, e.g. stress-ng --cpu 2.  Both host
  CPUs should show 100% guest utilization, since the two vCPUs are
  legal siblings.
* Start a host task on one of the pair, e.g. taskset -c X stress-ng
  --cpu 1.  CPU X's time should now be split between host and guest,
  and guest utilization on CPU Y should drop, since the vCPU on Y
  cannot enter guest mode while the host task runs on X.

Based on tip/master.

v5:
* Split guest and host support into separate series, per Sean and
  Boris [4]. This series carries guest support only.
* New patch 1: move the VCPU_ID/VCPU_SIBLING_MASK VMSA definitions out
  of the KVM host patch so that the guest side builds on its own.
  Retaining Tom's reviewed-by since it is functionally unchanged.
* Drop the sibling-mask comments from patches 2 and 3 - Boris
* Rebase onto tip/master.

Host-side changes from v1-v4 are left out below and will be listed in
the KVM series.

v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1794244450.git.prsampat@amd.com/
* Fix conflict of reserved bits introduced by PML support in
  vmcb_control_area

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/cover.1792184487.git.prsampat@amd.com
* Collected Reviewed-by tags - Tom
* Use sev_status to determine SNP support for guest as well - Tom
* Not syncing the tools/ copy of msr-index.h, since several bits apart
  from ESMTP differ and the perf tooling maintainers usually sync it.
  Happy to add a sync patch if needed.

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/cover.1791302373.git.prsampat@amd.com/
* Populate the ESMTP VMSA fields for Hyper-V AP bring-up - Sashiko
* Add ESMTP to SNP_FEATURES_IMPL and SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ - local
  Sashiko instance

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/cover.1789399214.git.prsampat@amd.com

[1]: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/13128
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/cover.1789399242.git.prsampat@amd.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/avc-5lkQhoR6US9o@google.com/

Pratik R. Sampat (3):
  x86/sev: Add Enhanced SMT Protection fields to the VMSA
  x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection
  x86/hyperv: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection

 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c   | 6 ++++--
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c         | 7 +++++++
 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c            | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h       | 8 +++++++-
 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [Patch v5 1/3] x86/sev: Add Enhanced SMT Protection fields to the VMSA
  2026-11-17 17:56 [Patch v5 0/3] Guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2026-11-17 17:56 ` Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 2/3] x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:57 ` [Patch v5 3/3] x86/hyperv: " Pratik R. Sampat
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-11-17 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, kvm, linux-hyperv, linux-kernel
  Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, haiyangz, wei.liu, seanjc, pbonzini,
	thomas.lendacky, kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra,
	prsampat

Enhanced SMT Protection (ESMTP) adds two VMSA fields that carry an
SEV-SNP vCPU's co-residency policy. VCPU_ID identifies the vCPU within
the guest and VCPU_SIBLING_MASK selects which of its peers it may share
a physical core with. Two ESMTP vCPUs of the same guest are legal
siblings when their VCPU_SIBLING_MASK values match and their VCPU_IDs
agree outside that mask.

Add both fields to struct sev_es_save_area so that the guest can
populate them in the AP VMSAs it builds and the hypervisor can populate
them in the VMSAs it builds.

Refer to the AMD64 APM Vol 2, section "AMD64 Enhanced SMT Protection".

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v4..v5:
* Move the VCPU_ID/VCPU_SIBLING_MASK VMSA definitions out of the KVM
  host patch so that the guest side builds on its own.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 83fd49b26a4b..aceb405449a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -486,6 +486,11 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {
 	u8 fpreg_x87[80];
 	u8 fpreg_xmm[256];
 	u8 fpreg_ymm[256];
+	u8 reserved_0x670[560];
+
+	/* Enhanced SMT Protection */
+	u32 vcpu_id;
+	u32 vcpu_sibling_mask;
 } __packed;
 
 struct ghcb_save_area {
@@ -558,7 +563,7 @@ struct vmcb {
 
 #define EXPECTED_VMCB_SAVE_AREA_SIZE		744
 #define EXPECTED_GHCB_SAVE_AREA_SIZE		1032
-#define EXPECTED_SEV_ES_SAVE_AREA_SIZE		1648
+#define EXPECTED_SEV_ES_SAVE_AREA_SIZE		2216
 #define EXPECTED_VMCB_CONTROL_AREA_SIZE		1024
 #define EXPECTED_GHCB_SIZE			PAGE_SIZE
 
@@ -593,6 +598,7 @@ static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x320);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x380);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x3f0);
+	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x670);
 
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(ghcb_save_area, 0x0);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(ghcb_save_area, 0xcc);
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [Patch v5 2/3] x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection
  2026-11-17 17:56 [Patch v5 0/3] Guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 1/3] x86/sev: Add Enhanced SMT Protection fields to the VMSA Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2026-11-17 17:56 ` Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:57 ` [Patch v5 3/3] x86/hyperv: " Pratik R. Sampat
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-11-17 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, kvm, linux-hyperv, linux-kernel
  Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, haiyangz, wei.liu, seanjc, pbonzini,
	thomas.lendacky, kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra,
	prsampat

Enhanced SMT Protection requires every VMSA to carry the vCPU's identity
and the mask of SMT siblings it may co-run with. The guest builds the
VMSA itself when bringing up an AP, so populate both fields there, before
the page is turned into a VMSA and while it is still writable.

Fully set the sibling mask so that all threads of the same guest trust
each other.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v4..v5:
* Remove comment about vCPU sibling mask configuration - Boris

v3..v4: No change
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c   | 6 ++++--
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c         | 7 +++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +++-
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index c6512f2ea31e..4e0fa5a5f70b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 |		\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 |		\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC |		\
-				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 |	\
+				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT |		\
+				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS20_22 |	\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
@@ -204,7 +205,8 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
  */
 #define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL	(MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP |	\
 				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC |	\
-				 SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC)
+				 SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC |	\
+				 MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT)
 
 u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index eb2e853e950a..92bf3afd4351 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT]	= "VMSARegProt",
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT]		= "SMTProt",
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT]		= "SecureAVIC",
+	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT]		= "ESMTProt",
 	[MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT]	= "IBPBOnEntry",
 };
 
@@ -849,6 +850,12 @@ static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned
 	vmsa->vmpl		= snp_vmpl;
 	vmsa->sev_features	= sev_status >> 2;
 
+	if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED &&
+	    (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT)) {
+		vmsa->vcpu_id = apic_id;
+		vmsa->vcpu_sibling_mask = U32_MAX;
+	}
+
 	/* Populate AP's TSC scale/offset to get accurate TSC values. */
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC)) {
 		vmsa->tsc_scale = snp_tsc_scale;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index c0914829a925..83517f53d757 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -754,7 +754,9 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT	18
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT)
-#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT	19
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS20_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 20)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT	23
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT		24
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [Patch v5 3/3] x86/hyperv: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection
  2026-11-17 17:56 [Patch v5 0/3] Guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 1/3] x86/sev: Add Enhanced SMT Protection fields to the VMSA Pratik R. Sampat
  2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 2/3] x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2026-11-17 17:57 ` Pratik R. Sampat
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2026-11-17 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, kvm, linux-hyperv, linux-kernel
  Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, haiyangz, wei.liu, seanjc, pbonzini,
	thomas.lendacky, kim.phillips, nikunj, michael.roth, ashish.kalra,
	prsampat

Add corresponding hyperv support for Enhanced SMT protection. A fully
enlightened SEV-SNP guest on Hyper-V builds the VMSA itself when
bringing up an AP, so populate both fields there, before the page is
turned into a VMSA and while it is still writable.

Similar to KVM, fully set the sibling mask so that all threads of the
same guest trust each other.

Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v4..v5:
* Remove comment about vCPU sibling mask configuration - Boris

v3..v4: No change
---
 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 2ce4dfe53472..bd57cac18181 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -347,6 +347,11 @@ int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned int cpu)
 	vmsa->vmpl = 0;
 	vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >> 2;
 
+	if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_ESMT_PROT) {
+		vmsa->vcpu_id = apic_id;
+		vmsa->vcpu_sibling_mask = U32_MAX;
+	}
+
 	ret = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, true);
 	if (ret) {
 		pr_err("RMPADJUST(%llx) failed: %llx\n", (u64)vmsa, ret);
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

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2026-11-17 17:56 [Patch v5 0/3] Guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 1/3] x86/sev: Add Enhanced SMT Protection fields to the VMSA Pratik R. Sampat
2026-11-17 17:56 ` [Patch v5 2/3] x86/sev: Add guest support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
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