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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Baul Lee" <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Cc: dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty
Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 06:36:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260726063625.26BDB1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260726062503.43717-1-baul.lee@xbow.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The probe function `universal_pidff_probe()` fails to call `hid_hw_stop()` when `hid_pidff_init_with_quirks()` returns an error, leading to leaked HID resources and an exploitable Use-After-Free.
- [High] Race condition in `hid_pidff_init_with_quirks` leading to a NULL pointer dereference when a malicious userspace process calls the `EVIOCSFF` ioctl between `input_ff_create()` and callback assignment.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty ---
commit 3acaf40e184c8c11b91d10a3096b1beb8e9b142b
Author: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty

This commit fixes an out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks()
by ensuring that the hid->inputs list is not empty before accessing it.
If the list is empty, the function now returns -ENODEV.

> Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the
> other HID force-feedback drivers already do.  universal_pidff_probe()
> propagates the error and unwinds.

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does universal_pidff_probe()
actually fully unwind here?

Looking at universal_pidff_probe() in drivers/hid/hid-universal-pidff.c:

	error = init_function(hdev, id->driver_data);
	if (error) {
		hid_warn(hdev, "Error initialising force feedback\n");
		goto err;
	}
...
err:
	return error;

This error path propagates the initialization error but misses the necessary
hid_hw_stop() call to unwind hid_hw_start(). If universal_pidff_probe()
fails during force feedback initialization, it returns an error without
unwinding hid_hw_start().

This leaves the hidraw and hidinput structures registered but pointing to a
soon-to-be-driverless hid_device. When the physical device is unplugged,
the core skips calling hid_hw_stop() because hdev->driver is NULL.

Could this lead to an exploitable use-after-free condition if a local user
plugs in an untrusted USB device to trigger this -ENODEV return, and then
accesses the lingering /dev/hidrawX node?


> diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
> index 5f4395f7c6458..22951b7ecd174 100644
> --- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
> +++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
> @@ -1539,13 +1539,20 @@ static int pidff_check_autocenter(struct pidff_device *pidff,
>  int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hid_device *hid, u32 initial_quirks)
>  {
>  	struct pidff_device *pidff;
> -	struct hid_input *hidinput =
> -		list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list);
> -	struct input_dev *dev = hidinput->input;
> +	struct hid_input *hidinput;
> +	struct input_dev *dev;
>  	struct ff_device *ff;
>  	int max_effects;
>  	int error;
>  
> +	if (list_empty(&hid->inputs)) {
> +		hid_err(hid, "no inputs found\n");
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +	}
> +
> +	hidinput = list_first_entry(&hid->inputs, struct hid_input, list);
> +	dev = hidinput->input;
> +

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is there a race condition
further down in this function during force feedback initialization?

The input device is already fully registered and visible to userspace (via
hidinput_connect()) before hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() is called. When
input_ff_create() is invoked later in this function, it sets the EV_FF bit
on the device and assigns dev->ff.

Immediately after it returns, but before ff->upload and other callbacks are
initialized, a userspace process can open the input node and issue an
EVIOCSFF ioctl:

	error = input_ff_create(dev, max_effects);
	if (error)
		goto fail;

	ff = dev->ff;
	ff->private = pidff;
	ff->upload = pidff_upload_effect;

Could a local unprivileged user trigger a null pointer dereference by
rapidly issuing ioctls on the newly created /dev/input/eventX node, causing
input_ff_upload() to invoke a null ff->upload function pointer?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260726062503.43717-1-baul.lee@xbow.com?part=1

      reply	other threads:[~2026-07-26  6:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-26  6:25 [PATCH] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty Baul Lee
2026-07-26  6:36 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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