From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Baul Lee" <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Cc: dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty
Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 06:36:24 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260726063625.26BDB1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260726062503.43717-1-baul.lee@xbow.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The probe function `universal_pidff_probe()` fails to call `hid_hw_stop()` when `hid_pidff_init_with_quirks()` returns an error, leading to leaked HID resources and an exploitable Use-After-Free.
- [High] Race condition in `hid_pidff_init_with_quirks` leading to a NULL pointer dereference when a malicious userspace process calls the `EVIOCSFF` ioctl between `input_ff_create()` and callback assignment.
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty ---
commit 3acaf40e184c8c11b91d10a3096b1beb8e9b142b
Author: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty
This commit fixes an out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks()
by ensuring that the hid->inputs list is not empty before accessing it.
If the list is empty, the function now returns -ENODEV.
> Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the
> other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe()
> propagates the error and unwinds.
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does universal_pidff_probe()
actually fully unwind here?
Looking at universal_pidff_probe() in drivers/hid/hid-universal-pidff.c:
error = init_function(hdev, id->driver_data);
if (error) {
hid_warn(hdev, "Error initialising force feedback\n");
goto err;
}
...
err:
return error;
This error path propagates the initialization error but misses the necessary
hid_hw_stop() call to unwind hid_hw_start(). If universal_pidff_probe()
fails during force feedback initialization, it returns an error without
unwinding hid_hw_start().
This leaves the hidraw and hidinput structures registered but pointing to a
soon-to-be-driverless hid_device. When the physical device is unplugged,
the core skips calling hid_hw_stop() because hdev->driver is NULL.
Could this lead to an exploitable use-after-free condition if a local user
plugs in an untrusted USB device to trigger this -ENODEV return, and then
accesses the lingering /dev/hidrawX node?
> diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
> index 5f4395f7c6458..22951b7ecd174 100644
> --- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
> +++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
> @@ -1539,13 +1539,20 @@ static int pidff_check_autocenter(struct pidff_device *pidff,
> int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hid_device *hid, u32 initial_quirks)
> {
> struct pidff_device *pidff;
> - struct hid_input *hidinput =
> - list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list);
> - struct input_dev *dev = hidinput->input;
> + struct hid_input *hidinput;
> + struct input_dev *dev;
> struct ff_device *ff;
> int max_effects;
> int error;
>
> + if (list_empty(&hid->inputs)) {
> + hid_err(hid, "no inputs found\n");
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> +
> + hidinput = list_first_entry(&hid->inputs, struct hid_input, list);
> + dev = hidinput->input;
> +
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is there a race condition
further down in this function during force feedback initialization?
The input device is already fully registered and visible to userspace (via
hidinput_connect()) before hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() is called. When
input_ff_create() is invoked later in this function, it sets the EV_FF bit
on the device and assigns dev->ff.
Immediately after it returns, but before ff->upload and other callbacks are
initialized, a userspace process can open the input node and issue an
EVIOCSFF ioctl:
error = input_ff_create(dev, max_effects);
if (error)
goto fail;
ff = dev->ff;
ff->private = pidff;
ff->upload = pidff_upload_effect;
Could a local unprivileged user trigger a null pointer dereference by
rapidly issuing ioctls on the newly created /dev/input/eventX node, causing
input_ff_upload() to invoke a null ff->upload function pointer?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260726062503.43717-1-baul.lee@xbow.com?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-26 6:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-26 6:25 [PATCH] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty Baul Lee
2026-07-26 6:36 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260726063625.26BDB1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=baul.lee@xbow.com \
--cc=dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-input@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox