[PATCH] HID: amd_sfh: Validate BAR 2 as memory-mapped I/O in probe

[PATCH] HID: amd_sfh: Validate BAR 2 as memory-mapped I/O in probe

[Preetam Sundar Das]

Syzbot reported a page fault in amd_mp2_pci_probe(). The fuzzer creates
a malicious PCI device where BAR 2 is defined as an I/O port rather
than a memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) region.

The driver previously assumed BAR 2 would always be MMIO and blindly
passed the I/O port address to readl(), causing a fatal page fault
when the CPU attempted to read from restricted memory.

Fix this by explicitly checking the PCI resource flags after waking
the device. If BAR 2 is not an IORESOURCE_MEM region, safely reject
the device with -EINVAL to prevent the panic.

Fixes: 4f567b9f8141 ("SFH: PCIe driver to add support of AMD sensor fusion hub")
Reported-by: syzbot+4eadd4dfe9e66522bae8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=227a9acbe565367eb7a1277b47115df8706d9a12

Signed-off-by: Preetam Sundar Das <daspreetam4@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
index 4b81cebdc335..aef105a81570 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
@@ -451,6 +451,9 @@ static int amd_mp2_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *i
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	if (!(pci_resource_flags(pdev, 2) & IORESOURCE_MEM))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	rc = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, BIT(2), DRIVER_NAME);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH] HID: amd_sfh: Validate BAR 2 as memory-mapped I/O in probe

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 7 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Race condition in driver teardown allows Use-After-Free of the HID device.
- [High] Missing `list_empty` check in `amd_sfh_work` leads to out-of-bounds access.
- [High] Missing BAR length validation leaves the driver vulnerable to out-of-bounds MMIO accesses.
- [High] Double Free and Use-After-Free due to dangling pointer on `hid_add_device()` failure.
- [Medium] Missing `dev.parent` initialization before registering the HID device.
- [Medium] Unsafe input reporting API used (`hid_input_report`).
- [Medium] Memory leak of pending `req_list` requests during driver unbind.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] HID: amd_sfh: Validate BAR 2 as memory-mapped I/O in probe ---
commit 9791ab9939f2a4ad3dfd9fdb427437ececbde787
Author: Preetam Sundar Das <daspreetam4@gmail.com>

HID: amd_sfh: Validate BAR 2 as memory-mapped I/O in probe

Syzbot reported a page fault in amd_mp2_pci_probe(). The fuzzer creates
a malicious PCI device where BAR 2 is defined as an I/O port rather
than a memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) region.

Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=227a9acbe565367eb7a1277b47115df8706d9a12

> diff --git a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
> index 4b81cebdc3359..aef105a815701 100644
> --- a/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
> +++ b/drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c
> @@ -451,6 +451,9 @@ static int amd_mp2_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *i
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
>  
> +	if (!(pci_resource_flags(pdev, 2) & IORESOURCE_MEM))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this check also need to
validate the length of the BAR using pci_resource_len()?

If a malicious device advertises a very small MMIO BAR, the driver
unconditionally accesses high register offsets, like AMD_P2C_MSG3 at 0x1068C
inside mp2_select_ops():

    privdata->mp2_acs = readl(privdata->mmio + AMD_P2C_MSG3);

Could this still trigger an out-of-bounds access if the length isn't verified
before mapping?

>  	rc = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, BIT(2), DRIVER_NAME);
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;

[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is it necessary for amdtp_hid_probe()
to initialize the parent device before registering the HID device?

drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_hid.c:amdtp_hid_probe() {
    hid = hid_allocate_device();
    ...
    rc = hid_add_device(hid);
}

The HID subsystem requires low-level transport drivers to fully initialize
the hid_device fields, including dev.parent, before calling hid_add_device().
Leaving it uninitialized can break the sysfs device hierarchy and place the
device in the virtual root.

[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but should amd_sfh_work() be using the safe
input reporting API instead?

drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c:amd_sfh_work() {
    ...
    hid_input_report(cli_data->hid_sensor_hubs[current_index],
                     cli_data->report_type[current_index],
                     cli_data->feature_report[current_index],
                     report_size, 0);
}

The HID subsystem guidelines recommend preferring hid_safe_input_report()
over hid_input_report(). Using hid_input_report() bypasses boundary checks
against the allocated buffer size, which might lead to out-of-bounds reads
if malformed reports are received.

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but could the driver teardown
sequence allow a use-after-free?

In drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c:amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit():

    cancel_delayed_work_sync(&cl_data->work);
    cancel_delayed_work_sync(&cl_data->work_buffer);
    amdtp_hid_remove(cl_data);

The workers are cancelled before amdtp_hid_remove() unregisters and frees
the hid device. Since the device is still active during the cancellation,
userspace could issue an ioctl triggering amd_sfh_get_report(), which
would re-arm the delayed work:

    schedule_delayed_work(&cli_data->work, 0);

When this work executes later, could it dereference the already freed
cli_data->hid_sensor_hubs array entry? Should the device be unregistered
before the workers are cancelled?

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but might amd_sfh_work() trigger out-of-bounds
accesses by blindly accessing the request list without verifying it is empty?

In drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c:amd_sfh_get_report(), the work
is unconditionally scheduled even if no request was added to the list:

    schedule_delayed_work(&cli_data->work, 0);
    return 0;

Then in amd_sfh_work():

    req_node = list_last_entry(&req_list->list, struct request_list, list);
    list_del(&req_node->list);

If the work is scheduled but the list is empty, could this lead to list
corruption and invalid memory accesses?

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but will a failure in
hid_add_device() result in a double free?

In drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_hid.c:amdtp_hid_probe(), the array
entry is populated before registration:

    cli_data->hid_sensor_hubs[cur_hid_dev] = hid;
    ...
err_hid_device:
    kfree(hid_data);
err_hid_data:
    hid_destroy_device(hid);

The error path destroys the device and frees hid_data, but does not
clear the pointer from the array. This failure propagates up to
amd_sfh_hid_client_init(), which jumps to cleanup and calls
amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit(). That triggers amdtp_hid_remove():

    if (cli_data->hid_sensor_hubs[i]) {
        hid_data = cli_data->hid_sensor_hubs[i]->driver_data;
        hid_destroy_device(cli_data->hid_sensor_hubs[i]);
        kfree(hid_data);
    }

Could this see the non-NULL dangling pointer, read hid->driver_data,
and call hid_destroy_device() and kfree() on already-freed objects?

[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but what happens to pending requests in
amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit()?

When handling GET_REPORT, amd_sfh_get_report() dynamically allocates
request_list nodes and adds them to req_list->list. If the driver is
unbound while there are unprocessed requests:

drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_client.c:amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit() {
    ...
    cancel_delayed_work_sync(&cl_data->work);
    cancel_delayed_work_sync(&cl_data->work_buffer);
    amdtp_hid_remove(cl_data);
}

The worker threads are cancelled, but the queue is never drained. Will
this permanently leak any orphaned allocations on device teardown?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260815121938.1337631-1-daspreetam4@gmail.com?part=1