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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 19:21:19 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210810162119.htk366pmacrnzdmh@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1628527136-2478-15-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 12:38:56PM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The Secure Launch MLE environment uses PCRs that are only accessible from
> the DRTM locality 2. By default the TPM drivers always initialize the
> locality to 0. When a Secure Launch is in progress, initialize the
> locality to 2.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 13 +++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> index ddaeceb..48b9351 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>  #include <linux/major.h>
>  #include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
>  #include <linux/hw_random.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>  #include "tpm.h"
>  
>  DEFINE_IDR(dev_nums_idr);
> @@ -34,12 +35,20 @@
>  
>  static int tpm_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  {
> -	int rc;
> +	int rc, locality;

        int locality;
        int rc;

>  
>  	if (!chip->ops->request_locality)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	rc = chip->ops->request_locality(chip, 0);
> +	if (slaunch_get_flags() & SL_FLAG_ACTIVE) {
> +		dev_dbg(&chip->dev, "setting TPM locality to 2 for MLE\n");
> +		locality = 2;
> +	} else {
> +		dev_dbg(&chip->dev, "setting TPM locality to 0\n");
> +		locality = 0;
> +	}

Please, remove dev_dbg()'s.

> +
> +	rc = chip->ops->request_locality(chip, locality);
>  	if (rc < 0)
>  		return rc;
>  
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-10 16:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-09 16:38 [PATCH v3 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/boot: Add missing handling " Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-16 14:16     ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-08-16 14:18     ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:23 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-25  2:10   ` Daniel P. Smith

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