From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/boot: Add missing handling of setup_indirect structures
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2021 10:16:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87c42ae4-dfd7-c7e1-071c-7f32cf719954@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210810161932.wdwfu3wosjytdj4h@kernel.org>
On 8/10/21 12:19 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 12:38:44PM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> One of the two functions in ioremap.c that handles setup_data was
>> missing the correct handling of setup_indirect structures.
>
> What is "correct handling", and how was it broken?
>
> What is 'setup_indirect'?
>
>> Functionality missing from original commit:
>
> Remove this sentence.
>
>> commit b3c72fc9a78e (x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect)
>
> Should be.
>
> Fixes: b3c72fc9a78e ("x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect")
I will fix these things and make the commit message clearer.
Thanks,
Ross
>
>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
>> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> index ab74e4f..f2b34c5 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> @@ -669,17 +669,34 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>
>> paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>> while (paddr) {
>> - unsigned int len;
>> + unsigned int len, size;
>>
>> if (phys_addr == paddr)
>> return true;
>>
>> data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> + size = sizeof(*data);
>>
>> paddr_next = data->next;
>> len = data->len;
>>
>> - early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
>> + if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len))) {
>> + early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
>> + return true;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (data->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) {
>> + size += len;
>> + early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
>> + data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, size);
>> +
>> + if (((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->type != SETUP_INDIRECT) {
>> + paddr = ((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->addr;
>> + len = ((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->len;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + early_memunmap(data, size);
>>
>> if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
>> return true;
>> --
>> 1.8.3.1
>>
>>
>
> /Jarkko
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-16 14:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-09 16:38 [PATCH v3 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/boot: Add missing handling " Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-16 14:16 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-09 16:38 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-16 14:18 ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-10 16:23 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-25 2:10 ` Daniel P. Smith
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