From: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
rnsastry@linux.ibm.com, sudhakar@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 21:07:55 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a78e0ff6-5060-415f-bb09-d6e05de2adb5@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <apbSKDGTGbAyVWC4@kernel.org>
Hi Jarkko
On 9/1/26 6:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 29, 2026 at 06:39:17PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
>> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
>> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
>> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
>> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>>
>> Define a trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
>> there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in the private member of
>> trusted_key_options.
>>
>> No functional change intended.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> Changelog:
>> v4:
>> - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were
>> merged
>> - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts
>>
>> v3:
>> - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed
>> in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")
>>
>> v2:
>> - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
>> - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
>> - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean
>> up patch)
>> - Address other minor comments from Jarkko
>>
>> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
>> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++
>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++---------
>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------
>> 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>>
>> struct trusted_key_options {
>> uint16_t keytype;
>> - uint32_t keyhandle;
>> - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> - uint32_t blobauth_len;
>> - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> - uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>> - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>> - int pcrlock;
>> - uint32_t hash;
>> - uint32_t policydigest_len;
>> - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> - uint32_t policyhandle;
>> void *private;
>> };
>>
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> index 3a0fa3bc8454..98d638d13ecb 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
>>
>> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>>
>> +struct trusted_tpm_options {
> To be aligned with existing convention a better name would be "trusted_key_tpm".
Sure, will make this change and send out v5.
Thanks,
Srish.
>
>> + uint32_t keyhandle;
>> + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> + uint32_t blobauth_len;
>> + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> + uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>> + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>> + int pcrlock;
>> + uint32_t hash;
>> + uint32_t policydigest_len;
>> + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> + uint32_t policyhandle;
>> +};
>> +
>> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options);
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> index bf0bf7f36970..14d005e76a1c 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
>> static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
>> +
>> if (!trusted_debug)
>> return;
>>
>> pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
>> - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
>> - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
>> - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
>> + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
>> + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
>> + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
>> print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
>> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>> + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>> }
>>
>> static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
>> @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>> static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> struct trusted_key_options *o)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
>> int ret;
>>
>> struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
>> p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>>
>> - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
>> + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
>> p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
>> - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
>> + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
>> + private->pcrinfo_len);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>
>> @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>> struct trusted_key_options *o)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
>> int ret;
>>
>> struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>
>> tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>
>> - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
>> - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>> + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
>> + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>> else
>> @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> struct trusted_key_options *opt)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private;
>> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
>> char *p = c;
>> int token;
>> @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> if (tpm2 < 0)
>> return tpm2;
>>
>> - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>> + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>>
>> if (!c)
>> return 0;
>> @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>
>> switch (token) {
>> case Opt_pcrinfo:
>> - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>> - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>> + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>> + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>> - opt->pcrinfo_len);
>> + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>> + private->pcrinfo_len);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> break;
>> @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
>> - opt->keyhandle = handle;
>> + private->keyhandle = handle;
>> break;
>> case Opt_keyauth:
>> if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
>> + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
>> SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
>> * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
>> */
>> - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>> + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>>
>> - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>> + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>> + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
>> - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> - opt->blobauth_len);
>> + if (tpm2 &&
>> + private->blobauth_len <=
>> + sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
>> + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> + private->blobauth_len);
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - opt->pcrlock = lock;
>> + private->pcrlock = lock;
>> break;
>> case Opt_hash:
>> if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
>> return -EINVAL;
>> for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
>> if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
>> - opt->hash = i;
>> + private->hash = i;
>> break;
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> }
>> break;
>> case Opt_policydigest:
>> - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
>> + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
>> if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
>> + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
>> digest_len);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>> + private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>> break;
>> case Opt_policyhandle:
>> if (!tpm2)
>> @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
>> if (res < 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - opt->policyhandle = handle;
>> + private->policyhandle = handle;
>> break;
>> default:
>> return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>
>> static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options;
>> int tpm2;
>>
>> @@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>> /* set any non-zero defaults */
>> options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>>
>> - if (!tpm2)
>> - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> + private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
>> + if (!private) {
>> + kfree_sensitive(options);
>> + options = NULL;
>> + } else {
>> + if (!tpm2)
>> + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> + options->private = private;
>> + }
>> }
>> return options;
>> }
>>
>> static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>> int ret = 0;
>> int tpm2;
>> @@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> goto out;
>> dump_options(options);
>>
>> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> + private = options->private;
>> + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> ret = -EINVAL;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> @@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> goto out;
>> }
>>
>> - if (options->pcrlock) {
>> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>> + if (private->pcrlock) {
>> + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>> if (ret < 0) {
>> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>> goto out;
>> }
>> }
>> out:
>> + if (options)
>> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>> kfree_sensitive(options);
>> return ret;
>> }
>>
>> static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>> int ret = 0;
>> int tpm2;
>> @@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> goto out;
>> dump_options(options);
>>
>> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> + private = options->private;
>> + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> ret = -EINVAL;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> @@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> if (ret < 0)
>> pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>
>> - if (options->pcrlock) {
>> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>> + if (private->pcrlock) {
>> + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>> if (ret < 0) {
>> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>> goto out;
>> }
>> }
>> out:
>> + if (options)
>> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>> kfree_sensitive(options);
>> return ret;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> index 67225dd562a9..07b831b515bb 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options,
>> u8 *src, u32 len)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>> const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
>> u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
>> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
>> asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>>
>> - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
>> + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
>> unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
>> /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
>> w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
>> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> goto err;
>> }
>>
>> - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
>> + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
>> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
>> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>>
>> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options,
>> u8 **buf)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>> int ret;
>> struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
>> u8 *blob;
>> @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> *buf = blob;
>> - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>> + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>>
>> memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
>> blob += ctx.priv_len;
>> @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> u32 flags;
>> int rc;
>>
>> - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
>> + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
>> if (hash < 0)
>> return hash;
>>
>> - if (!options->keyhandle)
>> + if (!private->keyhandle)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
>> @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>
>> tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>
>> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>> if (rc)
>> goto out;
>>
>> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
>> - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>
>> /* sensitive */
>> - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
>> + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
>>
>> - if (options->blobauth_len)
>> - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>> + if (private->blobauth_len)
>> + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>>
>> tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
>> tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
>> @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>
>> /* key properties */
>> flags = 0;
>> - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>> + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>> flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
>> tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
>>
>> /* policy */
>> - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
>> - if (options->policydigest_len)
>> - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
>> + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
>> + if (private->policydigest_len)
>> + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
>> + private->policydigest_len);
>>
>> /* public parameters */
>> tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
>> @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> u32 *blob_handle)
>> {
>> u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> unsigned int private_len;
>> unsigned int public_len;
>> @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> }
>>
>> /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
>> - if (!options->keyhandle)
>> + if (!private->keyhandle)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
>> @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>> tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
>>
>> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>> if (rc)
>> return rc;
>>
>> - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
>> + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
>> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>
>> tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
>> @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> struct trusted_key_options *options,
>> u32 blob_handle)
>> {
>> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
>> struct tpm_header *head;
>> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> u16 data_len;
>> @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> if (rc)
>> return rc;
>>
>> - if (!options->policyhandle) {
>> + if (!private->policyhandle) {
>> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>> - options->blobauth,
>> - options->blobauth_len);
>> + private->blobauth,
>> + private->blobauth_len);
>> } else {
>> /*
>> * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
>> @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
>> * password.
>> */
>> - tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
>> + tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
>> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
>> - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>> + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>> NULL, 0);
>> --
>> 2.53.0
>>
> BR, Jarkko
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-01 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-29 13:09 [PATCH v4] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-01 13:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-09-01 15:37 ` Srish Srinivasan [this message]
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