From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
luto@amacapital.net, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 09:45:12 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <04080c88-3e69-b4e6-0af2-0690accaa02f@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1645070085-14255-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On 2/16/22 19:54, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to
> enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of
> focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing
> a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of
> Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing
> a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and
> cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming
> Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel
> follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution
> Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a
> boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has
> been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional
> component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the
> Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in
> development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage
> and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available.
What problem is this patch series solving? Is the same problem solved
in a different way in the kernel today? What is wrong with that
solution? What effects will end users see if they apply this series?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-23 17:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-17 3:54 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2022-02-17 3:54 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2022-02-23 17:45 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-02-25 18:57 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Daniel P. Smith
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