From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro-zLv9SwRftAIdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
Cc: kevin.tian-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
ashok.raj-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
<konrad.wilk-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
alan.cox-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
pengfei.xu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
jacob.jun.pan-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
mika.westerberg-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org,
Christoph Hellwig <hch-jcswGhMUV9g@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 08/10] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer
Date: Sun, 21 Apr 2019 09:17:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190421011719.14909-9-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190421011719.14909-1-baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
This adds a helper to check whether a device needs to
use bounce buffer. It also provides a boot time option
to disable the bounce buffer. Users can use this to
prevent the iommu driver from using the bounce buffer
for performance gain.
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++++
drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2b8ee90bb644..86880eb3fc73 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1726,6 +1726,11 @@
Note that using this option lowers the security
provided by tboot because it makes the system
vulnerable to DMA attacks.
+ nobounce [Default off]
+ Do not use the bounce buffer for untrusted devices like
+ the Thunderbolt devices. This will treat the untrusted
+ devices as the trusted ones, hence might expose security
+ risks of DMA attacks.
intel_idle.max_cstate= [KNL,HW,ACPI,X86]
0 disables intel_idle and fall back on acpi_idle.
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index e4a164324bdd..0d80f26b8a72 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_strict;
static int intel_iommu_superpage = 1;
static int intel_iommu_sm;
static int iommu_identity_mapping;
+static int intel_no_bounce;
#define IDENTMAP_ALL 1
#define IDENTMAP_GFX 2
@@ -396,6 +397,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_iommu_gfx_mapped);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(device_domain_lock);
static LIST_HEAD(device_domain_list);
+static inline bool device_needs_bounce(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
+
+ if (intel_no_bounce)
+ return false;
+
+ if (dev_is_pci(dev))
+ pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
+
+ return pdev ? pdev->untrusted : false;
+}
+
/*
* Iterate over elements in device_domain_list and call the specified
* callback @fn against each element.
@@ -478,6 +492,9 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str)
printk(KERN_INFO
"Intel-IOMMU: not forcing on after tboot. This could expose security risk for tboot\n");
intel_iommu_tboot_noforce = 1;
+ } else if (!strncmp(str, "nobounce", 8)) {
+ pr_info("Intel-IOMMU: No bounce buffer. This could expose security risks of DMA attacks\n");
+ intel_no_bounce = 1;
}
str += strcspn(str, ",");
--
2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, ashok.raj@intel.com,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
alan.cox@intel.com, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
pengfei.xu@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@intel.com,
mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: [PATCH v3 08/10] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer
Date: Sun, 21 Apr 2019 09:17:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190421011719.14909-9-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190421011717.0ih9cL4Pvy0brf77fQjWWsSMuY8KcUkyLeqG22KqW0Y@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190421011719.14909-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
This adds a helper to check whether a device needs to
use bounce buffer. It also provides a boot time option
to disable the bounce buffer. Users can use this to
prevent the iommu driver from using the bounce buffer
for performance gain.
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@intel.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++++
drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2b8ee90bb644..86880eb3fc73 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1726,6 +1726,11 @@
Note that using this option lowers the security
provided by tboot because it makes the system
vulnerable to DMA attacks.
+ nobounce [Default off]
+ Do not use the bounce buffer for untrusted devices like
+ the Thunderbolt devices. This will treat the untrusted
+ devices as the trusted ones, hence might expose security
+ risks of DMA attacks.
intel_idle.max_cstate= [KNL,HW,ACPI,X86]
0 disables intel_idle and fall back on acpi_idle.
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index e4a164324bdd..0d80f26b8a72 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_strict;
static int intel_iommu_superpage = 1;
static int intel_iommu_sm;
static int iommu_identity_mapping;
+static int intel_no_bounce;
#define IDENTMAP_ALL 1
#define IDENTMAP_GFX 2
@@ -396,6 +397,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_iommu_gfx_mapped);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(device_domain_lock);
static LIST_HEAD(device_domain_list);
+static inline bool device_needs_bounce(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
+
+ if (intel_no_bounce)
+ return false;
+
+ if (dev_is_pci(dev))
+ pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
+
+ return pdev ? pdev->untrusted : false;
+}
+
/*
* Iterate over elements in device_domain_list and call the specified
* callback @fn against each element.
@@ -478,6 +492,9 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str)
printk(KERN_INFO
"Intel-IOMMU: not forcing on after tboot. This could expose security risk for tboot\n");
intel_iommu_tboot_noforce = 1;
+ } else if (!strncmp(str, "nobounce", 8)) {
+ pr_info("Intel-IOMMU: No bounce buffer. This could expose security risks of DMA attacks\n");
+ intel_no_bounce = 1;
}
str += strcspn(str, ",");
--
2.17.1
_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-21 1:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-21 1:17 [PATCH v3 00/10] iommu: Bounce page for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
[not found] ` <20190421011719.14909-1-baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] iommu: Add helper to get minimal page size of domain Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-29 10:55 ` Robin Murphy
2019-04-29 10:55 ` Robin Murphy
2019-04-30 0:40 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-30 0:40 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] swiotlb: Factor out slot allocation and free Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-22 16:45 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-22 16:45 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-23 1:58 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 1:58 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 6:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-23 6:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-23 7:32 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 7:32 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-24 14:45 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-24 14:45 ` Christoph Hellwig
[not found] ` <20190424144532.GA21480-jcswGhMUV9g@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-25 2:07 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-25 2:07 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-26 15:04 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-26 15:04 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-29 5:10 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-29 5:10 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-29 11:06 ` Robin Murphy
2019-04-29 11:06 ` Robin Murphy
2019-04-29 11:44 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-29 11:44 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-05-06 1:54 ` Lu Baolu
2019-05-13 7:05 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-05-16 1:53 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-30 2:02 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-30 2:02 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-30 9:53 ` Robin Murphy
2019-04-30 9:53 ` Robin Murphy
2019-05-02 1:47 ` Lu Baolu
2019-05-02 1:47 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] swiotlb: Limit tlb address range inside slot pool Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] swiotlb: Extend swiotlb to support page bounce Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] iommu: Add bounce page APIs Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] iommu/vt-d: Add trace events for domain map/unmap Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] iommu/vt-d: Keep swiotlb on if bounce page is necessary Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-22 16:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-22 16:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-23 2:00 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 2:00 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer Lu Baolu
2019-04-22 16:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-22 16:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
[not found] ` <20190422164755.GC31181-jcswGhMUV9g@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-23 2:03 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 2:03 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 6:08 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-23 6:08 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-04-23 7:35 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-23 7:35 ` Lu Baolu
[not found] ` <e11489cf-87cc-a956-7c6c-ffdd26a4e3ec-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2019-04-24 18:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-04-24 18:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] iommu/vt-d: Add dma sync ops for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer " Lu Baolu
2019-04-21 1:17 ` Lu Baolu
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