Re: [PATCH] killswitch: add per-function short-circuit mitigation primitive

[Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>]

On Mon, May 11, 2026 at 03:49:24PM +0200, Michal Hocko wrote:
>On Mon 11-05-26 09:39:32, Sasha Levin wrote:
>> On Mon, May 11, 2026 at 03:07:51PM +0200, Michal Hocko wrote:
>> > On Mon 11-05-26 04:41:38, Breno Leitao wrote:
>> > > On Fri, May 08, 2026 at 05:47:04PM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
>> > > > On Fri, May 08, 2026 at 01:56:30PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
>> > > > > On Thu,  7 May 2026 03:05:45 -0400 Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
>> > > > >
>> > > > > > When a (security) issue goes public, fleets stay exposed until a patched kernel
>> > > > > > is built, distributed, and rebooted into.
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > For many such issues the simplest mitigation is to stop calling the buggy
>> > > > > > function. Killswitch provides that. An admin writes:
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > >     echo "engage af_alg_sendmsg -1" \
>> > > > > >         > /sys/kernel/security/killswitch/control
>> > > > >
>> > > > > It certainly sounds useful, but what would I know.  How do we hunt down
>> > > > > suitable operations people (aka "target audience") to find out how
>> > > > > useful this is to them?
>> > > >
>> > > > I'm not entierly sure here... If folks have suggestions on folks to loop in,
>> > > > that'll be great!
>> > >
>> > > I work with these issues at Meta, and this approach would address a real
>> > > need we have.
>>
>> Thanks for the feedback!
>>
>> > > While livepatch could theoretically solve this problem, it's less suited
>> > > for rapid mitigation for a couple of reasons:
>> > >
>> > > 1) Livepatch rollout is inherently slower due to the blast radius if a
>> > >    bug exists in the livepatch mechanism itself.
>> > >
>> > > 2) It's common to run hundreds of different kernel versions across a
>> > >    fleet. Since livepatch is kernel-specific, a single CVE suddenly
>> > >    requires building and deploying hundreds of individual livepatches—
>> > >    far less practical than a simple sysfs write.
>> >
>> > LP is certainly a more laborous solution. I guess this is quite clear.
>> > It is also much safer option as it deals with all implementation details
>> > like consistency. All that is not done for fun. I am really wondering
>> > how admins are expected to a) know which kernel functions are ok/safe to
>> > disable and b) when it is safe to do so without introducing unsafe
>> > kernel state or introduce an outright bug that way.
>>
>> In a similar way to how they would know if a given livepatch is safe to apply -
>> ideally it would be communicated by the vendor/distro/kernel team.
>
>You have missed my point. KLP takes an extra steps to make sure patching
>a particular function is safe to modify or to put the change into the
>effect.

Safety checks like making sure the patched function is on the stack, or did you
mean something else?

>> "On Debian XX.YY, use the following command to mitigate CVE-AAAA-BBBB:
>>
>>  echo "engage woops -1" > /sys/kernel/security/killswitch/control"
>>
>> > Thiking about this I can see how waiting for an official LP can be time
>> > consuming and sometimes creating those is far from trivial. But would it
>> > make sense to have automated LP creation tooling available that would
>> > allow to return early from a function and relly on the existing
>> > infrastructure to do the right thing?
>>
>> This would definitely help (and in light of how the last couple of weeks played
>> out, the case for livepatches definitely increased), but not all
>> vendors/distros provide livepatches.
>
>The point I've tried to make is that you (as an admin) shouldn't depend
>on your vendor to provide you with an official LP just to disable a
>certain function(ality). That is/should be a trivial case where the LP
>should be ideally generated automagically if you have a tooling
>available. I might be wrong and overlook some complexity here.

Module signing is what stops that approach for me.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha