* Re: [patch] seccomp.2: Note that memory area is read-only [not found] ` <5522A66F.9060606-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> @ 2015-04-18 11:17 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-04-18 23:37 ` Kees Cook 1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) @ 2015-04-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: CC: Kees Cook Cc: Michael Kerrisk, linux-man-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, lkml Hi Kees, Ping! Cheers, Michael On 6 April 2015 at 17:29, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote: > Hi Kees, > > I recently was asked about the point below, and had to go check the code > to be sure, since the man page said nothing. It would be good to have > a confirmation: the seccomp_data buffer supplied to a seccomp BPF program > is read-only, right? (That is, one can't write to the buffer in order to > change the arguments that a system call actually receives.) > > A small man page patch below. > > Cheers, > > Michael > > --- a/man2/seccomp.2 > +++ b/man2/seccomp.2 > @@ -232,15 +232,15 @@ struct sock_filter { /* Filter block */ > }; > .fi > .in > > When executing the instructions, the BPF program operates on the > system call information made available (i.e., use the > .BR BPF_ABS > -addressing mode) as a buffer of the following form: > +addressing mode) as a (read-only) buffer of the following form: > > .in +4n > .nf > struct seccomp_data { > int nr; /* System call number */ > __u32 arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value > (see <linux/audit.h>) */ > > > -- > Michael Kerrisk > Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ > Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ -- Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [patch] seccomp.2: Note that memory area is read-only [not found] ` <5522A66F.9060606-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> 2015-04-18 11:17 ` [patch] seccomp.2: Note that memory area is read-only Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) @ 2015-04-18 23:37 ` Kees Cook [not found] ` <CAGXu5jLriPDQR=BDDe7ztVua+-0wLDd-vsFZt5eu18ThYN69nA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread From: Kees Cook @ 2015-04-18 23:37 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) Cc: linux-man-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, lkml On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 8:29 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote: > Hi Kees, > > I recently was asked about the point below, and had to go check the code > to be sure, since the man page said nothing. It would be good to have > a confirmation: the seccomp_data buffer supplied to a seccomp BPF program > is read-only, right? (That is, one can't write to the buffer in order to > change the arguments that a system call actually receives.) That's correct. If BPF even allows changing the data, it's not copied back to the syscall when it runs. Anything wanting to do things like that would need to use ptrace to catch the call an directly modify the registers before continuing with the call. > > A small man page patch below. Looks good, thanks! -Kees > > Cheers, > > Michael > > --- a/man2/seccomp.2 > +++ b/man2/seccomp.2 > @@ -232,15 +232,15 @@ struct sock_filter { /* Filter block */ > }; > .fi > .in > > When executing the instructions, the BPF program operates on the > system call information made available (i.e., use the > .BR BPF_ABS > -addressing mode) as a buffer of the following form: > +addressing mode) as a (read-only) buffer of the following form: > > .in +4n > .nf > struct seccomp_data { > int nr; /* System call number */ > __u32 arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value > (see <linux/audit.h>) */ > > > -- > Michael Kerrisk > Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ > Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <CAGXu5jLriPDQR=BDDe7ztVua+-0wLDd-vsFZt5eu18ThYN69nA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [patch] seccomp.2: Note that memory area is read-only [not found] ` <CAGXu5jLriPDQR=BDDe7ztVua+-0wLDd-vsFZt5eu18ThYN69nA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> @ 2015-04-19 0:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2015-04-19 7:32 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2015-04-19 0:29 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Kees Cook Cc: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages), linux-man-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, lkml On Sat, Apr 18, 2015 at 04:37:35PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 8:29 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) > <mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote: > > Hi Kees, > > > > I recently was asked about the point below, and had to go check the code > > to be sure, since the man page said nothing. It would be good to have > > a confirmation: the seccomp_data buffer supplied to a seccomp BPF program > > is read-only, right? (That is, one can't write to the buffer in order to > > change the arguments that a system call actually receives.) > > That's correct. If BPF even allows changing the data, it's not copied > back to the syscall when it runs. Anything wanting to do things like > that would need to use ptrace to catch the call an directly modify the > registers before continuing with the call. Today BPF programs can only read from seccomp_data buffer. I think it would be an interesting feature to allow overwrite of syscall arguments by the program on the fly... sometime in the future. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [patch] seccomp.2: Note that memory area is read-only [not found] ` <CAGXu5jLriPDQR=BDDe7ztVua+-0wLDd-vsFZt5eu18ThYN69nA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2015-04-19 0:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov @ 2015-04-19 7:32 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) @ 2015-04-19 7:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Kees Cook Cc: linux-man-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, lkml, Pierre Chifflier On 19 April 2015 at 01:37, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 8:29 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) > <mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote: >> Hi Kees, >> >> I recently was asked about the point below, and had to go check the code >> to be sure, since the man page said nothing. It would be good to have >> a confirmation: the seccomp_data buffer supplied to a seccomp BPF program >> is read-only, right? (That is, one can't write to the buffer in order to >> change the arguments that a system call actually receives.) > > That's correct. If BPF even allows changing the data, it's not copied > back to the syscall when it runs. Anything wanting to do things like > that would need to use ptrace to catch the call an directly modify the > registers before continuing with the call. > >> >> A small man page patch below. > > Looks good, thanks! Thanks, Kees! Cheers, Michael >> --- a/man2/seccomp.2 >> +++ b/man2/seccomp.2 >> @@ -232,15 +232,15 @@ struct sock_filter { /* Filter block */ >> }; >> .fi >> .in >> >> When executing the instructions, the BPF program operates on the >> system call information made available (i.e., use the >> .BR BPF_ABS >> -addressing mode) as a buffer of the following form: >> +addressing mode) as a (read-only) buffer of the following form: >> >> .in +4n >> .nf >> struct seccomp_data { >> int nr; /* System call number */ >> __u32 arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value >> (see <linux/audit.h>) */ >> >> >> -- >> Michael Kerrisk >> Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ >> Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ > > > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security -- Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2015-04-18 11:17 ` [patch] seccomp.2: Note that memory area is read-only Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-04-18 23:37 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jLriPDQR=BDDe7ztVua+-0wLDd-vsFZt5eu18ThYN69nA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-04-19 0:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-04-19 7:32 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
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