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* [PATCH] media: uvcvideo: Fix integer overflow in frame buffer size calculation
@ 2026-08-07 10:14 Noam Ben Shimon
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Noam Ben Shimon @ 2026-08-07 10:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: laurent.pinchart, hansg, mchehab
  Cc: linux-media, linux-kernel, Noam Ben Shimon

In the function uvc_parse_frame(), it recomputes
dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize for uncompressed formats. This helps working
around devices that report it wrong:

	frame->dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize = format->bpp * frame->wWidth
					 * frame->wHeight / 8;

These three arguments originate from the device's own descriptors, and
therefore can be decided by it. bpp is a u8 and wWidth and wHeight are
u16. The expression is evaluated in int, and the maximum value is
255 * 65535 * 65535 (which is roughly 510 times INT_MAX).
A device that declares large dimensions therefore overflows a signed
int here.
The kernel is built using -fno-strict-overflow, so this wraps rather
than being miscompiled, but the wrapped value (which is often negative)
is then divided by 8 and stored in a u32 used as a size.

Two examples for this (using legal field values):

  - 32 bpp, 16384x4096: the product is exactly 2^31 and wraps to
    INT_MIN. After division and conversion to u32 the field has the
    value 4026531840 rather than 268435456.

  - 16 bpp, 16384x16384: the product is exactly 2^32 and wraps to 0.
    The field holds 0, rather than the correct 536870912.

I don't think memory corruption is a consequence of this. The value
reaches uvc_queue_setup() as the vb2 buffer size, and every copy on the
decode path is bounded by buf->length, which uvc_buffer_prepare() gets
from vb2_plane_size() rather than this field. What a wrapped value does
instead is make the driver describe the stream inconsistently.
For an uncompressed format uvc_fixup_video_ctrl() copies it into
ctrl->dwMaxVideoFrameSize unconditionally, and that becomes the
sizeimage reported by VIDIOC_G_FMT. This is while width, height and
bytesperline continue to describe the full frame.
This also makes uvc_video_validate_buffer() mark error on all frames,
because it is comparing bytesused against the same number.

Compute the size in 64-bit, and if the result does not fit in the u32
field then reject the frame descriptor. An uncompressed frame this
large is probably not a real device and rejection is consistent with
the other checks over malformed-descriptors in this function.

Fixes: c0efd232929c ("V4L/DVB (8145a): USB Video Class driver")
Signed-off-by: Noam Ben Shimon <noambs2999@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
index e289cc71ba98..d319368f9d21 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
@@ -296,9 +296,21 @@ static int uvc_parse_frame(struct uvc_device *dev,
 	 * information. For uncompressed formats this can be fixed by computing
 	 * the value from the frame size.
 	 */
-	if (!(format->flags & UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED))
-		frame->dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize = format->bpp * frame->wWidth
-						 * frame->wHeight / 8;
+	if (!(format->flags & UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED)) {
+		u64 bufsize;
+
+		bufsize = (u64)format->bpp * frame->wWidth * frame->wHeight / 8;
+		if (bufsize > U32_MAX) {
+			uvc_dbg(dev, DESCR,
+				"device %d videostreaming interface %d FRAME %u: computed buffer size overflows\n",
+				dev->udev->devnum,
+				alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
+				frame->bFrameIndex);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		frame->dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize = bufsize;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Clamp the default frame interval to the boundaries. A zero

base-commit: f9a2394a23482bfd330911e9c8295b71724feacd
-- 
2.34.1
I was working on a certain device that had a variation of the Linux kernel.
During my work, I had searched for memory mismanagement and misallocation in media 
drivers. At some point I stumbled into the `uvc_driver.c` and found a flaw that is 
not a vulnerability, but still a flaw.  I figured that it was worth letting you 
know rather than shrug it off.

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