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From: Samiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	 Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>,
	Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
	 Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>, Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>,
	 Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	 Vivek Kasireddy <vivek.kasireddy@intel.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>, David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
	 Pasha Tatashin <tatashin@google.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_PUNCH_HOLE
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2026 19:30:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <auZAViCjlzN3gd6g@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bb50fcfa-9d71-4905-a76a-ab7bc149d62b@kernel.org>

On Sat, Oct 31, 2026 at 10:32:32AM +0100, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>On 10/31/26 04:03, Samiullah Khawaja wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 03:43:53PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 10:40 AM Samiullah Khawaja <skhawaja@google.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >On 10/30/26 13:11, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
>>>> >> On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 11:20:30AM +0100, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> We have the exact same situation when userspace maps anonymous folios
>>>> into vfio
>>>> >>> and then desides to MADV_DONTNEED the pages. Or any other memory backend
>>>> that is
>>>> >>> used for such purposes.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> User space must not zap/punch things that might be pinned elsewhere.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> That's not specific to memfd, udmabuf, iommufd or anything else.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> I don't see a reason to make userspace (that should not shoot itself into
>>>> the
>>>> >>> foot) a kernel feature it must activate itself to not shoot itself into
>>>> the foot.
>>>>
>>>> Agreed, for normal use this is userspace's problem. The seal was meant
>>>> for the kernel to cheaply verify at preserve time that nothing was
>>>> punched.
>>>>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The issue is live update doesn't preserve those background punched
>>>> >> folios and now we have created an UAF attack on the kernel across
>>>> >> kexec if you don't do something about it.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> There was some notion here that with the right sealing flags we could
>>>> >> tell if everything was 'live update compatible' and then know that
>>>> >> these attacks are impossible.
>>>> >Just remember that there was any hole punch and refuse to live update this
>>>> instance.
>>>> >
>>>> >We could likely implement "we saw hole punch on a pinned folio" as well, but I
>>>> >don't think that's required initially.
>>>>
>>>> If I understand correctly, you mean recording on the memfd that a hole
>>>> punch happened, and refusing the live update if it did? That would work
>>>> and is much cheaper than what we do today, where iommufd walks all the
>>>> mapped pages at preserve time. For truncate, the existing F_SEAL_SHRINK
>>>> is enough or I can record that also on the memfd. I will send patches
>>>> for this.
>>>
>>> This entire situation continues to give me the willies.  After much
>>> prodding and contemplating (in my own brain), I got a friendly LLM to
>>> report:
>>>
>>> --- begin AI output ---
>>>
>>> IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_FILE uses memfd_pin_folios(). Collapse [MADV_COLLAPSE
>>> or khugepaged] checks the old folio’s reference count, so a pin
>>> acquired before that check makes collapse fail.
>>>
>>>  The problematic interleaving is:
>>>
>>>  1. collapse_file() locks and unmaps the old folio, then passes its
>>> reference-count check (mm/khugepaged.c:2446).
>>>  2. memfd_pin_folios() (mm/gup.c:3483) obtains the old folio from the
>>> file’s XArray and pins it, without taking the folio lock.
>>>  3. Collapse copies the contents and replaces the old cache entries
>>> with the new huge folio. It does not repeat the reference check or
>>> freeze the old count.
>>>  4. IOAS retains the old physical pages; accesses through the file
>>> use the new folio.
>>>
>>> --- end AI output ---
>>>
>>> Is this correct?  I haven't personally verified it.  But this whole
>>
>> Yes, I think this is correct. memfd_pin_folios() pins the folios
>> directly without taking the folio lock. Other page cache lookups lock
>> the folio and recheck folio->mapping, e.g. shmem_get_folio_gfp(). Only
>> memfd_pin_folios() misses it.
>>
>> This scenario is different from punch hole or MADV_DONTNEED where the
>> user decides to remove the pinned memory. Here the kernel is removing
>> the pinned page without the user knowing. Collapse already checks the
>> refcount to avoid this.
>>
>> The recent fix [1] by Chris already takes the folio lock for !uptodate
>> folios. I think we can take the lock unconditionally and recheck
>> folio->mapping, that should fix this. I can send a patch for this fix,
>> if folks agree.
>
>I have another patch from Anthropic on my "rework schlop" queue that should fix
>this:
>
>"mm/gup: pin memfd folios under the folio lock".
>
>
>We'd do just what we do in other context now, which is checking under folio lock
>whether the folio was truncated.
>
>Care to send a proper fix?

Sure, I will send a fix.

Thanks,
Sami


      reply	other threads:[~2026-10-31 19:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-26 22:05 [PATCH 0/2] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_PUNCH_HOLE Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-26 22:05 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-26 22:05 ` [PATCH 2/2] selftests/memfd: add F_SEAL_PUNCH_HOLE tests Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-26 22:46 ` [PATCH 0/2] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_PUNCH_HOLE Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-27 22:55   ` Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-28  3:57     ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-29 23:16       ` Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-30  0:26         ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-30  2:11           ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-30 12:12             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-30 19:52                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-30 10:20 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:11   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:39     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-10-30 15:11       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 17:40       ` Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-30 22:43         ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-31  3:03           ` Samiullah Khawaja
2026-10-31  9:32             ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-10-31 19:30               ` Samiullah Khawaja [this message]

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