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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alex@amutable.com>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount()
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:10:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-227541@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-7-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [High] fs: namespace: broken cross-userns locking in
  attach_recursive_mnt()
--

commit 74ae0b488300551c347e9b244e2d68e31f9a48cf
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount()

This commit adds the MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS flag to move_mount() to allow
attaching detached anonymous mount trees directly into a target mount
namespace specified by an nsfs file descriptor.

> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index b2dc84c0d0d66..b65f1fdd92811 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -2641,6 +2652,7 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct mount *source_mnt,
>  	struct user_namespace *user_ns = ns->user_ns;
>  	struct pinned_mountpoint root = {};
>  	struct mountpoint *shorter = NULL;
> +	struct mnt_namespace *src_ns;
>  	struct mount *child, *p;
>  	struct mount *top;
>  	struct hlist_node *n;
> @@ -2662,6 +2674,9 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct mount *source_mnt,
>  		user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
>  	else
>  		user_ns = ns->user_ns;
> +	src_ns = moving ? NULL : source_mnt->mnt_ns;
> +	if (move_mntns && src_ns)
> +		user_ns = src_ns->user_ns;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Preallocate a mountpoint in case the new mounts need to be
> @@ -2728,8 +2743,12 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct mount *source_mnt,
>  		struct mount *q;
>  		hlist_del_init(&child->mnt_hash);
>  		/* Notice when we are propagating across user namespaces */
> -		if (child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns != user_ns)
> +		if (child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns != user_ns) {
>  			lock_mnt_tree(child);
> +			if ((move_mntns || is_anon_ns(ns)) &&
> +			    list_empty(&child->mnt_expire))
> +				child->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
> +		}
>  		q = __lookup_mnt(&child->mnt_parent->mnt,
>  				 child->mnt_mountpoint);
>  		commit_tree(child);

[Severity: High]
Does overwriting user_ns with src_ns->user_ns break cross-user-namespace
mount locking when source_mnt is attached via MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS?

move_mount_mntns() checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in target_mnt_ns->user_ns
(ns->user_ns), not src_ns->user_ns.  When src_ns->user_ns differs from
ns->user_ns (for example, an anonymous mount created in a less-privileged
user namespace U2 is attached by a manager into a mount namespace owned by
U1) and dest_mnt propagates to a slave mount in a namespace owned by U2,
child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns == user_ns (both U2).
lock_mnt_tree(child) is then skipped on the copy propagated from U1 into
U2, leaving MNT_READONLY, MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and submounts
unlocked in U2.

In the same case, for the primary mount (child == source_mnt) attached
into target_mnt_ns, child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns (U1) != user_ns
(U2) is true, which locks source_mnt with MNT_LOCKED inside the privileged
target_mnt_ns itself.  Also, checking move_mntns unconditionally for all
entries in tree_list sets MNT_LOCKED on the root of every cross-userns
propagated copy (child != source_mnt), preventing slave namespaces from
unmounting propagated mounts that did not cover an existing locked mount.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=6


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22  0:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21  0:08 [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/25] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:09   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:49     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:53       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/25] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 15:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 18:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/25] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/25] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/25] nsfs: Add nsproxy_open_namespace() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/25] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/25] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/25] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:32   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 18:08     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/25] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 19:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 19:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 19:54       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 20:16         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/25] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/25] proc: Implement ->set_rootns() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/25] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:47   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/25] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/25] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/25] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/25] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/25] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 17:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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