Re: [PATCH 10/11] nfsd: make deny mode enforcement more efficient and close races in it

[Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>]

On Fri, 11 Jul 2014 10:31:26 -0700
"Frank Filz" <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com> wrote:

> > The current enforcement of deny modes is both inefficient and scattered
> > across several places, which makes it hard to guarantee atomicity. The
> > inefficiency is a problem now, and the lack of atomicity will mean races
> once
> > the client_mutex is removed.
> > 
> > First, we address the inefficiency. We have to track deny modes on a per-
> > stateid basis to ensure that open downgrades are sane, but when the server
> > goes to enforce them it has to walk the entire list of stateids and check
> > against each one.
> > 
> > Instead of doing that, maintain a per-nfs4_file deny mode. When a file is
> > opened, we simply set any deny bits in that mode that were specified in
> the
> > OPEN call. We can then use that unified deny mode to do a simple check to
> > see whether there are any conflicts without needing to walk the entire
> > stateid list.
> > 
> > The only time we'll need to walk the entire list of stateids is when a
> stateid
> > that has a deny mode on it is being released, or one is having its deny
> mode
> > downgraded. In that case, we must walk the entire list and recalculate the
> > fi_share_deny field. Since deny modes are pretty rare today, this should
> be
> > very rare under normal workloads.
> 
> What we do in Ganesha to avoid walking the list of stateids on release is
> maintain the effective deny (and access) mode not at bits, but as a counter
> for each bit. Thus, to remove a SHARE_ACCESS_READ | SHARE_DENY_WRITE, you
> decrement the counts for access_read and deny_write.
> 
> Frank
> 
> 

Sure, that's another possibility that I considered, but I didn't want
to be bothered with having to add counters for deny modes. In practice
there are *no* clients that use them (aside from pynfs and maybe the
semi-mythical Windows v4.1 client).

With this scheme, deny mode enforcement is pretty darned efficient,
particularly in the common case where there are no deny modes to
enforce.

Any penalty for the use of deny modes is generally paid during the
CLOSE or OPEN_DOWNGRADE on behalf of the client that's using them.
Any RPC from a client that's not won't need to do any extra work
(aside from maybe spinning on the fi_lock while another client is
having to recalculate the fi_share_deny).

-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>