From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] nfsd4: fix gss-proxy 4.1 mounts for some AD principals
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 11:36:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151124183650.GC20456@pad.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1448388306.29102.2.camel@redhat.com>
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 01:05:06PM -0500, Simo Sorce wrote:
> On Tue, 2015-11-24 at 12:18 -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com>
> >
> > The principal name on a gss cred is used to setup the NFSv4.0 callback,
> > which has to have a client principal name to authenticate to.
> >
> > That code wants the name to be in the form servicetype@hostname.
> > rpc.svcgssd passes down such names (and passes down no principal name at
> > all in the case the principal isn't a service principal).
> >
> > gss-proxy always passes down the principal name, and passes it down in
> > the form servicetype/hostname@REALM. So we've been munging the name
> > gss-proxy passes down into the format the NFSv4.0 callback code expects,
> > or throwing away the name if we can't.
> >
> > Since the introduction of the MACH_CRED enforcement in NFSv4.1, we've
> > also been using the principal name to verify that certain operations are
> > done as the same principal as was used on the original EXCHANGE_ID call.
> >
> > For that application, the original name passed down by gss-proxy is also
> > useful.
> >
> > Lack of that name in some cases was causing some kerberized NFSv4.1
> > mount failures in an Active Directory environment.
> >
> > This fix only works in the gss-proxy case. The fix for legacy
> > rpc.svcgssd would be more involved, and rpc.svcgssd already has other
> > problems in the AD case.
> >
> > Reported-and-tested-by: James Ralston <ralston@pobox.com>
> > Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
>
> LGTM, feel free to add ack by me.
Thanks!--b.
>
> > Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 10 +++++++++-
> > include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h | 9 ++++++++-
> > net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 3 +++
> > 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > index 36ad22a15d61..0e685201f0db 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > @@ -1875,6 +1875,10 @@ static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
> > ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
> > if (ret)
> > return ret;
> > + ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
> > + source->cr_raw_principal);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
> > target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
> > target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
> > @@ -1978,6 +1982,9 @@ static bool mach_creds_match(struct nfs4_client *cl, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> > return false;
> > if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
> > return false;
> > + if (cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal)
> > + return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal,
> > + cr->cr_raw_principal);
> > if (!cr->cr_principal)
> > return false;
> > return 0 == strcmp(cl->cl_cred.cr_principal, cr->cr_principal);
> > @@ -2389,7 +2396,8 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> > * Which is a bug, really. Anyway, we can't enforce
> > * MACH_CRED in that case, better to give up now:
> > */
> > - if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal) {
> > + if (!new->cl_cred.cr_principal &&
> > + !new->cl_cred.cr_raw_principal) {
> > status = nfserr_serverfault;
> > goto out_nolock;
> > }
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > index 8d71d6577459..c00f53a4ccdd 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h
> > @@ -23,13 +23,19 @@ struct svc_cred {
> > kgid_t cr_gid;
> > struct group_info *cr_group_info;
> > u32 cr_flavor; /* pseudoflavor */
> > - char *cr_principal; /* for gss */
> > + /* name of form servicetype/hostname@REALM, passed down by
> > + * gss-proxy: */
> > + char *cr_raw_principal;
> > + /* name of form servicetype@hostname, passed down by
> > + * rpc.svcgssd, or computed from the above: */
> > + char *cr_principal;
> > struct gss_api_mech *cr_gss_mech;
> > };
> >
> > static inline void init_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> > {
> > cred->cr_group_info = NULL;
> > + cred->cr_raw_principal = NULL;
> > cred->cr_principal = NULL;
> > cred->cr_gss_mech = NULL;
> > }
> > @@ -38,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void free_svc_cred(struct svc_cred *cred)
> > {
> > if (cred->cr_group_info)
> > put_group_info(cred->cr_group_info);
> > + kfree(cred->cr_raw_principal);
> > kfree(cred->cr_principal);
> > gss_mech_put(cred->cr_gss_mech);
> > init_svc_cred(cred);
> > diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > index 59eeed43eda2..f0c6a8c78a56 100644
> > --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> > @@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
> > if (data->found_creds && client_name.data != NULL) {
> > char *c;
> >
> > + data->creds.cr_raw_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> > + client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +
> > data->creds.cr_principal = kstrndup(client_name.data,
> > client_name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (data->creds.cr_principal) {
>
>
> --
> Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-24 18:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-24 17:18 [PATCH 0/5] fix nfs server handling of principal names J. Bruce Fields
2015-11-24 17:18 ` [PATCH 1/5] svcrpc: move some initialization to common code J. Bruce Fields
2015-11-24 17:18 ` [PATCH 2/5] nfsd: helper for dup of possibly NULL string J. Bruce Fields
2015-11-24 17:18 ` [PATCH 3/5] nfsd: minor consolidation of mach_cred handling code J. Bruce Fields
2015-11-24 17:18 ` [PATCH 4/5] nfsd: fix unlikely NULL deref in mach_creds_match J. Bruce Fields
2015-11-24 17:18 ` [PATCH 5/5] nfsd4: fix gss-proxy 4.1 mounts for some AD principals J. Bruce Fields
2015-11-24 18:05 ` Simo Sorce
2015-11-24 18:36 ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
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