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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev,
	"Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Sasha Levin" <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.6 79/87] selinux: more strict policy parsing
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 15:26:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260825132544.927842506@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260825132541.813800447@linuxfoundation.org>

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>

[ Upstream commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912 ]

Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.

Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    1 
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c         |   37 +++++-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h         |   13 ++
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c   |   18 +--
 security/selinux/ss/constraint.h    |    1 
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      |  196 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |   23 +++-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |    6 -
 8 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, si
 int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len);
 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
 
+/* Maximum supported number of permissions per class */
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
 	struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
 	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
 	int rc;
-	unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers;
+	unsigned int vers = pol->policyvers;
 
 	memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
 	memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
@@ -391,9 +391,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return rc;
 		}
+		/* Read five or more items: source type, target type,
+		 * target class, AV type, and at least one datum.
+		 */
 		items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
-		if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
-			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+		if (items2 < 5 || items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid item count\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		}
@@ -423,6 +426,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 		enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
 
@@ -442,6 +452,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
 			if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+				if (items >= items2) {
+					pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has too many items (%d/%d)\n",
+					       items + 1, items2);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
 				key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
 				datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 				rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -477,13 +492,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	set = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
-		if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
-			set++;
+	if (hweight16(key.specified & ~AVTAB_ENABLED) != 1) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  not exactly one specifier\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (!set || set > 1) {
-		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  more than one specifier\n");
+
+	if (key.specified & ~AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  invalid specifier\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -500,6 +515,10 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return rc;
 		}
+		if (!avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(xperms.specified))
+			pr_warn_once_policyload(pol,
+						"SELinux: avtab: unsupported xperm specifier %#x\n",
+						xperms.specified);
 		rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
 		if (rc) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ struct avtab_key {
 				AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
 #define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
 #define AVTAB_ENABLED		0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK	(AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_XPERMS | \
+				AVTAB_ENABLED)
 	u16 specified;	/* what field is specified */
 };
 
@@ -67,6 +69,17 @@ struct avtab_extended_perms {
 	struct extended_perms_data perms;
 };
 
+static inline bool avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(u8 specified)
+{
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+	case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
 struct avtab_datum {
 	union {
 		u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -198,19 +198,12 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *dat
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
-{
-	if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-
 int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
 	__le32 buf[3];
-	u32 len;
+	u32 len, val;
 	int rc;
 
 	booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -222,11 +215,12 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, s
 		goto err;
 
 	booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-	booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+	if (!val_is_boolean(val))
 		goto err;
+	booldatum->state = (int)val;
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 
@@ -240,6 +234,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, s
 
 	return 0;
 err:
+	pr_err("SELinux: conditional: failed to read boolean\n");
 	cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -360,7 +355,8 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct poli
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+	if (expr->expr_type == COND_BOOL &&
+	    (expr->boolean == 0 || expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim)) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct constraint_expr {
 	u32 op;			/* operator */
 
 	struct ebitmap names;	/* names */
+	/* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
 	struct type_set *type_names;
 
 	struct constraint_expr *next;   /* next expression */
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -633,13 +633,11 @@ static int sens_index(void *key, void *d
 	levdatum = datum;
 	p = datap;
 
-	if (!levdatum->isalias) {
-		if (!levdatum->level.sens ||
-		    levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
-			return -EINVAL;
+	if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!levdatum->isalias)
 		p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level.sens - 1] = key;
-	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -652,12 +650,11 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *da
 	catdatum = datum;
 	p = datap;
 
-	if (!catdatum->isalias) {
-		if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
-			return -EINVAL;
+	if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!catdatum->isalias)
 		p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
-	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1120,6 +1117,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p,
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1154,6 +1154,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1303,7 +1306,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	__le32 buf[6];
-	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel;
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
 	int rc;
 
 	cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1316,8 +1319,16 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-	cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (val > U16_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+	cladatum->value = val;
 
 	rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1383,16 +1394,59 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 
-		cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-		cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+			cladatum->default_user = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+			cladatum->default_role = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+		case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+			cladatum->default_range = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
-		cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+			cladatum->default_type = val;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto bad;
+		}
 	}
 
 	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
@@ -1402,6 +1456,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
 	return 0;
 bad:
 	cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid class\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1593,7 +1649,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p,
 	struct level_datum *levdatum;
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[2];
-	u32 len;
+	u32 len, val;
 
 	levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!levdatum)
@@ -1604,7 +1660,11 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p,
 		goto bad;
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-	levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+		goto bad;
+	levdatum->isalias = val;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1620,6 +1680,8 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p,
 	return 0;
 bad:
 	sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid sensitivity\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1629,7 +1691,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p,
 	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[3];
-	u32 len;
+	u32 len, val;
 
 	catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!catdatum)
@@ -1641,7 +1703,11 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p,
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-	catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+		goto bad;
+	catdatum->isalias = val;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1653,6 +1719,8 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p,
 	return 0;
 bad:
 	cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid category\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1834,7 +1902,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p
 	struct mls_range *r = NULL;
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[2];
-	u32 i, nel;
+	u32 i, nel, val;
 
 	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
 		return 0;
@@ -1865,7 +1933,11 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p
 			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
-			rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (val > U16_MAX)
+				goto out;
+			rt->target_class = val;
 		} else
 			rt->target_class = p->process_class;
 
@@ -1902,6 +1974,8 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p
 out:
 	kfree(rt);
 	kfree(r);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid range\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1910,7 +1984,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_co
 	struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
 	struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
 	char *name = NULL;
-	u32 len, stype, otype;
+	u32 len, stype, otype, val;
 	__le32 buf[4];
 	int rc;
 
@@ -1929,9 +2003,17 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_co
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
 	stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, stype))
+		goto out;
 	key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-	key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, key.ttype))
+		goto out;
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+		goto out;
+	key.tclass = val;
 	key.name = name;
 
 	otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
@@ -1986,6 +2068,9 @@ out:
 	kfree(ft);
 	kfree(name);
 	kfree(datum);
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid compat filename transition\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1994,7 +2079,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(st
 	struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
 	struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
 	char *name = NULL;
-	u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i;
+	u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i, val;
 	u16 tclass;
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	int rc;
@@ -2014,8 +2099,15 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(st
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
 	ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-	tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, ttype))
+		goto out;
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+		goto out;
+	tclass = val;
 
 	ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 	if (ndatum == 0) {
@@ -2045,6 +2137,10 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(st
 
 		datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, datum->otype))
+			goto out;
+
 		dst = &datum->next;
 	}
 
@@ -2076,6 +2172,9 @@ out:
 		ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
 		kfree(datum);
 	}
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid filename transition\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2123,7 +2222,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct po
 static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	int rc;
-	u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
+	u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2, val;
 	__le32 buf[1];
 	struct ocontext *l, *c;
 	struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
@@ -2193,7 +2292,11 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 
-			newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (val > U16_MAX || (val != 0 && !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val)))
+				goto out;
+			newc->v.sclass = val;
 			rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p,
 						       fp);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2230,6 +2333,9 @@ out:
 	}
 	ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
 
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid genfs\n");
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2238,7 +2344,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb
 {
 	int rc;
 	unsigned int i;
-	u32 j, nel, len;
+	u32 j, nel, len, val;
 	__be64 prefixbuf[1];
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	struct ocontext *l, *c;
@@ -2302,11 +2408,25 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb
 				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
-				c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-				c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-				c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
-							       p, fp);
+
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				if (val > U8_MAX)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.protocol = val;
+				val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				if (val > U16_MAX)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.low_port = val;
+				val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+				if (val > U16_MAX)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.high_port = val;
+				if (c->u.port.low_port == 0 ||
+				    c->u.port.low_port > c->u.port.high_port)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2424,6 +2544,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid ocon\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2438,7 +2560,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, st
 	struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm;
+	u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm, val;
 
 	char *policydb_str;
 	const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
@@ -2624,7 +2746,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, st
 			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 			if (rc)
 				goto bad;
-			rtk->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (val > U16_MAX)
+				goto bad;
+			rtk->tclass = val;
 		} else
 			rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
 
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct class_datum {
 /* Role attributes */
 struct role_datum {
 	u32 value; /* internal role value */
-	u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+	u32 bounds; /* boundary of role, 0 for none */
 	struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
 	struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
 };
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ struct role_allow {
 /* Type attributes */
 struct type_datum {
 	u32 value; /* internal type value */
-	u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+	u32 bounds; /* boundary of type, 0 for none */
+	/* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
 	unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
 	unsigned char attribute; /* attribute ?*/
 };
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ struct type_datum {
 /* User attributes */
 struct user_datum {
 	u32 value; /* internal user value */
-	u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+	u32 bounds; /* bounds of user, 0 for none */
 	struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
 	struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
 	struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ struct ocontext {
 		} ibendport;
 	} u;
 	union {
-		u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+		u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs (can be 0 for wildcard) */
 		u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
 	} v;
 	struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
@@ -386,9 +387,23 @@ static inline char *sym_name(struct poli
 	return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
 }
 
+static inline bool val_is_boolean(u32 value)
+{
+	return value == 0 || value == 1;
+}
+
 extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
 
 extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
 extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
 
+#define pr_warn_once_policyload(policy, fmt, ...)    \
+	do {                                         \
+		static const void *prev_policy__;    \
+		if (prev_policy__ != policy) {       \
+			pr_warn(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+			prev_policy__ = policy;      \
+		}                                    \
+	} while (0)
+
 #endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -445,8 +445,6 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k
 	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
 	char **permission_names = args;
 
-	BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
-
 	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -465,7 +463,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(stru
 	char *tclass_name;
 	char *scontext_name = NULL;
 	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
-	char *permission_names[32];
+	char *permission_names[SEL_VEC_MAX];
 	int index;
 	u32 length;
 	bool need_comma = false;
@@ -506,7 +504,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(stru
 			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
 			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
 
-	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+	for (index = 0; index < SEL_VEC_MAX; index++) {
 		u32 mask = (1 << index);
 
 		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-25 13:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-25 13:25 [PATCH 6.6 00/87] 6.6.154-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 01/87] PCI: host-generic: Fix NULL pointer dereference on 32-bit CAM systems Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 02/87] Bluetooth: RFCOMM: take rfcomm_mutex for the deferred setup accept Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 03/87] rndis_host: add overflow check in rndis_rx_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 04/87] NTB: ntb_netdev: Preserve RX queue depth on allocation failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 05/87] serial: amba-pl011: synchronize DMA teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 06/87] perf: Unify perf_event_free_task() / perf_event_exit_task_context() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 07/87] perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 08/87] serial: qcom-geni: fix TX DMA buffer flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 09/87] serial: sc16is7xx: fix copy-paste errors in EFR_SWFLOWx_BIT constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 10/87] serial: sc16is7xx: convert bitmask definitions to use BIT() macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 11/87] serial: sc16is7xx: rename EFR mutex with generic name Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 12/87] serial: sc16is7xx: use guards for simple mutex locks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 13/87] serial: sc16is7xx: enable THRI before filling TX FIFO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 14/87] inet: frags: add inet_frag_putn() helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 15/87] ipv4: frags: remove ipq_put() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 16/87] inet: frags: change inet_frag_kill() to defer refcount updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 17/87] inet: frags: save a pair of atomic operations in reassembly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 18/87] inet: frags: publish queues before arming timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 19/87] mmc: atmel-mci: Fix use-after-free in atmci_remove due to race condition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 20/87] xfs: dont use a xfs_log_iovec for ri_buf in log recovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 21/87] xfs: bounds-check buffer log items dirty bitmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 22/87] ALSA: dummy: Check card index validity at probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 23/87] ocfs2: fix missing metadata reservation for large xattrs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 24/87] null_blk: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds when zone_size is 0 or overflows Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 25/87] kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 26/87] ext4: stop retrying saturated xattr cache entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 27/87] ext4: clear error before retrying inode xattr space fallback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 28/87] xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 29/87] gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 30/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Free all memory if cp_init() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 31/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 32/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Calculate idal length based on idaw type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 33/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Implement a crw lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 34/87] drm/amd/amdgpu: disable ASPM in some situations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 35/87] drm/amd/display: Fix BT2020 YCbCr limited/full range input Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 36/87] drm/amd/display: fix BT.2020 YCbCr limited output CSC matrix Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 37/87] drm/amdgpu: check ASPM on the dGPU host link Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 38/87] nfc: digital: clamp SENSF_RES length to the destination buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 39/87] nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 40/87] nfc: microread: validate target discovery payload lengths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 41/87] nfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 42/87] nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in TLV parsers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 43/87] nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 44/87] nfc: pn533: purge fragmented skbs during cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 45/87] nfc: st21nfca: validate ATR_REQ length against the received frame Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 46/87] nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 47/87] nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 48/87] nfc: nci: free destination parameters when closing a connection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 49/87] ndisc: ndisc_send_redirect() cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 50/87] Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 51/87] libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 52/87] ipv4: reject undersized MTUs in ip_do_fragment() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 53/87] ipv6: fix use-after-free in ip6_finish_output2() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 54/87] nvmet-auth: zero the AUTH_RECEIVE response buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 55/87] nvmet-fc: fix invalid free in LS IOD error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 56/87] nvmet-tcp: Do not WARN on remotely-controlled oversized SGL allocations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 57/87] ASoC: sof: pcm: use snd_pcm_direction_name() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 58/87] ASoC: SOF: Relocate and rework functionality for PCM stream freeing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 59/87] ASoC: SOF: pcm: Move period/buffer configuration print after platform open Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 60/87] ASoC: SOF: pcm: Add snd_sof_pcm specific wrappers for dev_dbg() and dev_err() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 61/87] ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 62/87] ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 63/87] mptcp: pm: fix data race in add_addr timer callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 64/87] HID: magicmouse: fix battery reporting for Bluetooth Magic Trackpad USB-C Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 65/87] HID: magicmouse: do not keep a stale msc->input if no input is claimed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 66/87] HID: magicmouse: Prevent out-of-bounds (OOB) read during DOUBLE_REPORT_ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 67/87] HID: core: fix OOB read of field->usage in hid_set_field() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 68/87] xfrm: fix sk_dst_cache double-free in xfrm_user_policy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 69/87] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix advertising data UAFs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 70/87] Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR FMB-Ps internal keyboard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 71/87] Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 72/87] mptcp: pm: fix memory leak from alloc-during-teardown race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 73/87] selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/policydb.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 74/87] selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/policydb.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 75/87] selinux: use known type instead of void pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 76/87] selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 77/87] selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 78/87] selinux: use u16 for security classes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 80/87] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 81/87] selinux: require a classs permission values to cover its " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 82/87] HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 83/87] HID: core: fix number/pointer type confusion on long items Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 84/87] HID: sensor: custom: Fix use-after-free in enable_sensor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 85/87] HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 86/87] Bluetooth: hci_event: fix LE list UAF on reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 87/87] Bluetooth: hci_event: validate LE Set CIG Parameters response Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 19:32 ` [PATCH 6.6 00/87] 6.6.154-rc1 review Pavel Machek
2026-08-25 21:59 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-08-26  0:12 ` Shuah Khan
2026-08-26  6:22 ` Ron Economos
2026-08-26  9:46 ` Wentao Guan
2026-08-26 10:06 ` Barry K. Nathan
2026-08-26 10:32 ` Brett A C Sheffield
2026-08-26 11:53 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-08-26 12:04 ` Peter Schneider

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