From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev,
"Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Sasha Levin" <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.6 79/87] selinux: more strict policy parsing
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 15:26:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260825132544.927842506@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260825132541.813800447@linuxfoundation.org>
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912 ]
Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.
Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 37 +++++-
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 13 ++
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 18 +--
security/selinux/ss/constraint.h | 1
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 23 +++-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 -
8 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, si
int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len);
int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+/* Maximum supported number of permissions per class */
#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
int rc;
- unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers;
+ unsigned int vers = pol->policyvers;
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
@@ -391,9 +391,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
+ /* Read five or more items: source type, target type,
+ * target class, AV type, and at least one datum.
+ */
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
- if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
- pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ if (items2 < 5 || items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid item count\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -423,6 +426,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
@@ -442,6 +452,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+ if (items >= items2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has too many items (%d/%d)\n",
+ items + 1, items2);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -477,13 +492,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
return -EINVAL;
}
- set = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
- if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
- set++;
+ if (hweight16(key.specified & ~AVTAB_ENABLED) != 1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: not exactly one specifier\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- if (!set || set > 1) {
- pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+
+ if (key.specified & ~AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid specifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -500,6 +515,10 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, str
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
+ if (!avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(xperms.specified))
+ pr_warn_once_policyload(pol,
+ "SELinux: avtab: unsupported xperm specifier %#x\n",
+ xperms.specified);
rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ struct avtab_key {
AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_XPERMS | \
+ AVTAB_ENABLED)
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
@@ -67,6 +69,17 @@ struct avtab_extended_perms {
struct extended_perms_data perms;
};
+static inline bool avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(u8 specified)
+{
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+ case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
struct avtab_datum {
union {
u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -198,19 +198,12 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *dat
return 0;
}
-static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
-{
- if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
int rc;
booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -222,11 +215,12 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, s
goto err;
booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = -EINVAL;
- if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
goto err;
+ booldatum->state = (int)val;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
@@ -240,6 +234,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, s
return 0;
err:
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional: failed to read boolean\n");
cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
@@ -360,7 +355,8 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct poli
return 0;
}
- if (expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+ if (expr->expr_type == COND_BOOL &&
+ (expr->boolean == 0 || expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim)) {
pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
return 0;
}
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct constraint_expr {
u32 op; /* operator */
struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+ /* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
struct type_set *type_names;
struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -633,13 +633,11 @@ static int sens_index(void *key, void *d
levdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!levdatum->isalias) {
- if (!levdatum->level.sens ||
- levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!levdatum->isalias)
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level.sens - 1] = key;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -652,12 +650,11 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *da
catdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!catdatum->isalias) {
- if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!catdatum->isalias)
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -1120,6 +1117,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p,
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1154,6 +1154,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
@@ -1303,7 +1306,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
char *key = NULL;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
__le32 buf[6];
- u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel;
+ u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
int rc;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1316,8 +1319,16 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->value = val;
rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
@@ -1383,16 +1394,59 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ cladatum->default_user = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ cladatum->default_role = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+ cladatum->default_range = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ cladatum->default_type = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
@@ -1402,6 +1456,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p
return 0;
bad:
cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid class\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1593,7 +1649,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p,
struct level_datum *levdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!levdatum)
@@ -1604,7 +1660,11 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p,
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+ goto bad;
+ levdatum->isalias = val;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1620,6 +1680,8 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p,
return 0;
bad:
sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid sensitivity\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1629,7 +1691,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p,
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!catdatum)
@@ -1641,7 +1703,11 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p,
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+ goto bad;
+ catdatum->isalias = val;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1653,6 +1719,8 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p,
return 0;
bad:
cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid category\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1834,7 +1902,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p
struct mls_range *r = NULL;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 i, nel;
+ u32 i, nel, val;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
return 0;
@@ -1865,7 +1933,11 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
- rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ rt->target_class = val;
} else
rt->target_class = p->process_class;
@@ -1902,6 +1974,8 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p
out:
kfree(rt);
kfree(r);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid range\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1910,7 +1984,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_co
struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, stype, otype;
+ u32 len, stype, otype, val;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc;
@@ -1929,9 +2003,17 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_co
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, stype))
+ goto out;
key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, key.ttype))
+ goto out;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+ goto out;
+ key.tclass = val;
key.name = name;
otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
@@ -1986,6 +2068,9 @@ out:
kfree(ft);
kfree(name);
kfree(datum);
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid compat filename transition\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1994,7 +2079,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(st
struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i;
+ u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i, val;
u16 tclass;
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
@@ -2014,8 +2099,15 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(st
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, ttype))
+ goto out;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+ goto out;
+ tclass = val;
ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (ndatum == 0) {
@@ -2045,6 +2137,10 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(st
datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, datum->otype))
+ goto out;
+
dst = &datum->next;
}
@@ -2076,6 +2172,9 @@ out:
ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
kfree(datum);
}
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid filename transition\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2123,7 +2222,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct po
static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
- u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
+ u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2, val;
__le32 buf[1];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
@@ -2193,7 +2292,11 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p
if (rc)
goto out;
- newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX || (val != 0 && !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val)))
+ goto out;
+ newc->v.sclass = val;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p,
fp);
if (rc)
@@ -2230,6 +2333,9 @@ out:
}
ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid genfs\n");
+
return rc;
}
@@ -2238,7 +2344,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb
{
int rc;
unsigned int i;
- u32 j, nel, len;
+ u32 j, nel, len, val;
__be64 prefixbuf[1];
__le32 buf[3];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
@@ -2302,11 +2408,25 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
if (rc)
goto out;
- c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
- p, fp);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U8_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.protocol = val;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.low_port = val;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.high_port = val;
+ if (c->u.port.low_port == 0 ||
+ c->u.port.low_port > c->u.port.high_port)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
@@ -2424,6 +2544,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb
}
rc = 0;
out:
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid ocon\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2438,7 +2560,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, st
struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
int rc;
__le32 buf[4];
- u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm;
+ u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm, val;
char *policydb_str;
const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
@@ -2624,7 +2746,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, st
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
- rtk->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+ rtk->tclass = val;
} else
rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct class_datum {
/* Role attributes */
struct role_datum {
u32 value; /* internal role value */
- u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of role, 0 for none */
struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
};
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ struct role_allow {
/* Type attributes */
struct type_datum {
u32 value; /* internal type value */
- u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of type, 0 for none */
+ /* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
unsigned char attribute; /* attribute ?*/
};
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ struct type_datum {
/* User attributes */
struct user_datum {
u32 value; /* internal user value */
- u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+ u32 bounds; /* bounds of user, 0 for none */
struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ struct ocontext {
} ibendport;
} u;
union {
- u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs (can be 0 for wildcard) */
u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
} v;
struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
@@ -386,9 +387,23 @@ static inline char *sym_name(struct poli
return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
}
+static inline bool val_is_boolean(u32 value)
+{
+ return value == 0 || value == 1;
+}
+
extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+#define pr_warn_once_policyload(policy, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ static const void *prev_policy__; \
+ if (prev_policy__ != policy) { \
+ pr_warn(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+ prev_policy__ = policy; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -445,8 +445,6 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k
struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
char **permission_names = args;
- BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
-
permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
return 0;
@@ -465,7 +463,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(stru
char *tclass_name;
char *scontext_name = NULL;
char *tcontext_name = NULL;
- char *permission_names[32];
+ char *permission_names[SEL_VEC_MAX];
int index;
u32 length;
bool need_comma = false;
@@ -506,7 +504,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(stru
"scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
- for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ for (index = 0; index < SEL_VEC_MAX; index++) {
u32 mask = (1 << index);
if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-25 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-25 13:25 [PATCH 6.6 00/87] 6.6.154-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 01/87] PCI: host-generic: Fix NULL pointer dereference on 32-bit CAM systems Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 02/87] Bluetooth: RFCOMM: take rfcomm_mutex for the deferred setup accept Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 03/87] rndis_host: add overflow check in rndis_rx_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 04/87] NTB: ntb_netdev: Preserve RX queue depth on allocation failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 05/87] serial: amba-pl011: synchronize DMA teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 06/87] perf: Unify perf_event_free_task() / perf_event_exit_task_context() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 07/87] perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 08/87] serial: qcom-geni: fix TX DMA buffer flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 09/87] serial: sc16is7xx: fix copy-paste errors in EFR_SWFLOWx_BIT constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 10/87] serial: sc16is7xx: convert bitmask definitions to use BIT() macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 11/87] serial: sc16is7xx: rename EFR mutex with generic name Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 12/87] serial: sc16is7xx: use guards for simple mutex locks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 13/87] serial: sc16is7xx: enable THRI before filling TX FIFO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 14/87] inet: frags: add inet_frag_putn() helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 15/87] ipv4: frags: remove ipq_put() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 16/87] inet: frags: change inet_frag_kill() to defer refcount updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 17/87] inet: frags: save a pair of atomic operations in reassembly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 18/87] inet: frags: publish queues before arming timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 19/87] mmc: atmel-mci: Fix use-after-free in atmci_remove due to race condition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 20/87] xfs: dont use a xfs_log_iovec for ri_buf in log recovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 21/87] xfs: bounds-check buffer log items dirty bitmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 22/87] ALSA: dummy: Check card index validity at probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 23/87] ocfs2: fix missing metadata reservation for large xattrs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 24/87] null_blk: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds when zone_size is 0 or overflows Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 25/87] kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 26/87] ext4: stop retrying saturated xattr cache entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 27/87] ext4: clear error before retrying inode xattr space fallback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 28/87] xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 29/87] gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 30/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Free all memory if cp_init() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 31/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 32/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Calculate idal length based on idaw type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 33/87] s390/vfio_ccw: Implement a crw lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 34/87] drm/amd/amdgpu: disable ASPM in some situations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 35/87] drm/amd/display: Fix BT2020 YCbCr limited/full range input Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:25 ` [PATCH 6.6 36/87] drm/amd/display: fix BT.2020 YCbCr limited output CSC matrix Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 37/87] drm/amdgpu: check ASPM on the dGPU host link Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 38/87] nfc: digital: clamp SENSF_RES length to the destination buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 39/87] nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 40/87] nfc: microread: validate target discovery payload lengths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 41/87] nfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 42/87] nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in TLV parsers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 43/87] nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 44/87] nfc: pn533: purge fragmented skbs during cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 45/87] nfc: st21nfca: validate ATR_REQ length against the received frame Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 46/87] nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 47/87] nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 48/87] nfc: nci: free destination parameters when closing a connection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 49/87] ndisc: ndisc_send_redirect() cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 50/87] Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 51/87] libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 52/87] ipv4: reject undersized MTUs in ip_do_fragment() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 53/87] ipv6: fix use-after-free in ip6_finish_output2() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 54/87] nvmet-auth: zero the AUTH_RECEIVE response buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 55/87] nvmet-fc: fix invalid free in LS IOD error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 56/87] nvmet-tcp: Do not WARN on remotely-controlled oversized SGL allocations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 57/87] ASoC: sof: pcm: use snd_pcm_direction_name() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 58/87] ASoC: SOF: Relocate and rework functionality for PCM stream freeing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 59/87] ASoC: SOF: pcm: Move period/buffer configuration print after platform open Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 60/87] ASoC: SOF: pcm: Add snd_sof_pcm specific wrappers for dev_dbg() and dev_err() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 61/87] ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 62/87] ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 63/87] mptcp: pm: fix data race in add_addr timer callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 64/87] HID: magicmouse: fix battery reporting for Bluetooth Magic Trackpad USB-C Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 65/87] HID: magicmouse: do not keep a stale msc->input if no input is claimed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 66/87] HID: magicmouse: Prevent out-of-bounds (OOB) read during DOUBLE_REPORT_ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 67/87] HID: core: fix OOB read of field->usage in hid_set_field() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 68/87] xfrm: fix sk_dst_cache double-free in xfrm_user_policy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 69/87] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix advertising data UAFs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 70/87] Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR FMB-Ps internal keyboard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 71/87] Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 72/87] mptcp: pm: fix memory leak from alloc-during-teardown race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 73/87] selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/policydb.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 74/87] selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/policydb.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 75/87] selinux: use known type instead of void pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 76/87] selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 77/87] selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 78/87] selinux: use u16 for security classes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 80/87] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 81/87] selinux: require a classs permission values to cover its " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 82/87] HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 83/87] HID: core: fix number/pointer type confusion on long items Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 84/87] HID: sensor: custom: Fix use-after-free in enable_sensor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 85/87] HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 86/87] Bluetooth: hci_event: fix LE list UAF on reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 13:26 ` [PATCH 6.6 87/87] Bluetooth: hci_event: validate LE Set CIG Parameters response Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-25 19:32 ` [PATCH 6.6 00/87] 6.6.154-rc1 review Pavel Machek
2026-08-25 21:59 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-08-26 0:12 ` Shuah Khan
2026-08-26 6:22 ` Ron Economos
2026-08-26 9:46 ` Wentao Guan
2026-08-26 10:06 ` Barry K. Nathan
2026-08-26 10:32 ` Brett A C Sheffield
2026-08-26 11:53 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-08-26 12:04 ` Peter Schneider
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