[PATCH 6.6 80/87] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>

[ Upstream commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd ]

perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image.  security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write.  The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.

Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs.  Well-formed policies are unaffected.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1120,6 +1120,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p,
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
 		goto bad;
+	/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
+	if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)